Abstract
Propositions have played a central role in many different metaphysical, epistemological, and linguistic theories. As a result the term ‘proposition’ has been used to play many different roles, though there are three principle roles it plays in contemporary philosophy. Propositions, it has been said, are the meanings of our sentences. They are also the objects of our thoughts and attitudes, and the prime bearers of truth and falsity. We can classify these three roles, meanings of sentences, objects of thought, and bearers of truth values, as the linguistic, epistemic, and metaphysical roles, respectively. Many philosophers have argued that one and the same kind of object plays all three roles but there are reasons to doubt this. My interest here however is mainly in metaphysical propositions, in particular, my interest is in a theory of propositions that includes propositions that contain individuals as constituents, so-called ‘singular propositions’. I shall begin with a brief discussion of why one would adopt such a theory of propositions, then consider some of the objections that could be raised against such a view, and finally, look at some of the modal consequences for such a position.
This paper appears in a collection of papers gathered to recognize Ed Gettier’s contribu-tion to contemporary philosophy. Although this paper does not deal directly with Ed’s most famous contribution to philosophy, it docs, I hope, represent a small part of Ed’s most important contribution, namely, his ability to teach and help his students and colleagues do philosophy. I spent many hours with Ed drinking coffee and discussing philosophy, and I am grateful for the generous amount of time he was willing to give me. Of course, Ed is responsible for the result, and thus any failings I might have as a philosopher can be traced to Ed and are not the result of any lack of ability on my part. This applies to this paper for although Ed may never have seen it, he played a significant causal role in its production.
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© 1988 Kluwer Academic Publishers
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Fitch, G.W. (1988). The Nature of Singular Propositions. In: Austin, D.F. (eds) Philosophical Analysis. Philosophical Studies Series, vol 39. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-009-2909-8_17
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-009-2909-8_17
Publisher Name: Springer, Dordrecht
Print ISBN: 978-1-4020-3150-2
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