Skip to main content

Debating (Neo)logicism: Frege and the Neo-Fregeans

  • Chapter
  • First Online:
Book cover Between Logic and Reality

Part of the book series: Logic, Epistemology, and the Unity of Science ((LEUS,volume 25))

  • 818 Accesses

Abstract

The paper’s aim is to determine and discuss in which sense, if any, Frege’s and neo-Fregean logicism are responding to the epistemological challenge concerning our arithmetical knowledge. More precisely the paper analyses what the epistemological significance of Frege’s logicist programme amounts to, namely, the objective justificatory connections obtaining between arithmetical and logical statements. It then contrasts this result with the self-understanding of the neo-Fregeans who allegedly follow Frege’s steps, but in fact take a rather different direction.

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this chapter

Chapter
USD 29.95
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
eBook
USD 84.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as EPUB and PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
Softcover Book
USD 109.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Compact, lightweight edition
  • Dispatched in 3 to 5 business days
  • Free shipping worldwide - see info
Hardcover Book
USD 109.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Durable hardcover edition
  • Dispatched in 3 to 5 business days
  • Free shipping worldwide - see info

Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout

Purchases are for personal use only

Institutional subscriptions

Notes

  1. 1.

    See e.g., Hale and Wright [8, 9].

  2. 2.

    Wright, On the philosophical significance of Frege’s theorem, p. 210.

  3. 3.

    Wherever possible, the Grundlagen quotations are taken from (Beaney [1]); alternatively they are from Austin’s translation.

  4. 4.

    See Dummett [4], Kitcher [11], Martin-Löf [13] and Shapiro [15].

  5. 5.

    See e.g., Burge [3].

  6. 6.

    The principle has been called Hume’s Principle by Boolos (in “The consistency of Frege’s Foundations of Arithmetic”, in [2]). Boolos gave it this title because it recalls a remark in Hume’s Treatise (Book I, Part iii, Section 1, par. 5), and because Frege quotes Hume in Grundlagen (§63):

    when two numbers are so combin’d, as that the one always as unite answering to every unite of the other, we pronounce them equal …

  7. 7.

    See e.g., Hale [7].

  8. 8.

    Hale and Wright [10, p. 169].

  9. 9.

    Ebert and Shapiro [5, p. 421].

References

  1. Beaney, Michael. 1997. The Frege Reader. Oxford: Blackwell Publishing.

    Google Scholar 

  2. Boolos, George. 1998. Logic, Logic and Logic. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  3. Burge, Tyler. 2005. Truth, Thought, Reason—Essays on Frege. Oxford: Clarendon Press.

    Book  Google Scholar 

  4. Dummett, Michael. 1991. Frege : Philosophy of Mathematics. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  5. Ebert, Philip, and Stewart Shapiro. 2009. “The Good, the Bad and the Ugly.” Synthese 170:415–41.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  6. Frege, Gottlob. 1884. Die Grundlagen der Arithmetik. Translated by Austin, J.L., 1953, The Foundations of Arithmetic. New York, NY: Harper & Brothers.

    Google Scholar 

  7. Hale, Bob. 1999. “Intuition and Reflection in Arithmetic II.” Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 73:75–98.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  8. Hale, Bob, and Crispin Wright. 2001. The Reason’s Proper Study—Essays Towards a Neo-Fregean Philosophy of Mathematics. Oxford: Clarendon Press.

    Google Scholar 

  9. Hale, Bob, and Crispin Wright. 2002. “Benacerraf’s Dilemma Revisited.” European Journal of Philosophy 10:101–29.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  10. Hale, Bob, and Crispin Wright. 2005. “Logicism in the Twenty-First Century.” In The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Mathematics and Logic, edited by Stewart Shapiro, 172–73, Oxford University Press, New York.

    Google Scholar 

  11. Kitcher, Philip. 1979. “Frege’s Epistemology.” The Philosophical Review 88:235–62.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  12. Lakatos, Imre. 1976. Proofs and Refutations. Cambridge: Cambridge Universtity Press.

    Google Scholar 

  13. Martin-Löf, Per. 1996. “On the Meaning of the Logical Constants and the Justifications of the Logical Laws.” Nordic Journal of Philosophical Logic 1:11–60.

    Google Scholar 

  14. Shapiro, Stewart. 2000. “Introduction to the Abstraction and Neo-Logicism Special Issue.” Philosophia Mathematica 8(II):99.

    Google Scholar 

  15. Shapiro, Stewart. 2004. “Foundations of Mathematics: Metaphysics, Epistemology, Structure.” The Philosophical Quarterly 54:22–23.

    Google Scholar 

  16. Shapiro, Stewart. 2009. “The Measure of Scottish Neo-Logicism.” In Logicism, Intuitionism, and Formalism, edited by Linström et al., Synthese Library 341. Springer Dordrecht; London.

    Google Scholar 

  17. Wright, Crispin. 1983. Frege’s Conception of Numbers as Objects. Aberdeen: Aberdeen University Press.

    Google Scholar 

Download references

Acknowledgements

Acknowledgments Portions of this were presented at the conference in Dubrovnik in May 2010. Many thanks to the participants for their comments: Stewart Shapiro, Per Martin-Löf, Alan Wier, Berislav Žarnić, Stephen Reed. Many thanks as well to Nenad Smokrović and especially to Nenad Miščević.

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

Authors

Corresponding author

Correspondence to Majda Trobok .

Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

Copyright information

© 2012 Springer Science+Business Media B.V.

About this chapter

Cite this chapter

Trobok, M. (2012). Debating (Neo)logicism: Frege and the Neo-Fregeans. In: Trobok, M., Miščević, N., Žarnić, B. (eds) Between Logic and Reality. Logic, Epistemology, and the Unity of Science, vol 25. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-007-2390-0_5

Download citation

Publish with us

Policies and ethics