Argument and Its Uses

Abstract

The chapter raises an alarm about the direction that theorizing seems to be taking. For understandable reasons there has been a focus on the persuasive use of arguments to such a degree that many now define argument as a tool of persuasion. But there are plenty of other uses of arguments and it is possible, and indeed desirable, to define “argument” without reference to any particular use. Arguments are reasons for beliefs or for believing, reasons for attitudes or for emotions, or reasons for decisions about what to do—that is, in Mill’s phrase, “considerations … capable of determining the intellect either to give or withhold its assent.” It is important to focus on arguments so defined because we have not yet finished the job of providing a complete account of their logical norms. I sketch one way of framing their norms within the Toulmin model that assimilates a lot of the recent work of various theorists. And I join those who insist that assessing the logic of an argument is not all there is to evaluating arguments.

A keynote address for the conference, “The Uses of Argument,” sponsored by the Ontario Society for the Study of Argumentation, McMaster University, Hamilton, Ontario. Reprinted with permission from Informal Logic 24(2) (2004): 137–151.