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Explanation and Modelization in a Comprehensive Inferential Account

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Part of the book series: The European Philosophy of Science Association Proceedings ((EPSP,volume 1))

Abstract

In the present chapter, we defend an inferential account both of explanation and scientific modelling. Our account is ‘comprehensive’ in the sense that not only our approach covers both aspects of scientific activity, but also because we assume a pragmatic perspective that tries to capture the intrinsic versatility that scientific models and explanations may adopt in the course of scientific discourse. Our view is essentially inspired by the work of Robert Brandom in the philosophy of language, in particular what he call ‘an inferential semantics grounded in a normative pragmatics’ (see Brandom 1994, 2000), but also takes elements from other authors, mainly from argumentation theory and epistemology. As many philosophers of science that favour an inferential perspective, we see scientific models as inferential tools that help to extract inferences about the target in relation to specific goals.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    For a similar approach to commitment in dialogue, see Walton and Krabbe (1995). From the formal point of view, Hintikka (1986) and Kibble (2006) are attempts of formalization of the logic of dialogues.

  2. 2.

    This extrapolation of the idea of commitment to the context of scientific knowledge is not new. Polanyi (1958) argued that commitment plays an essential role in the pursuit of scientific knowledge.

  3. 3.

    The terms of ‘explainer’ and ‘explainee’ are used by Goldberg (1965) and other authors.

  4. 4.

    By equating the meaning of a concept to its set of inferential links to other concepts, Brandom explains also the notion of ‘understanding a concept’ just as the capacity of performing in a proper way those inferential moves. See Brandom (1994, 85 and ff.).

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Acknowledgement

This chapter has received financial support from the Spanish Ministry of Science and Innovation (Research Projects Ref.: FFI2008-03607/FISO, FFI2008-01580/FISO, and FFI2009-08828/FISO).

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Correspondence to Xavier de Donato-Rodríguez .

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de Donato-Rodríguez, X., Zamora-Bonilla, J. (2012). Explanation and Modelization in a Comprehensive Inferential Account. In: de Regt, H., Hartmann, S., Okasha, S. (eds) EPSA Philosophy of Science: Amsterdam 2009. The European Philosophy of Science Association Proceedings, vol 1. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-007-2404-4_4

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