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Receptions of Phenomenological Insights in French Religious Thought, 1901–1929

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Part of the book series: Phaenomenologica ((PHAE,volume 208))

Abstract

This chapter is the first of two treating the reception of phenomenology among French religious thinkers, comprising theologians, philosophers of religion, and religious philosophers. It focuses on two representatives of the latter category, Édouard Le Roy and Pierre Rousselot , who were influenced by the phenomenological insights of Bergson and Blondel . In a 1901 article for the Revue de métaphysique et de morale on the philosophy of science, Le Roy proposed a “new positivisme” (positivisme nouveau). In a more controversial essay, “Qu’est-ce qu’un dogme?” (“What is a Dogma?”), which appeared in 1905, Le Roy argued that dogmas have a primarily practical rather than speculative significance, serving as dynamic principles for orienting and directing the assent of faith. In a collection of essays published in 1929 on the problem of God, Le Roy interpreted Bergson ’s élan vital through Blondel ’s notion of action to arrive at a spiritualist pragmatism. Le Roy ’s attempts to show the contradictions inherent in negative solutions to the problem of God and especially his dialectical phenomenology of the will evinced strong affiliations to the method of immanence advanced by Blondel and Lucien Laberthonnière . Rousselot meanwhile applied the insights he gained from his study of Aquinas , Blondel , and Maréchal toward the resolution of pressing theological problems, including the understanding of the development of dogma and the act of faith. In so doing, Rousselot championed the cause of intellectualism, which would prove significant for the later receptions of Husserlian phenomenology among neo-Thomists because Husserl’s doctrine of intuition was intellectualistic in character.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    For biographical information on Le Roy , see Daniel-Rops (1956, 475–492).

  2. 2.

    See Abelé (1955, 107).

  3. 3.

    See Le Roy (1900); cf. Le Roy (1899–1900).

  4. 4.

    See, for instance, the opening line of Lacroix (1955, 189): “Très consciemment Édouard Le Roy , après Bergson et comme plusieurs de ses contemporains, a voulu justifier la prédiction de Ravaisson selon laquelle la philosophie de l’avenir serait un réalisme ou un positivisme spiritualiste” (emphasis Lacroix’s).

  5. 5.

    Cf. Daniel-Rops (1956, 480): “La pensée d’Édouard Le Roy repose sur deux fondements; lui-même l’a bien marqué en déclarant que pour lui la philosophie est une ‘synthèse de science et de spiritualité.’”

  6. 6.

    Poincaré (1905, 168–169). Cf. Poincaré (1902, 137). For a comparison of Le Roy ’s and Poincaré ’s views on the philosophy of science see Abelé (1955, 107–112).

  7. 7.

    See especially Bergson (1897); Bergson (1957–1959, 98–128); Bergson (1972, 375–410, especially 386–387).

  8. 8.

    Le Roy (1912) appeared in English the following year as Le Roy (1913). “Une Philosophie nouvelle” originally appeared in Les revue des deux mondes in February 1912.

  9. 9.

    Le Roy (1912, iv--v); Le Roy (1913, vi).

  10. 10.

    Le Roy (1905), available in English as Le Roy (1918). Hereafter citations to “Qu’est-ce qu’un dogme” will be made to its inclusion in the 1907 compilation, Dogme et critique (Le Roy 1907b), as Le Roy (1907c) with secondary references to the English translation.

  11. 11.

    See Vidler (1970, 93n1). For the text of Le Roy ’s submission, see Daniel-Rops (1956, 483).

  12. 12.

    See Benrubi (1933, 2: 1013): “Le Roy estime que la Morale, en tant qu’elle affirme l’obligation et la liberté, prépare l’affirmation proprement religieuse.”

  13. 13.

    Le Roy (1912, iv-v); Le Roy (1913, v).

  14. 14.

    Le Roy (1912, 19); Le Roy (1913, 20).

  15. 15.

    Le Roy (1912, 33); Le Roy (1913, 37).

  16. 16.

    Le Roy (1912, 47); Le Roy (1913, 53).

  17. 17.

    Le Roy (1929–1930, 2: 285): “Le dessein majeur du présent ouvrage était de répondre aux questions suivantes: qu’est-ce que l’intuition? en quoi consiste et comment doit être conduite la pensée intuitive? que vaut enfin cette attitude ou démarche de l’esprit et de quels résultats est-elle capable?”

  18. 18.

    Emphasis Le Roy ’s. Cf. Le Roy (1955, 167): “… mais la saisie directe de l’immédiate n’est réalisable que par éclairs, par lueurs évanouissantes. Ces lueurs fugitives et sporadiques, il faut les soutenir, puis les raccorder; il faut tendre de l’une à l’autre un fil continu de transition théorique, le long duquel coure une lumière intelligible; et là intervient, à titre de substitut, le critère du total, c’est-à-dire la vérification par établissement d’une solidarité d’ensemble telle que, le long des fils concourants de la connexion rationnelle, la lumière émanée des ponts de perception immédiate vienne se rassembler jusque sur les points d’ombre où d’abord elle faisait défaut.”

  19. 19.

    We may note that this is a rather a limited conception of intellectualism, to which may be contrasted the intellectualism of Rousselot , below, which is essentially a form of contemplation.

  20. 20.

    For an early critique of intellectualism, see Le Roy (1901a, 296ff.).

  21. 21.

    Le Roy (1912); Le Roy (1913, 217) describes the fulfillment of intelligence though intuition as follows: “our task is to bring instinct to enrich intelligence, to become free and illumined in it; and this ascent towards super-consciousness is possible in the flash of an intuitive act . . .” Le Roy also draws a connection between his understanding of intuition as a return to the immediate and Bergson ’s notion of instinct: “[T]he peculiar task of the philosopher is to reabsorb intelligence in instinct, or rather to reinstate instinct in intelligence; or better still, to win back to the heart of intelligence all the initial resources which it must have sacrificed. This is what is meant by return to the primitive, and the immediate, to reality and life. This is the meaning of intuition” (1912, 107); (1913, 119).

  22. 22.

    See, for example, Le Roy (1912, 201; cf. 127); Le Roy (1913, 223; cf. 140).

  23. 23.

    Le Roy (1912, 96); Le Roy (1913, 107).

  24. 24.

    See Weber (1932) and Lacroix (1955).

  25. 25.

    Le Roy devotes a lengthy chapter to discussing this phase, as he does for the next on verification.

  26. 26.

    On pp. 212–213 Le Roy offers a synopsis of the four stages in the process of invention.

  27. 27.

    Bergson (1919); Bergson (1991, 811–977), available in English as Bergson (1920).

  28. 28.

    Le Roy developed this terminology in his investigation of dogma to express the complex unity of the judgment of faith and the act of faith. See below and Le Roy (1907d, 128).

  29. 29.

    Le Roy (1912, 141); Le Roy (1913, 156).

  30. 30.

    See Le Roy (1901a, 314).

  31. 31.

    Cf. Husserl (1950, 56); Husserl (1964, 44) and Husserl (1931, §3; 54ff.).

  32. 32.

    See Le Roy (1929–1930, 1:140): “En toute rigueur, il n’y a qu’un seul objet de parfaite perception immédiate, si tant est même qu’on puisse alors parler d’objet s’opposant à un sujet: à savoir, l’universelle continuité hétérogène et mouvante à l’intuition de laquelle conduit la critique du morcelage.”

  33. 33.

    Le Roy (1912, 196); Le Roy (1913, 218).

  34. 34.

    Husserl (1931, §50; 154): “instead of naïvely carrying out the acts proper to the nature-constituting consciousness with its transcendent theses and allowing ourselves to be led by motives that operate therein to still other transcendent theses, and so forth—we set all these theses ‘out of action,’ we take no part in them; we direct the glance of apprehension and theoretical inquiry to pure consciousness in its own absolute being” (emphasis Husserl’s).

  35. 35.

    Cf. Husserl (1931, §33; 113).

  36. 36.

    Le Roy (1912, 51), my translation. Cf. Le Roy (1913, 57).

  37. 37.

    Le Roy (1907c, 25); Le Roy (1918, 68).

  38. 38.

    Le Roy (1907c, 6ff.); Le Roy (1918, 29ff.).

  39. 39.

    Le Roy (1907c, 13); Le Roy (1918, 44).

  40. 40.

    Le Roy (1907c, 19ff.); Le Roy (1918, 57ff.).

  41. 41.

    Le Roy (1907c, 25); Le Roy (1918, 69), quoted from Laberthonnière (1903, 272). Laberthonnière would later charge that Le Roy had not entirely avoided extrinsicism; see Aubert (1945, 366n13).

  42. 42.

    Cf. Bergson (1902); Bergson (1972, 519–550); Bergson (1991, 930–959).

  43. 43.

    See Le Roy (1907d, 284).

  44. 44.

    See among others the criticisms of Turinaz (1905) and Portalié (1905).

  45. 45.

    Le Roy (1907c, 27); Le Roy (1918, 73).

  46. 46.

    Le Roy (1907c, 31); Le Roy (1918, 81), citing John 3: 21.

  47. 47.

    Cf. Aubert (1945, 362): “M. Le Roy est, en philosophie, un disciple de Bergson et non de M. Blondel . Mais il a développé incidemment, à propos de l’acte de foi, certains thèmes qu’il reprenait aux blondéliens.”

  48. 48.

    See Havet (1950, 7).

  49. 49.

    See Le Roy (1907d, 307): “Cette méthode enseigne—combien de fois faudra-t-il le répéter—non pas que le surnaturel est exigé par nous, mais qu’il est exigeant en nous” (emphasis Le Roy ’s).

  50. 50.

    Cf. Virgoulay (1980, 267–268).

  51. 51.

    For details concerning Rousselot ’s life, see the “Notice” by Léonce de Grandmaison in Rousselot (1924, v-lx), Marty (1940), and Lebreton (1899–1950).

  52. 52.

    Rousselot (1924), available in English as Rousselot (1932).

  53. 53.

    McCool (1989, 47). See also McDermott (1979). According to McDermott, the original title that Rousselot gave to the manuscript that the censors never allowed him to publish was, “Les absorptions nécessaires: la scolastique et l’idéalisme” (92).

  54. 54.

    Huby (1912). See Rimaud (1965) for a discussion of Rousselot ’s collaboration in this project.

  55. 55.

    Rousselot (1910c), available in English as Rousselot (1990).

  56. 56.

    For a discussion of developments in Rousselot ’s position after 1910, see McDermott (1983, 201–290: “Part III: Toward a New Synthesis”).

  57. 57.

    Rousselot (1924, ix); Rousselot (1932, 1).

  58. 58.

    Rousselot (1924, xi); Rousselot (1932, 2), emphasis Rousselot ’s.

  59. 59.

    Rousselot (1924, 7); Rousselot (1932, 20).

  60. 60.

    Rousselot (1924, 11); Rousselot (1932, 24).

  61. 61.

    Rousselot (1924, 19); Rousselot (1932, 31).

  62. 62.

    Rousselot (1924, 33); Rousselot (1932, 43).

  63. 63.

    Rousselot (1924, 41); Rousselot (1932, 51). Rousselot plays upon the alliterative possibilities of French here: “Le nerf de la théorie thomiste est la conception de l’intelligence comme faculté qui tient, opposée à la volonté, faculté qui tend” (emphasis Rousselot ’s).

  64. 64.

    Rousselot (1924, 133); Rousselot (1932, 133), my translation.

  65. 65.

    Rousselot (1924, 134); Rousselot (1932, 134).

  66. 66.

    Rousselot (1924, 146); Rousselot (1932, 145).

  67. 67.

    Rousselot (1924, 149); Rousselot (1932, 147).

  68. 68.

    Rousselot (1924, 162–163); Rousselot (1932, 159).

  69. 69.

    Rousselot (1924, 173); Rousselot (1932, 169).

  70. 70.

    Rousselot (1924, 192); Rousselot (1932, 187).

  71. 71.

    Rousselot (1924, 203); Rousselot (1932, 199).

  72. 72.

    Rousselot (1924, 211–212); Rousselot (1932, 206–207).

  73. 73.

    Rousselot (1924, 224); Rousselot (1932, 218), emphasis Rousselot ’s.

  74. 74.

    See McCool (1989, 82).

  75. 75.

    See McCool (1989, 69): “In a way, God is the creature while transcending it because the creature and God are one through the unity of participation. As the ever-present creative source of the creature’s being, God is the creature’s good more than the creature himself is. If therefore a spiritual creature loves his own good truly, he must love God more than he loves himself” (emphasis McCool’s).

  76. 76.

    See Rousselot (1908, 56–87), where Rousselot examines the disadvantages of the ecstatic love theory.

  77. 77.

    Cf. McDermott (1983, 49).

  78. 78.

    Rousselot (1924, 44); Rousselot (1932, 53). See also Rousselot (1924, 225); Rousselot (1932, 219).

  79. 79.

    Blondel (1993, 41); (Blondel 1984, 52), emphasis Blondel ’s.

  80. 80.

    Cf. Rousselot (1908, 35).

  81. 81.

    Because these notes have never been published, the information in the present paragraph has been drawn from Scott (1962, 332), who discusses these and other notes and correspondence regarding Blondel .

  82. 82.

    According to Scott (1962, 332), Rousselot copied passages from pp. 19, 133, 198, and 229 into his notes.

  83. 83.

    See Ossa (1965).

  84. 84.

    Blondel (1898). Cf. Scott (1962, 338ff.). Ossa (1965, 189[525]), contests this interpretation, however, insisting that Rousselot ’s usage is completely different than Blondel ’s.

  85. 85.

    See Rousselot (1910b, 562), where Rousselot claims there are two moments in human intellection: “attitude and knowledge or sympathy [connaturalitas], and representation”; cited by Scott (1962, 345).

  86. 86.

    See Blondel (1956, 65, 66); quoted in Scott (1962, 343).

  87. 87.

    Cited by Scott (1962, 337–338).

  88. 88.

    Auguste Valensin , Letter to Maurice Blondel , February 29, 1910, in Blondel and Valensin (1957, 2: 200); cited by Ossa (1965, 191[527]).

  89. 89.

    Maurice Blondel , Letter to Auguste Valensin , November 5, 1908, in Blondel and Valensin (1957, 2: 38), my translation; cited by Scott (1962, 335–336).

  90. 90.

    Maurice Blondel , Letter to Lucien Laberthonnière , October 20, 1908, in Blondel and Laberthonnière (1961, 215–216).

  91. 91.

    Maurice Blondel , Letter to Lucien Laberthonnière , November 1, 1908, in Blondel and Laberthonnière (1961, 216).

  92. 92.

    See Blondel (1909–1910, 159: 252–253); cited by Ossa (1965, 198[534]). Scott (1962, 337) argues the reverse, namely that Rousselot adopted the notion of connatural knowledge from Blondel , but this does not seem possible given that Rousselot had already incorporated the concept of connatural knowledge in both of his doctoral theses.

  93. 93.

    Cf. Alexander Dru, “Introduction” to Blondel (1964, 64).

  94. 94.

    See, for example, Blondel and Laberthonnière (1961, 242).

  95. 95.

    According to Rousselot ’s diary, quoted by Scott (1962, 330).

  96. 96.

    Blondel (1919, 385n1). See also Blondel (1922, 229n1) for more remarks approving Rousselot ’s intellectualism.

  97. 97.

    Ossa (1965, 191[527]): “. . . il me semble que les notes de Rousselot conseillent plutôt de parler de convergence ou d’un genre particulier de ‘collaboration’ à distance.”

  98. 98.

    See also Descoqs (1932–1935, 2: 326), who observes that Rousselot was “influencé dans une large mesure, très certainement et très manifestement, par L’action.” Descoqs’s testimony has been cited by Milet (1940–1945, 250–51n65), and the latter in turn by Bouillard (1961, 41); Bouillard (1969, 26).

  99. 99.

    Due to his years of study in England, Rousselot was certainly well acquainted with Newman’s writings. The question of Newman’s influence on his theory of the act of faith has been partially explored by Nédoncelle (1953). Nédoncelle concludes that while Newman privileges the moral conscience in the act of faith, Rousselot privileges the intellect. Nevertheless, the superiority of assent over inference that is expressed by the notion of the illative sense in the Grammar of Assent finds a certain analogy in the primacy Rousselot accords to synthesis over analysis (328).

  100. 100.

    For details regarding Rousselot ’s course on faith, De fide et dogmatismo, see Holstein (1965).

  101. 101.

    See Gardeil (1928). For an analysis of Gardeil ’s theory as well as other contemporary theories of the act of faith, including Rousselot ’s see Aubert (1945). For a detailed study of Rousselot ’s theory see Kunz (1969).

  102. 102.

    Rousselot (1910c, 249); Rousselot (1990, 26), emphasis Rousselot ’s.

  103. 103.

    Rousselot (1910c, 254): “C’est un acte identique, que la perception de la crédibilité et la confession de la vérité”; Rousselot (1990, 31), emphasis Rousselot ’s.

  104. 104.

    Rousselot (1910c, 255); Rousselot (1990, 32), emphasis Rousselot ’s.

  105. 105.

    Rousselot (1910c, 252): “une activité connaissante surnaturelle”; Rousselot (1990, 29).

  106. 106.

    Rousselot (1910c, 444); Rousselot (1990, 45).

  107. 107.

    Rousselot (1910c, 448); Rousselot (1990, 47–48).

  108. 108.

    Rousselot (1910c, 450); Rousselot (1990, 49).

  109. 109.

    Rousselot (1910c, 451); Rousselot (1990, 50), quoting John 20: 28.

  110. 110.

    Rousselot (1910c, 457–458); Rousselot (1990, 56).

  111. 111.

    Rousselot (1910c, 469); Rousselot (1990, 65).

  112. 112.

    Cf. McDermott (1983, 149ff.).

  113. 113.

    See McDermott (1983, 164ff.).

  114. 114.

    Other critics who discuss the influence of Maréchal on Rousselot include McCool (1989, 61–63, 70) and Van Riet (1946, 301–313). Van Riet, however, tends to explain similarities in their thought as a product of their common dependence upon Blondel , which he exaggerates.

  115. 115.

    Further evolutions in Rousselot ’s religious philosophy due to Maréchal ’s influence may be discerned in other essays that he published in 1910. Prior to this time, Rousselot hardly addressed the role of judgment in knowledge. Yet in his 1910 essay “Amour spirituel et synthèse aperceptive,” he borrowed Maréchal ’s notion of judgment as an aperceptive synthesis to argue that love is the formal object of the intellect. This won Rousselot the double advantage of assuring the qualitatively supernatural elevation of the intellect as well as insuring that the product of human intellection, namely the concept, could not be treated in isolation but had to be referred to the dynamism of the self toward God as its final end; cf. McDermott (1983, 116). In “L’être et l’esprit,” published the same year, Rousselot links the themes of judgment and apperceptive synthesis to the Thomist concept of the species impressa (impressed form). According to the Thomist scheme, human knowledge consists in the impression of the intentional form (species) of an object on the possible intellect through an operation of the active intellect. Once this operation is complete, the knower can express himself in the mental word (verbum) of the judgment. Because the judgment confirms that the mind of the knower has been ontologically similar to the object known in the mental word, Rousselot argues that the effect of the species impressa in Aquinas ’s metaphysics of knowledge is to produce an “enlightening sympathization of the mind” (Rousselot 1910b, 563). “Métaphysique thomiste et critique de la connaissance,” also published in 1910, represents the final stage of development in Rousselot ’s thought that appeared during his lifetime. Towards the end of this essay, Rousselot reverses the a priori strategy that characterizes the argument of The Intellectualism of St. Thomas. Instead of presupposing the divine and angelic intellects as the ideals of human knowledge, Rousselot tries to demonstrate from below, as it were, how one can conclude to their existence by examining the conditions for the possibility of the affirmation of material being. Rousselot contends that in the simplest human conceptions the mind synthesizes essence and existence in an “natural and primitive act” of judgment whereby it affirms “this is a being,” and by implication “being exists” (Rousselot 1910d, 497–498). By elaborating a Thomist metaphysics within the critical parameters of post-Kantian philosophy, Rousselot would thus “renew from the inside” the traditional scholastic proofs for the existence of God (509).

  116. 116.

    Cf. McDermott (1983, 175–176).

  117. 117.

    See, for example, Rousselot (1910a, 234n1).

  118. 118.

    See, for example, Rousselot (1910b, 570n1).

  119. 119.

    Cf. McCool (1989, 71).

  120. 120.

    Rousselot himself never admitted any intellectual kinship or interest in Bergson . In fact, his rare comments about him are generally negative. Marty (1940, 258) cites the following remark that Rousselot made to one of his friends upon the election of Bergson to the Académie française: “Pour Bergson , je trouve regrettable de voir un Juif dans ce fauteuil. Au point de vue intellectuel, la tendance générale de sa philosophie me paraît pernicieuse, mais il a des théories de détail justes, neuves et bien fouillées. C’est ce que Daudet ou du moins Maurras auraient pu dire; l’A.F. [Action française] journal ma paru un peu trop dur; la Revue critique, pour rétablir l’équilibre, a, selon moi, un peu trop penché de l’autre côté.—On me dit que Bergson s’est tenu soigneusement tranquille pendant l’affaire Dreyfus; on me dit même qu’il admire beaucoup Maurras, mais cela ne suffit pas à justifier sa philosophie. Il a arraché des gens au matérialisme et les a orientés vers la foi: tel ce Maritain converti qui l’attaque maintenant.”

  121. 121.

    Rousselot answered the charges of Ligeard and another critic, Stephane Harent, in an article published together with Ligeard’s; see Rousselot (1914). An English translation of the Rousselot ’s article, “Answer to Two Attacks,” with an introduction by Avery Dulles, appears as an appendix to Rousselot (1990, 85–112).

  122. 122.

    See Dulles (1990). In a footnote, Dulles notes that Ledochowski’s letter was upheld in 1951 by then Father General John Baptist Janssens in a comment on Humani generis. Nevertheless, since Vatican II did not reaffirm the relevant passages of the encyclical, Dulles doubts that the prohibitions of the earlier Jesuit generals remain in effect.

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Dupont, C. (2014). Receptions of Phenomenological Insights in French Religious Thought, 1901–1929. In: Phenomenology in French Philosophy: Early Encounters. Phaenomenologica, vol 208. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-007-4641-1_4

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