Abstract
Some of the most interesting and challenging puzzles concerning the logic of ‘ought’-statements have to do with “iffy oughts” —sentences that contain an ‘if’ as well as an ‘ought’ (or appropriate equivalent terms). Each of these sentences is an iffy ought:
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(1)
If it is his most stringent prima facie duty, then he ought to doit.
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(2)
If she promised to come for lunch, then she should come for lunch.
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(3)
If you want to gain a reputation for honesty, then you should give correct change.
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(4)
If rain would make the flowers grow, then there ought to be rain.
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Notes to Chapter 4
Although a number of deontic logicians have used the term ‘detachment’ in the relevant sense, I first came across the current use of ‘factual detachment’, as well as the current use of ‘deontic detachment’ in P. S. Greenspan’s ‘Conditional Oughts and Hypothetical Imperatives,’ The Journal of Philosophy LXXII (1975), 259–276.
By Arthur Prior in ‘The Paradoxes of Derived Obligation,’ Mind 63 (1954), 64–65.
My use of ‘overrides’ derives from Chisholm. See his ‘The Ethics of Requirement,’ The American Philosophical Quarterly 1 (1964), 148. Chisholm, in turn, cites W. D. Ross, The Right and the Good (New York: Oxford University Press, 1930), p. 18.
Prior, op. cit.
Once again, I am indebted to David Lewis. My proposal is an agent- and time-relativized version of the concept of conditional obligation he presents in Counterfactuals (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1973), p. 100. See also his ‘Semantic Analyses for Dyadic Deontic Logic,’ in Logical Theory and Semantic Analysis, ed. by Soren Stenlund (Dordrecht: Reidel, 1974), pp. 1–14.
See, for example, John Robison, ‘Who, What, Where and When: A Note on Deontic Logic,’ Philosophical Studies 15 (1964), 89–92.
A good discussion of this point may be found in Hans Lenk, ‘Varieties of Commitment,’ Theory and Decision 9 (1978), 17–37.
See esp. pp. 22–25.
See also Peter L. Mott, ‘On Chisholm’s Paradox,’ Journal of Philosophical Logic 2 (1973), 197–211
Judith W. DeCew, ‘Conditional Obligation and Counterfactuals,’ Journal of Philosophical Logic 10 (1981), 55–72.
Analysis 24 (1963), 33–36.
For an excellent review of some of the main treatments of Chisholm’s puzzle, as well as a fine bibliography of recent work in deontic logic in general, see James E. Tomberlin, ‘Contrary-to-Duty Imperatives and Conditional Obligation,’ Noûs XV (1981), 357–375.
Two other extremely useful works are: Azizah al-Hibri, Deontic Logic: A Comprehensive Appraisal and a New Proposal (Washington: University press of America, 1978)
Risto Hilpinen (ed.), Deontic Logic: Introductory and Systematic Readings (Dordrecht: Reidel, 1971).
One of the most insightful discussions of Chisholm’s problem may be found in Lennart Aqvist, ‘Good Samaritans, Contrary to Duty Imperatives, and Epistemic Obligations,’ Noûs 1 (1967), 361–379.
For example, Peter Mott, in ‘On Chisholm’s Paradox,’ op. cit.
Criticism along these lines is also presented in DeCew’s ‘Conditional Obligation and Counterfactuals,’ op. cit. For further criticism of Mott’s approach, see Tomberlin’s ‘Contrary to Duty Imperatives and Conditional Obligation, op. cit.
I don’t claim to be the first to see things in this way. See, for example, Bas van Fraassen, ‘The Logic of Conditional Obligation,’ Journal of Philosophical Logic 1 (1972), 417–438
David Lewis, ‘Semantic Analyses for Dyadic Deontic Logic,’ op. cit
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© 1986 D. Reidel Publishing Company, Dordrecht, Holland
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Feldman, F. (1986). Basic Iffy Oughts. In: Doing the Best We Can. Philosophical Studies Series in Philosophy, vol 35. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-009-4570-8_4
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