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Precursors to the Reception of Phenomenology in France, 1889–1909

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Part of the book series: Phaenomenologica ((PHAE,volume 208))

Abstract

This chapter examines precursors to the emergence of phenomenology in French thought. First, an overview of the French philosophy during the latter part of the nineteenth century is presented in order to establish the philosophical context into which phenomenology was eventually received. The major currents of thought that characterized this period—positivism , idealism , and spiritualism —are discussed in light of phenomenological viewpoints and methodologies. Special attention is devoted to comparing the philosophical approaches of some of the principal representatives of these currents, such as Charles Renouvier and Félix Ravaisson , to Husserl’s phenomenological strategies in order to ascertain whether they may have contributed directly to later receptions of Husserl. The absence of strong parallels between these thinkers and Husserl leads to consideration of the new styles of philosophical thought that emerged in France just prior to the turn of the century, namely those of Henri Bergson and Maurice Blondel . The remainder of the chapter shows how the original philosophical insights of Bergson (lived duration and intuition) and Blondel (action) functioned as immediate precursors to the receptions of phenomenology in both French philosophy and French religious thought. After sketching briefly the development of these insights in the contexts of their works, specific comparisons with Husserl’s works are made. The resulting positive correlations are used to support the assessment that both Bergson and Blondel anticipated aspects of Husserl’s phenomenology in ways that encouraged their later followers, including both philosophers and religious thinkers, to take an interest in Husserl and other German phenomenologists.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    Hyppolite ’s previously unpublished manuscript on Husserl is undated, but bibliographic citations within the article suggest authorship in the mid-1950s.

  2. 2.

    See Theau (1977, 12).

  3. 3.

    See Guitton (1968, 58–59). Cf. Bréhier (1950, 5–6) and Lalande (1905, 429–432).

  4. 4.

    Guitton (1968, 63ff.); Cf. Benrubi (1933), who categorizes his articles on more than a hundred French philosophers under the same three headings. A still earlier instance of this tri-partite classification of philosophical currents may be found in Janet (1897, 1:185–192). Janet , in fact, orders them hierarchically while introducing intermediate levels: materialism, positivism , phenomenism, criticism, idealism , and finally spiritualism .

  5. 5.

    See Lalande (1905, 433–434).

  6. 6.

    For details on Brentano ’s departure from the priesthood and religious views see Husserl (1976, 47–55) and O’Meara (1991, 103ff.).

  7. 7.

    See Oesterreicher (1952, 51–55). Cf. Spiegelberg (1982, 72, 79–80).

  8. 8.

    Cf. Husserl (1965, 79ff).

  9. 9.

    Taine (1870), available in English as Taine (1977). Taine was certainly influenced by positivism , but he was also an avid reader of Hegel , which has led some of his interpreters to dissociate him from the positivist movement in France; see, for example, Rosca (1928).

  10. 10.

    See my exposition of essays by Delbos , Shestov, and Groethuysen in Chap. 4.

  11. 11.

    Hering (1939, 370). Cf. Husserl (1931, §20; 86): “If by ‘Positivism’ we are to mean the absolute unbiased grounding of all science on what is ‘positive,’ i.e., on what can be primordially apprehended, then it is we who are the genuine positivists” (emphasis Husserl’s).

  12. 12.

    See Guitton (1968, 66).

  13. 13.

    See Guitton (1968, 66).

  14. 14.

    Phénoménisme is most appropriately translated by phenomenalism , the view that we know only phenomena and that nothing stands behind them causing their appearance. In British philosophy this doctrine was advanced in various forms by Berkeley, Hume , and J.S. Mill. On the continent, Mach and Avenarius were the chief proponents. Cf. Theau (1977, 23), who also cites Renouvier as an exponent.

  15. 15.

    Verneaux (1945a, 209) notes that Renouvier neglected to clarify the limitations of intuition in his Essais. Verneaux (1945b, 56) explains further that in his Critique de la doctrine de Kant (a late essay posthumously published in 1906), Renouvier for the first time explicitly dismissed intellectual intuition as an “arbitrary fiction,” his reasoning being that for Kant an intellectual intuition would mean grasping the thing in itself, the noumenon, but since there is no noumenon, there can be no intellectual intuition.

  16. 16.

    See Verneaux (1945a, 85).

  17. 17.

    Renouvier ’s critique of Kant on this matter is very similar to Sartre ’s rejection of the transcendental ego as espoused by Husserl.

  18. 18.

    This collection of essays on contemporary German thought will be examined in detail in the next chapter for its contribution to the French awareness of Husserl, Scheler , and Heidegger .

  19. 19.

    While the philosophies of both Brunschvicg and Husserl contain elements of idealis m, their epistemological approaches are actually quite different. Jean Cavaillès, a student of both, offers an amusing reflection: “I continue to read his [Husserl’s] logic. Yet unfortunately, if his general method of philosophy is perhaps useful, the system which he derives from it is so distant from everything Brunschvicg et~al. impregnated in me that I’m afraid that unless I were converted, I could only look at it from afar as a foreign thing” (Ferrières 1950, 88). Perhaps the distance between the philosophies of Husserl and Brunschvicg accounts for Brunschvicg ’s relative neglect of phenomenology.

  20. 20.

    Renouvier (1854–1864, 2:390), quoted in Logue (1993, 89n15).

  21. 21.

    Hamelin defended his thesis in 1897. The title intentionally responds to Bergson ’s 1889 thesis, Essai sur les données immédiates de la conscience; see Parodi (1919, 432).

  22. 22.

    See Descombes (1980, 6).

  23. 23.

    See Guitton (1968, 68–69).

  24. 24.

    Another interesting figure whose descriptive phenomenological philosophy bears certain similarities to Husserl’s own was Henri-Fréderic Amiel (1821–1881). See Spiegelberg (1967), reprinted in Spiegelberg (1981, 93–104).

  25. 25.

    “… une époque philosophique dont le caractère général serait la prédominance d’un réalisme ou positivisme spiritualiste ayant pour principe générateur la conscience que l’esprit prend en lui-même d’une existence dont il reconnaît que toute autre existence derive et dépend, et qui n’est autre que son action.”

  26. 26.

    Biran (1942, 22). A typographical error incorrectly dates Bergson ’s thesis to 1881. Also quoted in Janicaud (1969, 4–5).

  27. 27.

    See Guitton (1968, 81–82).

  28. 28.

    See Benrubi (1933, 2:581–594).

  29. 29.

    Bergson (1991, 1466); Bergson (1934, 273).

  30. 30.

    See Janicaud (1969, 186–187).

  31. 31.

    See Lachelier (1902), available in English as Lachelier (1960). See also Guitton (1968, 90).

  32. 32.

    Cf. Husserl (1931, §85; 246–251). For more on the distinction between sensile hulé and intentional morphé, see also Husserl (1931, §§97–98; 282–290).

  33. 33.

    It is said that for many years Lachelier left the Critique of Pure Reason open on his desk to the page where Kant writes, “The ‘I think’ must be able to accompany all of my representations” (Boutroux 1927, 11). By comparison to Husserl, however, Lachelier interprets Kant ’s thesis in a weaker sense. For Lachelier , it would seem that while it is always possible to consider a phenomenon in relation to a cogito , it is not strictly necessary. For Husserl, on the other hand, the cogito furnishes the essential structure of all phenomenal experience. Its role is always actual even if it often goes unperceived—in the background, as it were; cf. Husserl (1931, §57; 172–173).

  34. 34.

    Lachelier (1902, 147–157); Lachelier (1960, 81–87).

  35. 35.

    Boutroux (1874), available in English as Boutroux (1920). For discussions of Boutroux ’s thesis see Parodi (1919, 169–177) and Benrubi (1933, 2:699–713). Benrubi (1933, 2:696n1) cites Boutroux ’s dedication of his French thesis to Ravaisson and his Latin thesis to Lachelier as evidence of his ties to spiritualism .

  36. 36.

    Boutroux (1874, 28); Boutroux (1920, 32).

  37. 37.

    Boutroux (1874, 169); Boutroux (1920, 194).

  38. 38.

    Cf. Janicaud (1969, 1).

  39. 39.

    Vincent Descombes (1980, 3), among others, has pointed out that twentieth-century philosophy has been characterized by successive triads of authorities: the philosophical regency of Bergson , Blondel , and Brunschvicg passed to the German dynasty of Hegel , Husserl, and Heidegger after the war, who in turn yielded the throne to the three masters of suspicion, Marx, Nietzsche, and Freud during the 1960s.

  40. 40.

    “Allocution à une conférence du Pasteur Hollard, 14 mai 1911,” in Bergson (1972, 887); also in Bergson (1957–1959, 2:359). Quoted by Henri Gouhier, “Preface” to Bergson (1991, xxvii).

  41. 41.

    See Sect. 2.2.4 below on “Bergson ’s Influence on French Theologians.”

  42. 42.

    Bergson (1972, 765–766); Bergson (1957–1959, 2:294–295), emphasis in the original.

  43. 43.

    Bergson (1889, 56–104); Bergson (1991, 51–92). Available in English as Bergson (1910, 75–139).

  44. 44.

    Bergson (1896); Bergson (1991, 161–378). Available in English as Bergson (1911b).

  45. 45.

    Bergson (1907, 16, cf. 19); Bergson (1991, 508, cf. 510). Available in English as Bergson (1911a, 17, cf. 19).

  46. 46.

    Cf. Gouhier, “Preface” to Bergson (1991, xx).

  47. 47.

    Bergson (1932, 119, cf. 334); Bergson (1991, 1072, cf. 1242). Available in English as Bergson (1935, 105, cf. 302).

  48. 48.

    Cf. Gouhier, “Preface” to Bergson (1991, vii); Delattre (1952, 198); Guitton (1968, 99).

  49. 49.

    Bergson (1934); Bergson (1991, 1251–1482). Available in English as Bergson (1946). Since the title of the English translation is rendered as The Creative Mind rather than by a two-term conjunction, such as Thought and Movement or the more literal Thought and the Moving Thing, something of the resonance with titles of other of Bergson ’s works, such as Matter and Memory or “Duration and Simultaneity” is lost, and so I have preferred here and hereafter to use the original French title, La pensée et le mouvant, even though I quote the text of the English translation except where noted.

  50. 50.

    Cited hereafter as “Introduction I,” in Bergson (1934, 1–23); Bergson (1991, 1253–1270); Bergson (1946, 9–32).

  51. 51.

    Cited hereafter as “Introduction II,” in Bergson (1934, 25–98); Bergson (1991, 1271–1330); Bergson (1946, 25–98).

  52. 52.

    J.-L. Vieillard-Baron, “Bergson , Henri,” in Jacob (1989, t. 3, pt. 2:2251). Cf. Havet (1950, 6).

  53. 53.

    Cited hereafter as “Introduction to Metaphysics,” in Bergson (1934, 177–227); Bergson (1991, 1392–1432); Bergson (1946, 187–237).

  54. 54.

    Bergson , “Introduction I,” (1934, 2); Bergson (1991, 1254); Bergson (1946, 10).

  55. 55.

    Bergson , “Introduction I,” (1934, 4); Bergson (1991, 1255); Bergson (1946, 12).

  56. 56.

    Bergson , “Introduction to Metaphysics,” (1934, 211); Bergson (1991, 1420); Bergson (1946, 222).

  57. 57.

    Bergson , “Introduction I,” (1934, 5–6); Bergson (1991, 1256–1257); Bergson (1946, 14).

  58. 58.

    Besides the brief mention of Zeno in this context and many others, Bergson offers two extended treatments of the Stoic’s four paradoxes. The first may be found in Bergson (1896, 213–215); Bergson (1991, 326–329); Bergson (1911b, 250–253) and the second in Bergson (1907, 308–313); Bergson (1991, 755–760); Bergson (1911a, 308–314).

  59. 59.

    Bergson , “Introduction I,” (1934, 9); Bergson (1991, 1259); Bergson (1946, 17).

  60. 60.

    Bergson , “Introduction I,” (1934, 11); Bergson (1991, 1261); Bergson (1946, 20).

  61. 61.

    Bergson , “Introduction I,” (1934, 13); Bergson (1991, 1262); Bergson (1946, 21).

  62. 62.

    Bergson , “Introduction I,” (1934, 16); Bergson (1946, 24); Bergson (1991, 1265), my translation, emphasis Bergson ’s.

  63. 63.

    Bergson , “Introduction I,” (1934, 18); Bergson (1991, 1266); Bergson (1946, 26).

  64. 64.

    Bergson , “Introduction I,” (1934, 22); Bergson (1991, 1269); Bergson (1946, 30).

  65. 65.

    Bergson , “Introduction II,” (1934, 25); Bergson (1991, 1271); Bergson (1946, 33–34).

  66. 66.

    For significant discussions of intuition as a method in Bergson, see Husson (1947) and Deleuze (1968). The latter is available in English as Deleuze (1988).

  67. 67.

    Bergson , “Introduction II,” (1934, 29); Bergson (1991, 1274 and note on 1574); Bergson (1946, 37–38). Bergson here makes reference to Höffding (1916), who discerns four distinct meanings of intuition in his philosophy: concrete, practical, analytical, and synthetic.

  68. 68.

    Bergson , “Introduction to Metaphysics,” (1934, 216, n. 2); Bergson (1991, 1423–1424); Bergson (1946, 306, n. 26).

  69. 69.

    Bergson , “Introduction II,” (1934, 27); Bergson (1991, 1272); Bergson (1946, 35).

  70. 70.

    Bergson , “Introduction II,” (1934, 27); Bergson (1991, 1273); Bergson (1946, 35).

  71. 71.

    Cf. Hyppolite (1971, 1:468).

  72. 72.

    Cf. Bergson , “Introduction to Metaphysics,” (1934, 29); Bergson (1991, 1274); Bergson (1946, 37).

  73. 73.

    Bergson , “Introduction II,” (1934, 28); Bergson (1991, 1273); Bergson (1946, 35–36).

  74. 74.

    Bergson , “Introduction II,” (1934, 27); Bergson (1991, 1273); Bergson (1946, 36). Cf. Bergson “Introduction to Metaphysics,” (1934, 182); Bergson (1991, 1396); Bergson (1946, 191): “There is at least one reality which we all seize from within, by intuition and not by simple analysis. It is our own person in its flowing through time, the self which endures.”

  75. 75.

    Bergson , “Introduction to Metaphysics,” (1934, 181); Bergson (1991, 1395); Bergson (1946, 190), emphasis Bergson ’s.

  76. 76.

    Bergson , “Introduction II,” (1934, 35); Bergson (1991, 1279); Bergson (1946, 43).

  77. 77.

    Bergson , “Introduction II,” (1934, 84); Bergson (1991, 1319); Bergson (1946, 91).

  78. 78.

    Bergson , “Introduction II,” (1934, 30); Bergson (1991, 1275); Bergson (1946, 38).

  79. 79.

    Bergson , “Introduction II,” (1934, 76); Bergson (1991, 1312); Bergson (1946, 83–84), my translation.

  80. 80.

    Bergson , “Introduction II,” (1934, 95); Bergson (1991, 1328); Bergson (1946, 103).

  81. 81.

    Cf. Bergson , “Introduction to Metaphysics,” (1934, 177, 217); Bergson (1991, 1393, 1424); Bergson (1946, 187, 227).

  82. 82.

    Bergson , “Introduction to Metaphysics,” (1934, 188); Bergson (1991, 1401); Bergson (1946, 198).

  83. 83.

    Bergson , “L’intuition philosophique,” (1934, 122–123); Bergson (1991, 1350); Bergson (1946, 132). Quoted in Guitton (1968, 100).

  84. 84.

    Bergson , “Introduction II,” (1934, 97–98); Bergson (1946, 105–106); Bergson (1991, 1329–1330)

  85. 85.

    Cf. Bergson , “Introduction to Metaphysics,” (1934, 202); Bergson (1946, 213); Bergson (1991, 1413).

  86. 86.

    Vincent Descombes (1980, 9) notes that the decline of Bergsonism and revolt against neo-Kantianism in the early 1930s coincided with emergence of French interest in Hegel . With respect to the reevaluation of Bergsonism during these years, it is significant that Maritain released the second edition of his critical La philosophie bergsonienne in 1929. Thus, Bergson ’s popularity and influence over French philosophy was challenged in the 1930s on several fronts: by Thomism , Hegelianism, and, I would add, Husserlian phenomenlogy.

  87. 87.

    Hering (1939, 368n1). Also cited in Spiegelberg (1982, 428).

  88. 88.

    Ingarden (1922, 285–461). See also Ingarden (1959, 163–166).

  89. 89.

    Husserl (1991, 172); cf. Husserl (1966, 168, Ms. 12).

  90. 90.

    In later reflections on the phenomenology of time-consciousness, Husserl called the phases of primary memory and primary anticipation “retention” and “protention” respectively. “But these are no longer taken to be names for moments belonging to a perceptual act,” notes John Brough (1991, xlix), “they are rather moments of the ultimate level of consciousness through which one is aware of the perceptual act—and of any other act or content—as an immanent temporal object” (emphasis Brough’s). As will be noted below, Husserl’s interest shifted from an analysis of perception in his early studies to what he later considered to be the more fundamental act of temporal constitution.

  91. 91.

    Cf. Kolakowski (1968, 131).

  92. 92.

    Bergson , “Introduction to Metaphysics,” (1934, 213); Bergson (1991, 1421); Bergson (1946, 223).

  93. 93.

    Bergson , “Introduction to Metaphysics,” (1934, 214); Bergson (1991, 1422); Bergson (1946, 224), emphasis Bergson ’s.

  94. 94.

    Bergson , “Introduction to Metaphysics,” (1934, 226); Bergson (1991, 1432); Bergson (1946, 236).

  95. 95.

    Bergson , “Introduction to Metaphysics,” (1934, 216–217); Bergson (1991, 1424); Bergson (1946, 227).

  96. 96.

    Cf. Gouhier, “Preface” to Bergson (1991, xi–xii).

  97. 97.

    For an example of Bergson ’s reflections on Einstein’s theory of relativity, see (Bergson 1922); Bergson (1972, 57–244), available in English as Bergson (1965).

  98. 98.

    Bergson , “Introduction to Metaphysics,” (1934, 224); Bergson (1991, 1430); Bergson (1946, 234).

  99. 99.

    Bergson (1932, 272); Bergson (1991, 1193); Bergson (1935, 244–245).

  100. 100.

    Bergson (1932, 281); Bergson (1991, 1200); Bergson (1935, 252).

  101. 101.

    Bergson (1932, 282); Bergson (1991, 1201); Bergson (1935, 253–254).

  102. 102.

    Cf. Bergson (1889, 84); Bergson (1991, 76); Bergson (1910, 113).

  103. 103.

    Cf. Husserl (1991, 392–393), and also John Brough, “Introduction” to the preceding, pp. liv–lv.

  104. 104.

    Bergson , “Introduction II,” (1934, 97); Bergson (1991, 1329); Bergson (1946, 105), my translation.

  105. 105.

    Farber (1950, 67). See also Ingarden (1922, 285–461).

  106. 106.

    See for example the comments of Georges Gurvitch (1949, 74): “In sum, what Scheler appreciates most in Bergson is his theory of philosophical knowledge opposed to the knowledge of the sciences and founded on the participation by love in the blossoming of the world. Bergsonian anti-intellectualism is for Scheler , as we will see, uniquely an emotionalism and not at all a doctrine of action, a voluntarism to which Scheler is absolutely hostile.”

  107. 107.

    Bergson , “Introduction to Metaphysics,” (1934, 181); Bergson (1991, 1395); Bergson (1946, 190), emphasis Bergson ’s.

  108. 108.

    See also Chap. 2 for a more detailed discussion of Scheler ’s reception in France.

  109. 109.

    See Heidegger (1962, 500–501, n. xxx). Heidegger (1988, 320–321) later recanted, in part, his criticism of Bergson for having an Aristotelian notion of time. Joachim H. Seyppel (1956, 503–508) has argued that Heidegger ’s notion of temporaneity/temporality (Zeitlichkeit) is a kind of abstract version of Bergson ’s concept of duration (durée).

  110. 110.

    In 1910, Péguy asked Bergson to write a preface to his Oeuvres choisies, but Bergson refused, apparently to avoid compromising himself over the controversial writer. As a matter of principle, Bergson seldom endorsed the work of his followers.

  111. 111.

    Raïssa Maritain (1942, 79ff.) recounts the story.

  112. 112.

    See Guitton (1959, 137). Shortly after Bergson ’s last book appeared, Loisy (1933) published a pointed critique entitled, Y a-t-il deux sources de la religion et de la morale?

  113. 113.

    For further discussion of the similarities between Le Roy and Blondel , see Chap. 4 and also René Virgoulay (1980, 139–140).

  114. 114.

    In a lecture titled “L’âme et le corps,” given under the auspices of the Catholic journal Foi et vie on April 28, 1912, Bergson (1991, 836–860) argued that common sense has it right: the soul is distinct from body and brain. The immortality of the mind or soul cannot be proven but can be argued from a scientific perspective that the mind survives the body for a limited time. The soul depends upon the body for its manifestation, but not for its existence; memory is spiritual, not material.

  115. 115.

    Cf. Maritain (1930, 64–93, 123–146), available in English as Maritain (1955). Incidentally, Maritain ’s critique was echoed by others and soon Bergson found himself blamed for all the current anti-intellectual tendencies in France, and thus he became as much an enemy of the Sorbonne as of the Church.

  116. 116.

    Maritain ’s essay “Les deux bergsonismes” first appeared in the Revue thomiste (July-August, 1912) and was subsequently republished in La philosophie bergsonienne (Maritain (1930, 383–407); Maritain (1955, 285–300)).

  117. 117.

    In a now famous extract from his will, dated 8 February 1937, Bergson states: “My reflections have led me nearer and nearer to Catholicism, in which I find the absolute completion of Judaism. I would have become a convert if I had not seen in preparation for so many years this formidable wave of anti-Semitism that will soon overflow the world. I wanted to remain among those who tomorrow will be the persecuted ones. But I hope that a Catholic priest will be willing, if the Cardinal Archbishop of Paris gives him the authorization, to come and say the prayers at my burial. If this authorization is not given, a rabbi should be asked, but without hiding from him, or from anyone, my moral adherence to Catholicism, as well as the desire, before stated, of having the prayers of a Catholic priest.” Cited by Jean Wahl (1944, 45–50).

  118. 118.

    Cf. Havet (1950, 4–5).

  119. 119.

    Letter to Fr. Tonquédec, February 20, 1912, in Bergson (1972, 964), my translation. Also quoted by Gouhier, “Preface” to Bergson (1991, x).

  120. 120.

    Bergson (1932, 240ff.); Bergson (1991, 1168ff); Bergson (1935, 216ff.).

  121. 121.

    It is interesting to note that in the second introductory essay to La pensée et le mouvant, which he drafted in 1922, Bergson was willing to equate the goal of intuition with the truth of the mystics (Bergson (1934, 51); Bergson (1991, 1292); Bergson (1946, 57)).

  122. 122.

    Bergson (1932, 264); Bergson (1991, 1186); Bergson (1935, 237).

  123. 123.

    Bergson (1932, 255); Bergson (1932 1179); Bergson (1991, 229).

  124. 124.

    Bergson (1935, 270); Bergson (1932, 1192); Bergson (1935, 243).

  125. 125.

    Letter of Maurice Blondel to Georges Perrot, October 10, 1893 (Blondel (1961b, 36)).

  126. 126.

    Note by Maurice Blondel s.v. “Action” in André Lalande (1988, 20, emphasis Blondel ’s).

  127. 127.

    Blondel entered the École Normale in 1881, the same year Bergson graduated.

  128. 128.

    On this point see Saint-Jean (1965, 43–49).

  129. 129.

    See Blondel (1993, 424–465), available in English as Blondel (1984, 389–424).

  130. 130.

    See Alexander Dru, “Introduction” to Blondel (1964, 42–43); Blondel (1961a, 487n1).

  131. 131.

    Following Henri Gouhier, Jean Lacroix (1968, 11–24) divides Blondel ’s career into three phases: (1) prior to the “Letter on Apologetics” of 1896, (2) from 1896 to the publication of the first volume of his trilogy in 1934, and (3) from 1934 to his death in 1944. I prefer a four-stage periodization for reasons explained below.

  132. 132.

    For a brief discussion of Blondel ’s Latin thesis, see Somerville (1968, 315).

  133. 133.

    See Blondel ’s compte-rendu of Delbos (1893), published as Blondel [Bernard Aimant, pseud.], (1894).

  134. 134.

    See Henrici (1990, 41–43). For additional background on Blondel ’s intellectual formation see Saint-Jean (1965).

  135. 135.

    See Wehrlé (1951, 87–90).

  136. 136.

    Blondel (1895–1896), reprinted in Blondel (1956) and available in English as Blondel (1964).

  137. 137.

    Lalande’s Vocabulaire originally appeared in fascicles; the latest edition is Lalande (1988).

  138. 138.

    The volumes of Blondel ’s trilogy on thought, being, and action appeared in successive years: Blondel (1934), Blondel (1935), and Blondel (1936–1937). The companion volume on the Christian faith was published posthumously (Blondel 1944–1946).

  139. 139.

    L’Itinéraire philosophique de Maurice Blondel was first published in 1928 in Paris by Éditions Spes, but all subsequent citations are to the second edition (Blondel 1966). For Blondel ’s account of how the one hour became 400 and finally a book, see the “Avertissement,” 7.

  140. 140.

    Cf. Introduction to Blondel (1934, 1:5–19).

  141. 141.

    Those familiar with the sides taken in the mid-century debates over the interpretation of Blondel will recognize that my reasoning here and below follows Henri Bouillard. Justifying his privileging of action Bouillard (1969, 5) writes: “In fact, this is the work that constituted a breakthrough and has exerted the greatest influence. The works that follow are marked by the controversies that L’action gave rise to and they would be incomprehensible to anyone who did not enter through this door. Finally, we shall have the opportunity to show that this book, despite its imperfections, remains Blondel ’s masterpiece; it is the work in which his original contribution appears most vigorously.” Cf. Bouillard (1961, 18).

  142. 142.

    Blondel (1993, vii); Blondel (1984, 3).

  143. 143.

    Blondel (1993, 28); Blondel (1984, 40).

  144. 144.

    Cf. Blondel (1993, xxii, xxi, xxv, 99); Blondel (1984, 9, 12, 15, 105).

  145. 145.

    Cf. Saint-Jean (1965, 52–55), who cites an important passage from Blondel (1936–1937, 1:239) to which we will return in the following chapter: “Dès la première fiche, où se précisait, le 5 novembre 1882, le projet d’une thèse intitulée L’action, se trouvaient réunies diverses citations tirées de la Métaphysique ou des diverses Éthiques d’Aristote . Et, dans tous ces textes, le thème dominant qui était recueilli, c’était bien celui de caractère unitif, supra-discursif et gros d’infinitude, comme aussi de précision et de perfection, qu’inclut l’action d’après le Stagirite.” Hayen (1952, 354) reproduces this page of Blondel ’s notes, which was actually dated November 3, 1882.

  146. 146.

    Fessard (1956, 1:6n1), cited by Henrici (1958, 23n21).

  147. 147.

    See Bouillard (1961, 26), available in English as Bouillard (1969, 13): “The idea of phenomenology is not exactly the same for the two authors. Hegel devotes much of his attention to the consideration of history and historical categories; but his plays a minor role in Blondel . The purpose of philosophy for Hegel , the ideal of the wise man, is absolute knowledge; for Blondel it is the religious option which philosophy shows to be necessary.” Furthermore, while both Peter Henrici, cited in the previous note, and Edward J. Sponga (1955) have written monographs comparing the Hegelian and Blondelian dialectics, neither concludes that Blondel was in any way mimicking Hegel ’s style.

  148. 148.

    Blondel (1993, xxi); Blondel (1984, 12): “We must, on the contrary, take in all the negations that destroy one another, as if it were possible to admit them altogether. We must enter into all prejudices, as if they were legitimate, into all errors, as if they were sincere, into all passions, as if they had the generosity they boast of, into all philosophical systems, as if each one held in his grip the infinite truth it thinks it has cornered. We must, taking within ourselves all consciousnesses, become the intimate accomplice of all, in order to see if they bear within themselves their justification or condemnation.”

  149. 149.

    Letter of Maurice Blondel to Maurice Lena, March 23, 1890, in Blondel (1961b, 20).

  150. 150.

    Blondel (1993, 41); Blondel (1984, 52).

  151. 151.

    Blondel (1993, 42); Blondel (1984, 53).

  152. 152.

    See Somerville (1968, 73).

  153. 153.

    Blondel (1964, 157); Blondel (1956, 39).

  154. 154.

    Blondel (1993, 134); Blondel (1984, 136).

  155. 155.

    The Augustinianism of Blondel would make an interesting study. Although Blondel seldom refers to the Bishop of Hippo, the main lines of their thought are similar: the privileging of the will over the intellect and the expansive dynamism of the former and its dialectical relationship to the latter, etc. In one of his rare discussions of Augustine, a commemorative essay on the fifteen hundredth anniversary of his death, Blondel (1930, 468–469) tries to draw out the unity of his thought with the result that his philosophy appears remarkably similar to Blondel ’s own: “Augustin …implique constamment notre état concret, qui n’est ni nature pure et se suffisant intrinsèquement ni surnature naturlisable, mais état transnaturel, état qui, même initialement, posait une crise à résoudre avec les diverses répercussions justement possibles d’une libre option humaine et des libéralités de la condescendance divine.”

  156. 156.

    Blondel (1993, 339ff.); Blondel (1984, 314ff.).

  157. 157.

    Blondel (1993, 350); Blondel (1984, 324). Here again I side with the interpretation of Henri Bouillard, who understands Blondel to be arguing for recognition of an indeterminate supernatural as a philosophical necessity, as against Henri Duméry, who regards Blondel as asserting the supernatural as a philosophical possibility; see Duméry (1954).

  158. 158.

    For a discussion of how Blondel ’s argument compares to traditional proofs for the existence of God, see Somerville (1968, 215).

  159. 159.

    Blondel (1993, 357); Blondel (1984, 330).

  160. 160.

    See especially Cartier (1955). For a different perspective see Jolivet (1952).

  161. 161.

    The reference to St. Paul here is not without precedent: Blondel himself stated explicitly that he patterned his dialectic upon the apostle’s (see Letter of Blondel to Victor Delbos , May 6, 1889, in Blondel (1961b, 18)).

  162. 162.

    Bouillard (1961, 22); Bouillard (1969, 9).

  163. 163.

    Blondel (1993, 424–425); Blondel (1984, 389–390). Cf. Bouillard (1961, 224–228); Bouillard (1969, 176–180).

  164. 164.

    Blondel (1993, 425); Blondel (1984, 390).

  165. 165.

    Blondel (1993, 41, 481); Blondel (1984, 52, 437). In the latter context, Blondel refers jointly to phenomenalism , criticism, and positivism , making it difficult to determine precisely whose doctrine of phenomenalism he has in mind, although his qualifying description of rigorous restriction to empirical phenomena suggests Renouvier . With respect to the possibility of Blondel ’s making reference to Taine , see Troisfontaines (1986, 471n7).

  166. 166.

    Blondel (1956, 40), my translation. Trethowan misleadingly translates “phénoménisme intégral” as “entire phenomenology” (Blondel (1964, 157)).

  167. 167.

    Blondel (1956, 62); Blondel (1964, 179).

  168. 168.

    Blondel (1956, 171); Blondel (1964, 240). Trethowan misleadingly translates “qui ne sera qu’un phénoménisme” as “purely phenomenological in character.”

  169. 169.

    Wehrlé ’s account was first published a decade after Blondel ’s defense, so it is unlikely that it presents a faithful transcription of the dialog. Nevertheless, Blondel approved the publication, so we can trust that what is said here about phenomenology and phenomenism represents Blondel ’s actual opinion. This passage is also cited by Virgoulay (1992, 84n8). In addition, Virgoulay makes reference to a letter of Blondel addressed to Albert Lamy dated December 16, 1896, in which Blondel likewise distinguishes “phénoménisme” from a “phénoménologie scientifique de l’esprit,” preferring the latter to describe his own approach (Blondel (1961b, 119–120)). See also Bouillard (1961, 169); Bouillard (1969, 131) for a discussion of other instances of Blondel ’s use of “phenomenologie” and “phénoménisme” during the late 1890s.

  170. 170.

    Bouillard (1961, 169); Bouillard (1969, 132).

  171. 171.

    Blondel (1935, 368–380). See also École (1959, 27–28) for a discussion of Blondel ’s excursus.

  172. 172.

    Blondel (1993, 481–482); Blondel (1984, 437).

  173. 173.

    Cf. Blondel (1993, 305); Blondel (1984, 285).

  174. 174.

    Blondel (1993, 51); Blondel (1984, 62). For fuller, point-by-point critiques of the positive sciences see Blondel (1993, 61ff. and 82ff.); Blondel (1984, 70ff. and 89ff.).

  175. 175.

    Blondel (1993, 86); Blondel (1984, 93).

  176. 176.

    Blondel (1993, 86); Blondel (1984, 93).

  177. 177.

    Blondel (1993, 99); Blondel (1984, 105), emphasis Blondel ’s.

  178. 178.

    Blondel (1993, 102); Blondel (1984, 107).

  179. 179.

    Blondel (1993, 100); Blondel (1984, 106).

  180. 180.

    Blondel (1956, 5); Blondel (1964, 127). According to Bouillard (1961, 31); Bouillard (1969, 17), Denis meant to commend Blondel ’s Letter: “Denis’s intention was to praise the work, but Blondel saw in this appreciation a double misunderstanding: He had intended to work as a philosopher, not as an apologist in the current meaning of the term, and to approach the religious problem not through psychological analysis but through philosophical reflection.”

  181. 181.

    Blondel (1956, 10); Blondel (1964, 131–132).

  182. 182.

    Blondel (1956, 39); Blondel (1964, 157).

  183. 183.

    Blondel (1956, 71); Blondel (1964, 186).

  184. 184.

    Blondel (1993, 341); Blondel (1984, 316). Cf. Blondel (1993, 388); Blondel (1984, 357), where Blondel states that science speaks “in the name of determinism.”

  185. 185.

    Blondel (1993, xxi); Blondel (1984, 12).

  186. 186.

    The history of this important debate has been thoroughly analyzed by Renard (1941).

  187. 187.

    Blondel (1956, 54); Blondel (1964, 171). See also Blondel (1932).

  188. 188.

    Husserl (1965, 73): “I do not say that philosophy is an imperfect science; I say simply that it is not yet a science at all, that as science it has not yet begun.”

  189. 189.

    For a treatment of the evolution of the notion of intentionality from scholasticism to Husserl, see Spiegelberg (1976).

  190. 190.

    See Husserl (1970, Investigation V, §11; 2:557–560) and Husserl (1931, §88; 257–260). In the Logical Investigations , Husserl distinguishes between the real (real) existence of the object outside consciousness and the real (reell) content of the experience of the object within consciousness. In Ideas , Husserl refers to the reell content as the noema, or nucleus, of experienced meaning.

  191. 191.

    Blondel (1993, 135); Blondel (1984, 139).

  192. 192.

    Blondel (1993, 135); Blondel (1984, 139).

  193. 193.

    Pierre Rousselot makes this same observation; see Chap. 4, below.

  194. 194.

    Blondel (1993, 137); Blondel (1984, 139).

  195. 195.

    Husserl (1931, §3; 55), emphasis Husserl’s.

  196. 196.

    Husserl (1950, 45), available in English as Husserl (1964, 35), emphasis Husserl’s.

  197. 197.

    Blondel (1993, 46); Blondel (1984, 56–57), emphasis Blondel ’s.

  198. 198.

    Blondel (1993, 89); Blondel (1984, 95).

  199. 199.

    Blondel (1993, 98); Blondel (1984, 104), emphasis Blondel ’s.

  200. 200.

    Blondel (1956, 41); Blondel (1964, 159).

  201. 201.

    Bouillard (1961, 168); Bouillard (1969, 131).

  202. 202.

    Blondel (1993, 91); Blondel (1984, 97).

  203. 203.

    Blondel (1993, 241); Blondel (1984, 229).

  204. 204.

    Blondel (1993, 226); Blondel (1984, 217).

  205. 205.

    Blondel (1993, 246); Blondel (1984, 234).

  206. 206.

    Blondel (1993, 230); Blondel (1984, 220).

  207. 207.

    Blondel (1993, 459); Blondel (1984, 419); quoted in Troisfontaines, “Introduction” to Blondel (1972, 137).

  208. 208.

    Blondel (1993, 141–142); Blondel (1984, 142–143).

  209. 209.

    Blondel (1993, 470ff.); Blondel (1984, 427ff.). Cf. Bouillard (1961, 22); Bouillard (1969, 9).

  210. 210.

    Blondel (1966, 45ff.) describes his progress “vers une science du concret, science à la fois de l’être et de la pensée, par la méditation de l’action où convergent l’universel et le singulier.” See also the studies by Spaïer (1927) and Pradines (1928).

  211. 211.

    Bouillard (1961, 214); Bouillard (1969, 169) provides a summary list and discussion.

  212. 212.

    Blondel (1956, 44–45); Blondel (1964, 162–163).

  213. 213.

    Blondel (1956, 40); Blondel (1964, 158); see also Saint-Jean (1966), especially 229–239 and 421–431, but note: Saint-Jean finds in Blondel both a phenomenology and a philosophy of religion (424–425).

  214. 214.

    Cf. Blondel (1956, 69); Blondel (1964, 184).

  215. 215.

    Cf. McCool (1989, 7–8).

  216. 216.

    Blondel (1956, 71); Blondel (1964, 186).

  217. 217.

    Blondel (1956, 75); Blondel (1964, 190).

  218. 218.

    Their long-standing friendship and correspondence finally broke off in 1928 after continuing disagreements; see Claude Tresmontant, “Epilogue,” in Blondel and Laberthonnière (1961, 361ff.).

  219. 219.

    Cf. Saint-Jean (1966, 16).

  220. 220.

    “Mémoire à Monsieur R., prêtre de Saint-Sulpice,” in Blondel (1961a, 550–551), also quoted in Dru and Trethowan, “Introduction” to Blondel (1964, 16), my translation.

  221. 221.

    Blondel (1956, 150); Blondel (1964, 221).

  222. 222.

    See Somerville (1968, 280–281).

  223. 223.

    For a summary of neo-Thomist reaction to Blondel see Tresmontant (1963, 315–329).

  224. 224.

    Blondel (1956, 27–28); Blondel (1964, 146), emphasis Blondel ’s.

  225. 225.

    Also quoted by Bouillard (1961, 34); Bouillard (1969, 20).

  226. 226.

    Cf. Bouillard (1961, 40); Bouillard (1969, 26).

  227. 227.

    Cf. Dulles (1971, 209). Dulles distinguishes between traditional and revisionist approaches to apologetics in the twentieth century, citing Blondel as chief example of the latter (see pp. 202ff.).

  228. 228.

    Bouillard (1961, 40–41); Bouillard (1969, 26).

  229. 229.

    See Ossa (1965, 189 [525]).

  230. 230.

    See Ossa (1965, 198 [534]); Rousselot (1924), available in English as Rousselot (1932).

  231. 231.

    See Scott (1962, 346); Rousselot (1910), available in English as Rousselot (1990).

  232. 232.

    See Tresmontant (1963, 325).

  233. 233.

    Quoted in Tresmontant (1963, 325–326).

  234. 234.

    Blondel (1956, 77); Blondel (1964, 191–192).

  235. 235.

    Bouillard (1961, 34); Bouillard (1969, 20).

  236. 236.

    Cf. Garrigou-Lagrange (1935) and Tonquedec (1936).

  237. 237.

    Maritain (1932, 108), also quoted in Dru and Trethowan, “Introduction” to Blondel (1964, 13).

  238. 238.

    Milet (1940–1945, 247) cites the following remark about Blondel found in one of Maréchal ’s notebooks: “En soulignant mieux que Kant , l’action du sujet connaissant dans la constitution de phénomène, il avait permis à la métaphysique de réintégrer la place qu’elle occupait jadis au coeur de l’épistémologie avant qu’un formalisme statique ne l’en eût chassée.” For Milet’s remarks concerning Maréchal ’s rapprochement of Blondel and Aquinas, see 242–43.

  239. 239.

    See Maréchal (1930, 400), who concludes: “la notion critique d’évidence nous permettrait d’utiliser sans scrupule les rigoureuses analyses de M. Husserl…sans laisser d’emprunter à M. Blondel quelques vues pénétrantes du dynamisme sous-jacent à la pensée formelle. L’union de ces deux points de vue, sur la base éprouvée de la tradition scolastique, se montrerait probablement féconde.”

  240. 240.

    Letter of Teilhard de Chardin to Auguste Valensin , December 29, 1919, in de Lubac (1965, 42), available in English as de Lubac (1967, 46).

  241. 241.

    Bouillard (1961, 44); Bouillard (1969, 29).

  242. 242.

    Blondel (1966, 23–24): “Quant à m’inspirer de Bergson , je l’ai pu d’autant moins que je n’avais pas lu une ligne de lui avant d’achever et de soutenir ma thèse. Après 1893, c’est avec un vif plaisir que j’ai goûté la merveilleuse imagerie du philosophe-poète de l’élan vital…Toutefois, si la part critique est souvent belle et féconde (quoique sans doute autrement que je ne le souhaiterais), toute la part positive se déroule en un plan qui me semble finalement intenable. Aussi les mot mêmes que nous employons volontiers l’un et l’autre, tels que vie, action, intelligence, etc., me semblent chez lui (si j’ose m’exprimer de façon si peu pertinente) déracinés, désaxés et décapités, au point que la ‘durée pure’ et ‘l’évolution créatrice’ n’ont pu, après coup, que m’aider à prendre davantage conscience d’une inspiration totalement divergente” (emphasis Blondel ’s).

  243. 243.

    École (1959, 197). École’s study appeared to late for Tresmontant to discuss it in his Introduction à la métaphysique de Maurice Blondel (1963), however he quotes with approval several paragraphs from this section (see pp. 328–329).

  244. 244.

    Blondel (1993, xxii); cf. Blondel (1984, 13), my translation.

  245. 245.

    See “L’âme et le corps,” in Bergson (1991, 850). This not to ignore the fact that there are also important differences between Bergson and Blondel with regard to the meaning of action: “Notons à ce propos, une différence radicale entre Blondel et Bergson . Ce dernier prétendait que toute action déforme le réel pour des motifs utilitaires et il demandait, en conséquence, de revenir à une intuition originaire. Jamais Blondel n’a souscrit à ce propos car, pour lui, c’est en s’adaptant toujours mieux aux phénomènes que l’agent finit par en percevoir et en assimiler la réalité, en sorte que l’intuition n’est pas à chercher dans un passé perdu mais dans un avenir à conquérir” (Troisfontaines (1990, 75)).

  246. 246.

    Likewise Max Scheler , the first and best known German phenomenologist in France for many years, rejected all voluntarist positions and philosophies of action; see Gurvitch (1930, 74) and Chap. 3, below.

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Dupont, C. (2014). Precursors to the Reception of Phenomenology in France, 1889–1909. In: Phenomenology in French Philosophy: Early Encounters. Phaenomenologica, vol 208. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-007-4641-1_2

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