Abstract
There is a widespread impression that there is a special intuitionistic sense of disjunction, stronger than the classical sense. (There is a similar belief in a special intuitionistic sense of existential quantification; the fundamental issues involved are the same, as I hope to bring out.) The impression is mistaken—on the interpretation most favorable to the idea that there is a special intuitionistic disjunction, intuitionistic disjunction is weaker than classical—and it is philosophically pernicious. Early work by Belnap and some of his colleagues helps to show this.
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Hazen, A.P. (1990). The Myth of the Intuitionistic “OR”. In: Dunn, J.M., Gupta, A. (eds) Truth or Consequences. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-009-0681-5_12
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