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Vital Forces and Organisms in the Opus postumum

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Kant on Proper Science

Part of the book series: Studies in German Idealism ((SIGI,volume 15))

Abstract

In the Opus postumum, Kant takes vital forces to be fundamental to biological inquiry. The concept of vital force was much debated in eighteenth-century biology. I analyze some of these debates and reconstruct Kant’s views on vital forces. Kant could not accept the existence of teleological agents in nature. In the Opus postumum, he reinterprets vital forces as regulative ideas.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    Lenoir 1989, 22, 24. See also Zammito 2012.

  2. 2.

    Lenoir 1980, 83. Kant himself praises Blumenbach’s work in these terms. See AA 11: 184.

  3. 3.

    Richards 2000; Zammito 2012.

  4. 4.

    Adickes 1920, 216–235.

  5. 5.

    Mathieu 1989, 209–213.

  6. 6.

    Lenoir 1989.

  7. 7.

    Richards 2000 is titled: “Kant and Blumenbach on the Bildungstrieb: A Historical Misunderstanding”. See also Zammito 2006, 2012.

  8. 8.

    AA 5: 424.

  9. 9.

    Lenoir 1989; Richards 2002.

  10. 10.

    This, at least, is what Reil 1795, 48, claims.

  11. 11.

    Blumenbach’s works influenced Alexander von Humboldt, Karl Friedrich Kielmeyer, Heinrich Friedrich Link, Georg Reinhold Treviranus and Christoph Girtanner. On the possible influence of Kant’s philosophy of biology on these biologists, see Lenoir 1981, 111–205.

  12. 12.

    Kant was probably familiar with the first and second edition of Über den Bildungstrieb, published in 1781 and 1789. I will refer to both editions in the following. Blumenbach first published his ideas on the Bildungstrieb in the Göttingisches Magazin der Wissenschaften und Litteratur 1780.

  13. 13.

    Blumenbach 1789, 15–19. For discussion of Blumenbach’s concept of Bildungstrieb, to which my account is indebted, see Lenoir 1980, 82–87 and Richards 2000, 16–21.

  14. 14.

    Blumenbach 1789, 5–6.

  15. 15.

    My translation, with help from Richards translation of the first edition. Richards 2000, 18.

  16. 16.

    Blumenbach 1789, 66–68, 57–61, also cited many observations disconfirming the preformationist account of generation. For example, he argued that the generation of hybrids and the fact that in the early stages after fertilization one cannot observe any specific organic structure in the human embryo or in chicken eggs, provided empirical evidence against the theory of preformationism. See Richards 2000, 18–19.

  17. 17.

    Blumenbach 1789, 85–87.

  18. 18.

    Ibid.

  19. 19.

    Blumenbach 1789, 89.

  20. 20.

    Blumenbach 1789, 40–41; Cf. Blumenbach 1781, 23–24. In the following, I focus on the first edition, since it provides a more detailed account of the argument under consideration.

  21. 21.

    Blumenbach 1781, 21–24.

  22. 22.

    Blumenbach 1781, 25.

  23. 23.

    Blumenbach 1781, 25–26.

  24. 24.

    Larson 1979, 236–241. I have consulted an English translation of Blumenbach’s Institutiones physiologicae by John Elliotson of the third edition of 1810, published in 1817.

  25. 25.

    Blumenbach 1817, 16–17.

  26. 26.

    Ibid.

  27. 27.

    Blumenbach 1817, 79–80.

  28. 28.

    Blumenbach 1817, 18. See also Larson 1979, 237–238.

  29. 29.

    Blumenbach 1817, 18.

  30. 30.

    Blumenbach 1817, 18–19.

  31. 31.

    Blumenbach 1817, 20.

  32. 32.

    Richards has shown that this idea was also adopted by Kielmeyer. See Richards 2002.

  33. 33.

    Blumenbach 1817, 20.

  34. 34.

    Brandis 1795, xi.

  35. 35.

    Brandis 1795, 1–2.

  36. 36.

    Brandis 1795, 2–3.

  37. 37.

    Brandis 1795, 15–17.

  38. 38.

    Brandis 1795, 3–4.

  39. 39.

    Here, I adopt the translation by Förster 1993, 258.

  40. 40.

    Brandis 1795, 15–16.

  41. 41.

    Brandis 1795, 29.

  42. 42.

    Brandis 1795, 30–31.

  43. 43.

    Brandis 1795, 81.

  44. 44.

    Reil’s work is again instructively discussed by Lenoir 1989 and Richards 2002. Lenoir attributes to Reil the teleomechanistic method he also attributes to Kant and Blumenbach (Lenoir 1989, 35–27). Richards highlights the differences between the views of Blumenbach and Kant on the one hand and Reil on the other. I am in full agreement with Richards that the positions of Blumenbach and Reil are quite different. However, I will argue that in certain respects the views of Kant and Reil are quite similar.

  45. 45.

    Reil 1795, 11.

  46. 46.

    Reil 1795, 12.

  47. 47.

    Reil 1795, 13–14.

  48. 48.

    Reil 1795, 15–19.

  49. 49.

    Reil 1795, 19.

  50. 50.

    Reil 1795, 24–25.

  51. 51.

    Reil 1795, 45–46.

  52. 52.

    Reil 1795, 47.

  53. 53.

    Reil 1795, 47–48.

  54. 54.

    Reil 1795, 48–49.

  55. 55.

    Reil 1795, 50.

  56. 56.

    Ibid.

  57. 57.

    Reil 1795, 52–53.

  58. 58.

    Reil 1795, 54–56; Cf. Richards 2002, 259–260.

  59. 59.

    AA 5: 376.

  60. 60.

    Reil 1795, 55.

  61. 61.

    Reil 1795, 66–67.

  62. 62.

    Hildebrandt 1799, 43.

  63. 63.

    Hildebrandt 1799, 41. In the first edition of his Lehrbuch (1796), Hildebrandt still adopted a more neutral position, arguing that we know very little about the nature of the Lebenskraft. We may presume the work of Reil to have been influential with respect to Hildebrandt’s change of position.

  64. 64.

    Hildebrandt 1799, 41–44.

  65. 65.

    Lenoir 1980, 1981, 1989. Note that in the discussion of Reil in this chapter, we have already witnessed profound differences between the views of Reil on the one hand, and those of both Blumenbach and Kant on the other. Hence, Lenoir’s stress on profound similarities between these scientists seems to be exaggerated.

  66. 66.

    Richards 1998, 2000, 2002. Richard’s thesis is generally accepted. Cf. Beiser 2006, 13–14; Zammito 2006, 765.

  67. 67.

    Richards 1998, 709–711.

  68. 68.

    These texts are sometimes interpreted as expressing a positivistic stance wholly incompatible with biological theories invoking vital forces in Blumenbach’s sense. Cf. Beiser 2006, 9. In the following, I adopt a slightly different perspective, arguing that Kant mainly criticizes people who misuse biological theories for dogmatic metaphysical positions.

  69. 69.

    I have greatly benefited from Zammito’s insightful analysis of the Kant-Herder controversy. Zammito 1992, 189–213. See also Zammito 2003.

  70. 70.

    AA 8: 53.

  71. 71.

    AA 8: 54.

  72. 72.

    Herder 1785, 135–137.

  73. 73.

    Herder 1786, 122–140.

  74. 74.

    Herder 1786, 122–124.

  75. 75.

    Herder 1786, 128–133. See Sloan 2002, 242–244.

  76. 76.

    AA 8: 46–47.

  77. 77.

    AA 8: 49.

  78. 78.

    AA 8: 53.

  79. 79.

    Ibid. Zammito 1992, 185.

  80. 80.

    AA 8: 50.

  81. 81.

    On Kant’s notions of Keime (germs) and Anlagen (predispositions) see Grene and Depew 2004, 96–97, and Sloan 2002. Kant developed these notions in his Von den verschiedenen Racen, AA 2: 429–443; and in his “Bestimmung des Begriffs einer Menschenrace”, which appeared in the Berlinische Monatsschrift, November 1785, AA 8: 91–106.

  82. 82.

    AA 8: 62–63.

  83. 83.

    Zammito 2003, 86.

  84. 84.

    AA 8: 54.

  85. 85.

    Frederick Beiser 2006, 9, 13–14, has, in an illuminating discussion, argued that this argument implies a rejection of ‘vital materialism’, a term introduced by Lenoir to designate the researches of Blumenbach and the Göttingen school. As I will argue, this reading is too strong.

  86. 86.

    Zammito 1992, 189–213.

  87. 87.

    AA 5: 391.

  88. 88.

    AA 5: 392.

  89. 89.

    AA 5: 398–391.

  90. 90.

    AA 5: 394. This is also pointed out by Beiser 2006, 13–14.

  91. 91.

    Ibid.

  92. 92.

    This explication of the law of inertia is given in the Metaphysische Anfangsgründe, AA 4: 544.

  93. 93.

    AA 5: 394.

  94. 94.

    Ibid.

  95. 95.

    AA 5: 424. Cf. Beiser 2006, 13–14.

  96. 96.

    Original: “Die innerlich bildende Kräfte (vires interne formatrices) können nun entweder blos mechanisch oder organisch bildend seyn. Die letztere sind diejenige welche die Theile der Körper wechselseitig als Zwek (sic!) und Mittel unter einander verbinden und so organische Körper (denn sich selbst organisirende Materie ist ein Unding) ausmachen”.

  97. 97.

    Reil 1795, 48.

  98. 98.

    For a passage invoking the term Lebenskraft written shortly after those cited above, see for example AA 21: 213 (May–Aug 1799). The term Lebenskraft occurs numerous times throughout the whole of the Opus postumum.

  99. 99.

    I am not arguing for any concrete historical influence in this context. The concept of vital force was extremely widespread in Kant’s time, and it would be incorrect to argue that Kant only based himself on the writings of Blumenbach in the Opus postumum. At the present, I am merely noting similarities between the manner in which Kant employed the concept vital force and the theory of vital force proposed by Blumenbach,

  100. 100.

    Cf. KrV, B 310.

  101. 101.

    Original: “Allein der Organism körperlicher Wesen ist doch eine Idee von einem System bewegender Kräfte der Materie, wenigstens nach der Analogie nach Zwecken wirkender Ursachen, welches wenn es gleich nicht postulirt doch auch nicht abgewiesen werden kann mithin als problematisch immer seinen Platz in der Vernunft behauptet als ein Princip der Möglichkeit solcher bewegenden Kräfte dergleichen das denkende Wesen selbst seinen Ideen gemäs in Ausübung bringt: wobey es aber freylich nicht als materielles sondern als immaterielles Wesen (als Intelligenz) wirkt oder vielmehr (nach einem angemessenern Ausdruck) handelt.Man ist also berechtigt in die Classification der bewegenden Kräfte der Materie auch die der organisirten aufzustellen”.

  102. 102.

    AA 8: 181.

  103. 103.

    AA 21: 213.

  104. 104.

    AA 5: 9.

  105. 105.

    AA 7: 251.

  106. 106.

    This example stems from Kant’s Physischen Geographie (1802), where is spoken of planta sensitiva, which, when touched, drops its twigs and leaves as if it has sensations (Empfindungen). Cf. AA 9: 364. Thus we can treat of plants as if they have the vital force of sensibility, and may treat of them as if they are capable of action in accordance with representation (purposive action). Yet (following the line of argumentation of the Opus postumum) we treat of plants in this manner only by analogy with ourselves as agents capable of purposive action. I owe the reference to Ingensiep 2009, 103.

  107. 107.

    AA 21: 186.

  108. 108.

    AA 21: 189, 194. AA 5: 376.

  109. 109.

    Cf. Kant’s multiple characterizations of organisms at AA 21: 184–189, 193, 197–199, 211–213.

  110. 110.

    Cf. AA 21: 612. AA 22: 100.

  111. 111.

    AA 21: 211.

  112. 112.

    Ibid.

  113. 113.

    Cf. also AA 21: 188.

  114. 114.

    The same idea is expressed, once again, at AA 21: 188.

  115. 115.

    AA 22: 466.

  116. 116.

    AA 21: 275. I owe the reference to Mathieu 1989, 139.

  117. 117.

    AA 4: 525.

  118. 118.

    AA 29: 79.

  119. 119.

    Cf.: “To assume such a matter filling cosmic space is an inevitable necessary hypothesis, for, without it, no cohesion, which is necessary for the formation of a physical body, can be thought.” AA 21: 378.

  120. 120.

    KrV, B 876.

  121. 121.

    See, for example, AA 22: 300, 318. Kant explains this formula as follows: “Forma dat esse rei: i.e., the a priori principle of composition precedes the empirical concept, which only thereby becomes a determinate thing [Sache].” (AA 21: 637) In the Reflexionen zur Metaphysik we find: “Forma dat esse rei. For that which is essential to a thing [Sache] can only be cognized by means of reason; now, all the matter of cognition must be given sensibly; hence the essence of things [Sachen], in so far as they are cognized by reason, is form.” AA 17: 312

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van den Berg, H. (2014). Vital Forces and Organisms in the Opus postumum . In: Kant on Proper Science. Studies in German Idealism, vol 15. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-007-7140-6_7

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