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Belgium: From Categorical Nullities to a Judicially Created Balancing Test

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Exclusionary Rules in Comparative Law

Part of the book series: Ius Gentium: Comparative Perspectives on Law and Justice ((IUSGENT,volume 20))

Abstract

Although Belgium’s legal system was based on the French system and reflects many of its insitutions, such as “nullities”, the approach of the Belgian courts was quite different. Already in 1923, the Belgian Court of Cassation ruled that any “nullity” would ineluctably lead to exclusion of any evidence that was gathered as a result of the violation which was categorized as a “nullity”. This doctrine was reaffirmed by the Court of Cassation in 1986. In 1990 and 1995, however, rulings of the Court of Cassation signalled a slight softening of the rule of absolute exclusion, and this trend became law in the 2003 decision of the Court of Cassation, nicknamed the Antigone decision, after the police operation which led to the illegally seized evidence. In this landmark decision, the Court refused to suppress all evidence gathered in violation of the law, but limited exclusion to situations where the evidence was gathered following a violation punishable by a “nullity”, where the violation also affected the credibility of the evidence, or affected the defendant’s right to a fair trial. In Belgium, as in many European countries, the decision of the European Court of Human Rights in Salduz v. Turkey, discussed in detail in Chap. 16, has led to changes affecting the right to counsel during interrogations and exclusion of statements taken in violation thereof.

Translated from the French by Joshua Walker and Stephen C. Thaman.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    Franchimont et al. (2009, 1033)

  2. 2.

    This is the established case law of the ECHR; See, e.g., Eur. Ct. H.R. decisions of Schenk v. Switzerland (1991), 13 E.H.R.R. 1342 and Ramanauskas v. Lithuania (2010), 51 E.H.R.R. 11.

  3. 3.

    Moniteur Belge [Official Journal of Belgium], 24 Dec. 2004.

  4. 4.

    Braas (1925, 324).

  5. 5.

    Pasicrisie 66 (1924, I); See also, Cass., 12 Mar. 1923, Pasicrisie 233 (1923, I). Except in the case of older decisions, the decisions of the Cour de Cassation that we cite in the present report may be consulted online on the site www.cass.be.

  6. 6.

    Kuty (2005a, 350).

  7. 7.

    See Cass., 13 May 1986, I Pasicrisie 1107 (1986), and the conclusions of the Procureur général Dujardin in conformity with this.

  8. 8.

    Beernaert (2005, 1095) (note on Cass., 2 Mar. 2005).

  9. 9.

    Rechtskundig Weekblad 463 (1990–1991). Note of L. Huybrechts

  10. 10.

    Revue de droit pénal et de criminologie 94 (1992), note of C. De Valkeneer.

  11. 11.

    Traest (1994, 72–75).

  12. 12.

    Cass., 30 May 1995; Kuty (1998, 489) and Traest (1996, 151).

  13. 13.

    The question remained whether this theory should also apply where the report of the crime itself was a crime (for example where it constituted a violation of professional secrecy).

  14. 14.

    Cass., 14 Oct. 2003; Kuty (2004, 405).

  15. 15.

    Kuty (2005a, 352).

  16. 16.

    Beernaert (2005, 1103).

  17. 17.

    Cass., 16 Nov. 2004, R.G. P.04.1127.N, Revue de droit pénal et de criminologie 665 (2005). On the consequences of an irregular search warrant, we also refer to the decision of November 15, 2005. Pasicrisie 2254 (2005).

  18. 18.

    Kuty (2005a, 353). See also, more recently, Cass., 26 Jan. 2011, R.G. P.10.1321.F, Revue de droit pénal et de criminology 82 (2012), note of D. Dillenbourg.

  19. 19.

    Cass., 25 May 2005, R.G. P.05.0672.F, Revue de Jurisprudence de Liège-Mons-Bruxelles 1408 (2005).

  20. 20.

    Cass., 26 Nov. 2008, R.G. P.08.1293.F, Journal des Tribunaux 741 (2008) (and the conclusions of D. Vandermeersch).

  21. 21.

    Franchimont et al. (2009, 1045).

  22. 22.

    Criteria which are nevertheless neither exhaustive nor cumulative. Ibid, 1052.

  23. 23.

    Pasicrisie 500 (2004); Revue de droit pénal et de criminologie 661 (2005).

  24. 24.

    Bosly et al. (2010 , 1015–1016).

  25. 25.

    Ibid.

  26. 26.

    De Valkeneer (2005, 688).

  27. 27.

    Journal des Tribunaux 211 (Kuty 2005a).

  28. 28.

    Cass., 31 Oct. 2006, Pasicrisie 2239 (2006); Cass., 21 Nov. 2006, Pasicrisie 2437 (2006); Cass., 4 Dec. 2007, Rechtskundig Weekblad 110 (2008–2009).

  29. 29.

    Cass., 12 Oct. 2005, Revue de Jurisprudence de Liège-Mons-Bruxelles 585 (2006).

  30. 30.

    Illegally searched premises were certainly not publicly accessible but they were not a “home” within the meaning of Art. 8 of ECHR.

  31. 31.

    Lee Davies v. Belgium, No. 18704/05, ECHR, 28 July 2009.

  32. 32.

    Cass., 12 May 2004, R.G. P.04.0572.F.

  33. 33.

    Kuty (2005b, 95).

  34. 34.

    Ibid.

  35. 35.

    Ibid, 96.

  36. 36.

    Particularly in this sense see the decision of the Constitutional Court (at the time the Cour d’arbitrage) No. 14/93 of 18 Feb. 1993, point B.2.7.

  37. 37.

    Supplemented by a royal decree of February 13, 2001.

  38. 38.

    For an illustration, see e.g. Cass., 8 Jan. 2003, RG P.02.0694.F.

  39. 39.

    See in particular Cass., 2 May 1990, RG 8168.

  40. 40.

    §§ 46quinquies and 89ter of the Criminal Code go even further because they allow an investigating magistrate to put a home under a “discrete visual inspection”. This measure allows for entry into a private space to inspect it, not only without the consent of the owner, but even without knowledge of it. Bosly et al. (2010, 404). This is nevertheless subject to strict conditions and may not, in particular, be authorized other than for certain offenses (those for which wiretaps may be authorized or those committed in the context of a criminal organization).

  41. 41.

    Franchimont et al. (2009, 460–461).

  42. 42.

    Van Rossem v. Belgium, No. 41872/98, ECHR, 9 December 2004.

  43. 43.

    Inserted by a law dating June 10, 1998, becoming effective on October 2, 1998.

  44. 44.

    Inserted by a law dating February 11, 1991, becoming effective on March 26, 1991.

  45. 45.

    Inserted by a law dating June 30, 1994, becoming effective on February 3, 1995.

  46. 46.

    Which, in the case of mobile phones, involves identifying the antennae that relayed the telecommunication.

  47. 47.

    These are different offenses which can, among other things, give rise to wiretaps and recording private (tele)communication (see infra).

  48. 48.

    Beyond this duration, the intervention of an investigating magistrate will be necessary.

  49. 49.

    To fall within the scope of the measure, the interception must occur during the transmission of the speech or message, that is to say, on the trajectory between transmitter and receiver. The Cour de Cassation has held, however, that the discovery of the contents of a recording from a telephone answering machine and its seizure, done in the context of a search executed in a regular manner by the investigating magistrate or under his order, do not fall under § 90ter CCP (and further do not violate Art. 8 ECHR). (Cass., 27 Oct. 1999, RG P.99.0715.F).

  50. 50.

    This type of eavesdropping, called direct, may be done with the assistance of technical means placed outside the private space where the intercepted conversations are taking place (in which case, the Cour de Cassation believes there hasn’t been an affront to the inviolability of the home; Cass., 26 Mar. 2003, RG P.03.0412.F), or inside that space and without the knowledge of its occupants (it is then a special type of discrete visual inspection; see § 90ter (2) C.C.P.).

  51. 51.

    Under § 90ter(1)(para. 3) CCP, the measure may not be ordered except in respect, either to persons suspected, on the basis of specific evidence, of having committed one of the infractions listed in the law, or regarding (tele)communications regularly used by these suspects, places thought to be frequented by them, or people presumed, on the basis of specific evidence, to be in communication with them.

  52. 52.

    However this requirement is considered in abstracto, and does not assume that all other means of investigation have actually been attempted before the measure is ordered.

  53. 53.

    It may not exceed 1 month after the decision ordering it (§ 90quater(1)(4) CCP), unless renewed for a new term not permitted to exceed 1 month, with a maximum limit of 6 months (§ 90quinquies(1) CCP).

  54. 54.

    Except in flagrant cases of hostage taking or extortion for which the prosecutor may authorize the measure exceptionally for a duration not lasting more than 24 h (§ 90ter(5) CCP).

  55. 55.

    Cass., 10 Apr. 1990, RG 4346.

  56. 56.

    Cass., 11 Oct. 2000, RG P.00.1245.F; Cass., 26 Mar. 2003, RG P. 03.0412.F; Cass., 10 Oct. 2007, RG P.07.0864.F.

  57. 57.

    Cass., 19 Jun. 2007, RG P.07.0311.N.

  58. 58.

    On this question, see Franchimont et al. (2009, 308–310).

  59. 59.

    Cass., 13 May 1986, I Pasicrisie 1107 (1986), and the conclusions of the Procureur général Dujardin in conformity with this.

  60. 60.

    Traditionally, the Belgian Cour de Cassation evokes, on this topic, the respect of the rights of the defense “which the right to silence is a part of” (see notably Cass., 13 May 1986, RG 9136 and Cass., 13 Jan. 1999, RG P 98.0412.F). More recently, it has specified that there “does not exist a general principle of a right to silence separate from the general principle of law concerning the rights of the defense” (Cass., 16 June 2004, RG P.04.0671.F).

  61. 61.

    Usually referred to as the “Salduz law”.

  62. 62.

    Funke v. France (1993), 16 E.H.R.R. 297, 326, § 44.

  63. 63.

    Murray v. United Kingdom (1996), 22 E.H.R.R. 29, 60, § 45.

  64. 64.

    Saunders v. United Kingdom (1996), 23 E.H.R.R. 313, 337, § 68.

  65. 65.

    In other words, confessions or other self-incriminating statements must be both free and made in full knowledge of the facts.

  66. 66.

    Gäfgen v. Germany (G.C.) (2011) , 52 E.H.R.R. 1, 42, § 166 and the case law cited therein.

  67. 67.

    Which, indirectly, also sets the standards applicable in Belgian law regarding the case law of the Cour de Cassation and the benchmarks made therein for the criteria of a fair trial.

  68. 68.

    Ibid, 42, § 180.

  69. 69.

    This right has been guaranteed by the Salduz law of August 13, 2011, which entered into force on January 1, 2012.

  70. 70.

    Cass., 16 Feb. 1996, RG A.84.0002.F.

  71. 71.

    Cass., 16 Sept. 1998, RG A.94.0001.F. This decision is older than the new Antigone jurisprudence of the Cour de Cassation, but its teachings remain, for our purposes, valid, because in cases of violations of the right to silence, we find ourselves in one of the three situations where the Cour de Cassation still allows setting aside illicit evidence, namely where the use of the evidence would compromise the right to a fair trial.

  72. 72.

    Cass., 27 June 2007, RG P.07.0333.F.

  73. 73.

    Cass., 13 May 1986, RG 9136. In this case, agents of the Inspection spéciale des impôts had obtained statements from suspects by guaranteeing them they would not be prosecuted criminally, even though they did not have the authority to make such a promise.

  74. 74.

    On this issue, see De Valkeneer (2006, 171–174) and the case law cited therein.

  75. 75.

    Cass., 10 Oct. 2007, RG P.07.0864.F.

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Beernaert, MA., Traest, P. (2013). Belgium: From Categorical Nullities to a Judicially Created Balancing Test. In: Thaman, S. (eds) Exclusionary Rules in Comparative Law. Ius Gentium: Comparative Perspectives on Law and Justice, vol 20. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-007-5348-8_7

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