Aristotelian Grace

Abstract

Aristotelian grace (Nicomachean Ethics, V.5,1133a3-5) is the natural force that takes the good that we do to and for one another and returns, magnifies, and ramifies it. As a response to goodness, Aristotelian grace should be distinguished both from the grace of God and from grace under pressure (what Hemingway called guts), each of which responds, each in its own way, to evil. The essay illustrates and explains why grace is both natural and a force and illustrates and explains a few of its returns, magnifications, and ramifications.

For some years I have discussed the ideas in this paper with anyone who was willing to listen and even with a few who really weren’t; there is little chance that I will remember all or even most of them. Special thanks, though, are due to discussions with Jay Atlas, Paul Hurley, Debra Nails, Dion Scott-Kakures, Rivka Weinberg, and Nancy Young, among others, and to written comments from Kirk Fitzpatrick, Gabrielle Lear, and Suzanne Obdrzalek. I presented earlier versions of the paper at KeytFest, a conference honoring David Keyt at the University of Washington in May 2006, at the Northwest Philosophy Conference Seattle University in October 2006 (where Harald Thorsrud commented), at the Midsouth Philosophy Conference at Memphis University in February 2005, at the Ninth Annual Southern California Philosophy Conference at UC Irvine in October 2004, and at the Conference on Value Inquiry at the University of North Dakota in April 2003; I am grateful to those audiences and commentators for helpful discussion.

I am pleased to offer this chapter to David Keyt, to thank him for his many estimable contributions over the years to ancient philosophy and to those who work in the field.