Abstract
Immediately after discussing what we identified in Chap. 6 as transcendental causation in 1.4.2, Hume introduces his four-part system. A detailed explanation of this system is lacking in the literature, although Kemp Smith (1941), does parse it into respective parts, and gives a brief explanation of it as a four part system (pp. 474–487). However, in the next few chapters I give a much more exhaustive account.
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- 1.
Moreover, in the course of explaining this system, Kemp Smith does not distinguish between the vulgar position and Hume’s position (see Part III of this book for more on this distinction). As a I result, I think that he significantly compromises his analysis.
- 2.
Note however, that the vulgar initially seem to do just that—they reflexively identify a number of resembling perceptions into what they take to be an “object.” But for the reasons noted above (in addition to the problems Hume points out further on in 1.4.2), this could not be a proper account of identity.
- 3.
It should be noted that Baxter defends Hume’s arguments regarding the finite divisibility of time in earlier works as well, e.g. (1988).
- 4.
Generally speaking, Baxter proceeds as follows: In order for the Malezieu argument, presented on T 1.2.2.3; SBN 30–1 and the Additional argument, presented on T 1.2.2.4; SBN 31 to be taken seriously, Baxter must defend three assumptions made by Hume: (1) The Divisibility Assumption (T 1.2.2.2.; SBN 29–30), i.e. the idea that if something is actually divisible, then it has parts. (2) The Plurality Assumption (T 1.2.2.3; SBN 30), i.e. the idea that if something has parts, then it is many things, not a single thing. (3) The Existence Assumption (T 1.2.2.3; SBN 30), i.e. the idea that “only single things really exist” (2008, p. 26).
- 5.
Elsewhere, Hume does say that some impressions may be co-existent (e.g. T 1.4.6.16; SBN 259–60)). However, according to Hume, even co-existent perceptions would have to occur in the context of a succession. For instance, if I experience a number of co-existent chair impressions (A1, B1, C1) upon looking at what I perceive to be a chair, these impressions will inevitably all be interrupted (recall Chap. 6 and c.f. Chap. 8 of this book), to be replaced by a new set of co-existent chair impressions e.g. (A2, B2, C2), and so on. Thus, an impression, e.g. A1, may be both co-existent with its respective co-existent set (i.e. B1, C1) while simultaneously occurring in a succession, ( i.e. A1–An).
- 6.
Hume does write that “the idea of time, [may be] deriv’d from the succession of our perceptions of every kind” (T 1.2.3.6). However, by “every kind,” Hume is not including successions of somewhat constant, or alternatively, “compleat[ly]” constant impressions. Rather, he immediately continues: “[these perceptions include] ideas as well as impressions, and impressions of reflection as well as of sensation.” The point is that successions may be comprised of all kinds of perceptions, e.g. impressions of sensation, and ideas and impressions of reflection, not all kinds of successions.
- 7.
Hume discusses a similar case in more detail in 1.4.2 in regard to the vulgar position. We examine this case in detail in Chap. 8.
- 8.
Some might complain that by “real succession,” Hume is talking about a real mind-independent succession here, i.e. the burning coal as it moves from point to point. However, Hume is careful to point out in the Appendix that in regard to his discussions concerning space and time that “As long as we confine our speculations to the appearances of objects to our senses, without entry into disquisitions concerning their real nature and operations, we are safe from all difficulties, and never be embarrass’d by any question …If we carry our enquiry beyond the appearances of objects to the sense, I am afraid, that most of our conclusions will be full of skepticism and uncertainty” (T 1.2.5.26 fn 12; SBN 638–9). Thus, it is clear that Hume is not making a reference to a mind-independent coal here. Rather, he is speaking of the “reality” of our perceptions, namely, a “real succession” of perceptions.
- 9.
See Chap. 8 for a more detailed explanation of how a succession of resembling perceptions may be mistaken for an idea of invariable and uninterrupted object. Technically speaking, we do not, according to Hume, perceive an invariable and uninterrupted object (i.e. a Baxterian “steadfast object”), although in some cases, we think we do thanks to the disposition that a succession of resembling perceptions invokes in us (T 1.4.2.33; SBN 203).
- 10.
Thus, in a certain qualified respect, I am defending a version of what Baxter refers to as the “Brevity Assumption.” Recall that Baxter characterizes this as “[the assumption that] perceptions that seem long are really uninterrupted successions of resembling perceptions” (2008, 33; emphasis added). However, as noted above, according to Hume, all successions are necessarily interrupted (in fact, this is what makes a succession a succession). Thus, rather than defending Baxter’s interpretation of Stroud’s, Bennett’s Green’s and Price’s collective position, I find it more instructive to present my own analysis of the relevant passages.
- 11.
This does not rule out the possibility that we may simultaneously perceive successions of perceptions that exactly resemble each other, i.e. are not changing. Rather, Hume’s comment could be interpreted as suggesting that we can perceive successions of perceptions that exactly resemble each other while simultaneously perceiving successions of changing perceptions. For instance, while perceiving a succession of exactly resembling perceptions of what I think is a chair, I could be simultaneously perceiving a successions of changing auditory perceptions, etc. Moreover, perceptions that belong to a succession of changing perceptions might also resemble each other, although not exactly. For instance, as a light source changes, my perceptions of what I perceive to be an orange could change, but they may still resemble each other.
- 12.
Hume does not use an orange to illustrate his point, but doing so helps to illuminate his thought process.
- 13.
How and why this could make sense to Hume is explained at the end of this chapter.
- 14.
- 15.
However, as we will see in Chap. 12, according to Hume, our ability to think in terms of natural causal relations does not seem to presuppose an ability to imagine objects that we think admit of a perfect identity.
- 16.
Where the other four are, recall, elementary belief, causally-produced belief, philosophical belief, and indirect belief.
- 17.
C.f. Gaskin (1974) and his notion of natural belief.
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Rocknak, S. (2013). Unity, Number and Time: The Third Account of Transcendental Perfect Identity. In: Imagined Causes: Hume's Conception of Objects. The New Synthese Historical Library, vol 71. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-007-2187-6_7
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