Abstract
From the very beginning Schutz announced his project as one within the tradition of “Interpretive Sociology.” Nonetheless, this tradition itself remains highly controversial and sociology’s history is confronted with diverse interpretations of its conceptual and methodical focus. Accordingly, several theoretical as well as empirical research perspectives derive from Schutz‘s understanding of the tradition of Weberian sociology. The following contribution will analyze some of its landmarks, trying to overcome at least some of the mutual exclusions established in this field of sociological research.
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- 1.
The contours of Schutz’s concept of “Interpretive Sociology” from 1932 are laid out in the fifth part of the “Meaningful Constructions” titled “On problems of Interpretive Sociology” (§§ 42–49), a rather neglected section in discussions of his work.
- 2.
There are already several studies on the relationship between both works which point out some of the differences between Weber and Schutz, for example, the missing significance of communicative (linguistic) processes or the difficulty of constitution which are not discussed by Weber. Also, questions regarding the problem of the formation of typologies are discussed (see for example Srubar 1979; also Endress 2006b: 31–37).
- 3.
At the core of the discussion are the manifold hermeneutic disputes between “objective” hermeneutics (Oevermann), “documentary interpretation” (Bohnsack), and the subject-oriented, socio-scientific hermeneutics, as, for example, the hermeneutics of the Sociology of Knowledge. Bohnsack explicitly claims a mediating position by using the “documentary method” and thus refers to Karl Mannheim, in contrast to the other two concepts.
- 4.
While 20 years ago Matthiesen (1994) claimed that the overstressing of the communalities of the various ‘interpretative approaches’ serves as a substantially irrelevant mutual profiling, the situation nowadays is one of a forced parceling of the field of ‘interpretative approaches’ and research methods due to substantial differences concerning methodological as well as methodical aspects.
- 5.
For Weber, such a classification requires a detailed explanation, but to an even greater extent it conceals the systematic form of Schutz’s analyses, whose core lies, according to the position argued here, in the fundamental intersubjectivity of structures of meaning. The usual classification of Weber as well as Schutz as belonging to the perspective of methodological individualism has first of all to be commented on because the concept of methodological individualism (which itself also points to the already mentioned relation of the general to the concrete) has to be differentiated here. The core of the thesis of methodological individualism can be identified in the claim that all knowledge of social phenomena can be and has to be deduced and justified through knowledge about individualities, these being attitudes, interests, and actions of individuals (to follow a more recent usage: actors). Thus, methodological individualism is at the core a heuristic postulate. This methodological meaning of methodological individualism has to be carefully distinguished from any possible ontological meaning. Second, methodological individualism as a heuristic postulate can either be analyzed with a claim to totality (thus, each social phenomenon can be traced back to something individual) or merely in the sense of a heuristic instruction (hence, the “reductionist” endeavor should be emphasized as much as possible). Methodological individualism is not an ontological statement but a methodical, i.e., a research-pragmatic norm.
- 6.
See also Husserl’s reflection in “Experience and Judgment” concerning both the “typical” and “indeterminate generality of anticipation,” according to which “every real thing whatsoever has, as an object of possible experience, its general ‘a priori,’ a pre-knowledge that is an indeterminate generality but which remains identifiable as the same, as a type belonging a priori to a realm of a priori possibilities” (1973: 36).
- 7.
Husserl indeed attempted to thematize “the entire spatiotemporal world” in “the unity of a systematic survey” by “paying constant attention to the relativity of the surrounding life-worlds” (Husserl 1970: 147). Accordingly, this “systematic survey” has to proceed just “in the form of an iterated synthesis of relative, spatiotemporal life-worlds” (ibid.).
- 8.
It is therefore questionable whether this “concrete generality” aims at the explication of the world-constituting powers of consciousness and action of the actors (Phenomenology: Schutz, Berger/Luckmann), at the tacit general conventions concerning interactions (Ethnomethodology, analysis of conversation and typification), at the systems of symbols and interactions (Symbolic interactionism, hermeneutic sociology of knowledge: Blumer, Soeffner), at the socio-historical framework and social stratifications (documentary method, biography and generation research: Bohnsack, Hildenbrand, Rosenthal), at discourses and dispositifs (discourse analysis: Foucault), or at the sense generating latent structures of meaning (objective hermeneutics: Oevermann) (see also the list of options in Hitzler 2007: [18]).
- 9.
According to Bohnsack’s conception, it is the mediating position of the documentary interpretation (inspired by Mannheim) that is opposite to both the objectivism of objective hermeneutics and the subjectivism of social phenomenology following Schutz, and which therefore presents the only fully valid form of an interpretive approach (Bohnsack 2005).
- 10.
- 11.
Concerning the questions of the possibility of socio-scientific interpretation, one can formulate some basic meta-theoretical rules concerning the conflict between Explanatory and Interpretive Sociology, which seem at any rate suitable to the delimitation of a perspective overlapping the objective space of possibility. These can actually be labeled according to their specific origin: firstly, as an explaining sociologist one cannot see the specific interpretative profile of Interpretive Sociology ab ovo as complete nonsense and at the same time systematically take into account the cultural embedment of any social action, secondly, as a hermeneutically oriented sociologist, one cannot argue on behalf of the ever typical character of social acting and at the same time dismiss any generalization in another theoretical language as factually wrong; thirdly, as an explaining sociologist one cannot center on the cultural framing of social acting and at the same time skip the theoretical level of the explication of typical structures of interpretation, and fourthly, as a hermeneutically oriented sociologist one cannot emphasize the constitutive relevance of language for the perception of reality and at the same time rule out a priori specific (scientific) language play as inadequate.
- 12.
See also Husserl’s clarification in the “Crisis”: “In advance there is the world, ever pregiven and undoubted in ontic certainty and self-verification” (1970: 186–7).
- 13.
To think hermeneutically, according to Gadamer (1974: 1061), to transfer a context from another ‘world’ into one’s own has always been perceived as a method of translation. Similarly, in Sociology the term has been used well before it came into fashion, as for example by Stephen P. Turner (1980) and Michael Callon (1986).
- 14.
Here, we are obviously dealing with the ‘backstage’, introduced by Goffman (1959) in a still concretistic manner. It would be nonsense, however, to use qualitative social research with the too far reaching and constrained idea that on each ‘backstage’ or ‘behind the facad’ is a hidden and supposedly ‘true’ reality which is constantly and fraudulently concealed and/or veiled by the front stage. Especially because such presumptions at once would have to assume strong (manifest) intentions they really should have been reduced in the tended process of distancing. But the contrary assumption of an in principle manifest reality is, given the afore-mentioned reasons, also not tenable.
- 15.
- 16.
Matthiesen speaks of “a fundamentally dual, genetic structural concept” (1994: 83).
- 17.
Compare in the following the question of the concept of rule which is drawn on for the idea of a “generalization of structure in singular cases” by Oevermann.
- 18.
It has to be studied separately to what extent the difference of a reference to “implicit knowledge” and “objective (latent) structures of meaning” is relevant here (see Matthiesen 1994: 97f.).
- 19.
For that purpose I will use a study concerning students in a city in the South of Germany who became members of a fraternity. The following empirical data about the students comes from a 2-year qualitative as well as quantitative research practical training at the University of Tuebingen.
- 20.
A method of sequential analysis is methodically adequate insofar as a “meaningful construction” of a social world is to be reconstructed in detailed analytical steps.
- 21.
In order to validate the assumption of a case structure imprinting every interview sequence, singular text passages considered less relevant are analyzed in a case-intern contrasting.
- 22.
- 23.
Breuer (2006: 8) emphasizes by referring to recent contributions (see Endress 2006b; Greshoff 2006) that “Weber’s Sociology also includes other dimensions beyond the subjectively meant sense” and “the actions of the concerned persons”: the universe of ‘social relationships’ (1968: 26ff., 40ff.) which are grounded on intersubjective (mutual) dispositions and should be understood as self-contained structures; the sphere of ‘legitimate systems’ (1968: 31ff.) which are built upon ‘trans-subjective’ or even objective dispositions and lastly also the whole aggregate of non-intended, ‘trans-intentional’ consequences of action.
- 24.
In this context, the converse critique of a virtually latent objectivism in Schutz and Berger/Luckmann has been ignored because of the special meaning of the processes of typification, see Hahn (1994: 21, 108f., 162, 193ff., 356f.). Giddens’ accusation of determinism concerning Berger/Luckmann goes in a comparable direction (1976: 96 connected to 171: note 6).
- 25.
See, for example, Kurt (2004) who promotes a subjectivistic-intentionalistic reduction of Interpretive Sociology adhering to Weber in the tradition of social phenomenology in an almost exemplary way. This positioning orients itself towards the goal formulated by Soeffner, according to whom the object of discussion is the “interpretation and understanding of the singular in respect to its typical and typifiable relations to general structures” (1989: 7ff., 66ff., 98ff.; also: 1991a). Lastly, this results in a surprising proximity of subjective, socially scientific hermeneutics and “objectivistic” as well as “epistemological” (methodological) positions like, e.g., in Emilio Betti, who, in contrast to Gadamer, sees understanding as a “recognition and reconstruction of sense” as originally intended by the author (Betti 1962: 11ff., 27f.).
- 26.
The German original reads as follows: “Die Methoden einer sinnverstehenden handlungstheoretischen Soziologie können nicht in der üblichen Nachvollzugs-Hermeneutik mit der zentralen Kategorie des ‘subjektiv gemeinten Sinns’ bestehen, sie müssen in einem der objektiven Hermeneutik entsprechenden Typ der Rekonstruktion von objektivem Sinn fundiert sein”. From my point of view, the hermeneutics of the sociology of knowledge does not do justice to this when it is argued that “the sociology of knowledge […] has to work historically reconstructive […] with the single aim to establish the mechanisms of choice which are developed by the actors to reach certain goals” (Soeffner and Reichertz 2004: [24]). In my opinion, the same is also applicable when this position is argued: “The subject of the sociology of knowledge is societal knowledge … as far as it is expressed by subjects and can be reconstructed” (ibid. [28]).
- 27.
A critique however that is, following to the already mentioned arguments, not adequate to devalue this method of interpretation in toto, yet this seems to be Bohnsack’s opinion (2003: 555, 558).
- 28.
Bohnsack includes Mannheim’s concept of social bearings and the focus on socialization of historical phenomena in his analysis here (see 2003: 562).
- 29.
In these three forms of knowledge, the different structures of meaning can be specifically identified; thus, the documentary interpretation aims at the uncovering of intersubjective and ‘transsubjective’ structures of meaning, the phenomenologically oriented analysis of the life-world at the identification of subjective-intersubjective structures of meaning and objective hermeneutics at the analysis of subjective-trans-subjective structures of meaning.
- 30.
See in contrast to this the Grounded Theory which cannot be discussed here because of pragmatic reasons (for example Hildenbrand 2004: 178).
- 31.
Insofar as Schleiermacher sees general hermeneutics as having the double duty of grammatical as well as technical psychological interpretation and thus with handling the relation between the outside-totality of language use inside a language community on the one hand and the proof of an individual soul as an expression of the inner on the other hand. Oevermann’s objective hermeneutics thus follows a remarkable tradition. This is particularly correct because a dialectical understanding is seen as constitutive for a mutual relation of postulates for Schleiermacher as well.
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Acknowledgement
I would like to thank Mahon O’Brien and Annika Toll for their help in translating this paper, as well as one of the anonymous reviewers, who provided many very helpful suggestions for revising a first version of this paper. Finally, I am also grateful to Michael Staudigl for his continuing support.
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Endress, M. (2014). Interpretive Sociologies and Traditions of Hermeneutics. In: Staudigl, M., Berguno, G. (eds) Schutzian Phenomenology and Hermeneutic Traditions. Contributions to Phenomenology, vol 68. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-007-6034-9_3
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