Abstract
This chapter connects the Hegelian conception of free agency from chapter one with Pettit’s republican writings on the nature of freedom. While chapter one offers a predominantly normative account of free agency, chapter two deals with the social and political conditions for freedom and autonomy. In so doing, this chapter also explains some of the differences between the role of recognition within our republican account of justice and Honneth’s well-known theory of the struggle for recognition. Moreover, this chapter not only further discusses the exact role and scope of recognition for a social account of freedom, but it also critically examines the nature and value of equality for safeguarding every person’s free and autonomous agency. In the course of this analysis, chapter two will uncover the crucial significance of non-domination and non-alienation for being a free and equal member of society, putting the focus on certain forms on inequality and their agency-hampering effects.
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Notes
- 1.
I discuss these issues also in Schuppert (2013b).
- 2.
For the difference between structure-based and outcome-based conceptions of domination, see Loevtt’s (2010, pp. 40–47) excellent overview.
- 3.
As most readers probably know, there exists significant disagreement over the differences between the republican ideal of freedom as non-domination (Pettit 2006a, 1996; Laborde and Maynor 2008) and the classic liberal mantra of freedom as non-interference (Carter 1999; Kramer 2003; Larmore 2003), or simply negative freedom (Berlin 1958). I do not want to go into this issue here, since I hope that from what I say in this chapter and Chap. 3 it will be sufficiently clear that republican non-domination is a valuable ideal in its own right. Moreover, let me note that the strict distinction between positive and negative freedom was always an unfortunate one, as any liberal theory seems to include at least some form of positive freedom, too. From the viewpoint of rational agency, though, it is simply important to stress that the conditions for free and autonomous agency can be easily hampered and distorted without direct interference, a fact Pettit’s republican ideal of non-domination seems strikingly more aware of than classic negative liberty views.
- 4.
It is important to note that non-domination alone might not suffice to protect a person’s agency against all possible threats. This is a point I return to later in this chapter.
- 5.
It is worth noting that Bradley (1927) offers a somewhat different take on Hegel’s practical philosophy and recognition theory, as Bradley attributes Hegel a social role view, according to which each person has her station and duties in the greater workings of society. Bradley, thus, like Green sees Hegel’s recognition theory as part of a moral theory in which the self is fully realized by serving the greater social organism. However, Bradley’s emphasis differs from Green’s.
- 6.
- 7.
The problem with a lot of writings on multiculturalism and the politics of recognition is precisely that recognition is interpreted as a value which gives legitimacy to rather essentialist claims of cultural, social, or ethnic distinctiveness, instead of arguing for a society in which every person, no matter to which group she belongs, can exercise her freedom and autonomy as a rational agent (Laden and Owen 2007, Chaps. 8 and 10; Phillips 2007; Young 1990; Kymlicka 1995). In fact, this struggle over cultural recognition has also triggered criticisms of Honneth’s writings, arguing that it is redistribution and not recognition which helps the poor and needy (Fraser and Honneth 2003; Tully 2000).
- 8.
Recognizing others as competent judges and free rational agents is distinctly different from tolerating other people’s behaviour because one feels compelled to respect other people’s life-choices. Equating recognition with toleration is extremely problematic, just like equating impartiality with absolute neutrality. See Galeotti (2002), Castiglione and McKinnon (2003), as well as de Marneffe (1990) and Mendus (1999).
- 9.
As with so many other great philosophers, Honneth’s immense productivity means that he has published different accounts of recognition since his thinking on the interplay between recognition, personality formation and justice has obviously evolved. I will nonetheless try to deal with Honneth’s work as whole, attempting to always use a friendly but critical reading of his works as basis for my own analysis.
- 10.
Honneth offers an in-depth discussion of these three forms of relationship and their necessary re-assessment in the third part of Das Recht der Freiheit.
- 11.
Terry Pinkard interprets the idea of self-sufficiency as proof for an underlying strong Aristotelianism in Honneth’s work (Pinkard 2012).
- 12.
- 13.
I am not sure whether Honneth’s reading is indeed closer to Hegel than my own, since my own reading seems to focus more on the Phenomenology while Honneth also seems to draw heavily on the Philosophy of Right. Be that as it may, as I said earlier Honneth’s theory is highly insightful and especially useful for analysing the social pathologies of contemporary capitalist societies.
- 14.
Another point worth making is that Honneth clearly sees his theory as directed at one society at a time, which might possibly explain his optimism about achieving social unity. However, my own theory is global in scope and certainly wants to avoid all idealistic visions of a world of perfect harmony.
- 15.
People who roughly fall into the luck-egalitarian camp include Dworkin (1981a, b), Cohen (1989) and Rakowski (1991). For critical discussions of luck-egalitarianism and some of its related problems, see Hinton (2001), Seligman (2007), Scheffler (2005), Vallentyne (2008), Arneson (1989, 2000b), Cohen (2008), Lippert-Rasmussen (2001), and Matravers (2007).
- 16.
This is not the only possible definition of luck-egalitarianism. Lippert-Rasmussen for instance seems to hold that any theory which cares on some level about responsibility is luck-egalitarian. I think such a definition of luck-egalitarianism is too wide.
- 17.
Luck-egalitarianism thus argues for a distinct form of equality of opportunity, though it is important that this form of equality of opportunity differs significantly from the one advocated by Rawls (1999b, §12 and §14) as part of his second principle of justice. There exist big differences between narrow and wide conceptions of equality of opportunity, both in terms of the opportunities provided and the scope and site of these opportunities (Cohen 1989; Chambers 2009; Phillips 2006; Mason 2001; Wallimann-Helmer 2013).
- 18.
This is the so-called harshness objection to luck-egalitarianism. While one should not make the mistake of overstating the harshness objection, since some bad decisions can be traced back to bad brute luck, there is indeed good reason to believe that luck egalitarians struggle with keeping a lid on social inequalities due to their harsh policy of holding people responsible. For a less critical view of the harshness-objection, see Voigt (2007).
- 19.
The German term Wertschätzung also translates as esteem, a term well known from Honneth’s work. Esteem, however, has been used in the literature to describe a slightly different form of recognition referring rather to a currency of praise and blame, something well expressed and discussed in Brennan and Pettit (2004). With respect to autonomy as non-alienation I think that the difference between wertschätzen (to appreciate) and respektieren (to respect) which Jaeggi also alludes to is much better suited to grasp the matter of the issue.
- 20.
The distinction between dominium (i.e. the arbitrary interference by private actors in civil society) and imperium (i.e. the arbitrary interference by institutions and agents of the state) was put forth by Pettit (1997, Chap. 5).
- 21.
For an excellent discussion of issues related to this point, see Laborde (2008), especially Chaps. 4, 7, and 10 and Laborde (2006). In this way the connection between non-domination, freedom and autonomy, as they are understood here, leads precisely not to those strong liberal perfectionist claims (in the name of autonomy and the morality of freedom) as Joseph Raz (1986, Chaps. 14 and 15) presents them at the end of his book.
- 22.
For an in-depth discussion, see for instance Lovett’s (2010, Chap. 3) critique of the imbalance of power conception of domination.
- 23.
- 24.
The idea of social equality as a separate ideal of equality has only recently gained traction within normative political theory. Thus far, however, the term social equality is used by different theorists in different ways, which leads to a fair amount of confusion. For a collection of the most important positions on social equality and its merits, see Fourie et al. (forthcoming).
- 25.
See also Barry’s (1995) excellent discussion.
- 26.
- 27.
- 28.
I will come back to editorial and contestatory forms of discursive control in political decision-making procedures in Chap. 5.
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Schuppert, F. (2014). Analysing Freedom and Autonomy: Recognition, Responsibility and Threats to Agency. In: Freedom, Recognition and Non-Domination. Studies in Global Justice, vol 12. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-007-6806-2_2
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