Abstract
Traditionally, scholars have argued that 1.4.2 may be split into two general sections: one that concerns the “vulgar” conception of objects, and another that concerns the “philosophical” conception of objects. I argue that there is a third position: Hume’s, which includes two more accounts of how we transcendentally conceive of perfect identity. We examine one of those accounts of perfect identity here (which constitutes Hume’s second account of how we transcendentally conceive of perfect identity) and the other in Chap. 7 (which constitutes Hume’s third account of how we transcendentally conceive of perfect identity). In Chaps. 8 and 9, I show why all three instances of how we transcendentally conceive of perfect identity are not to be confused with the vulgar position on objects, nor with the philosophical position.
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Notes
- 1.
I am grateful for the feedback I received when presenting earlier versions of this chapter at the Upstate New York Early Modern Workshop, Syracuse University (2005), the NY/NJ Consortium in the History of Modern Philosophy, NY, NY (2006) and New Philosophical Perspectives on Hume, University of San Francisco (2007).
- 2.
A detailed discussion of these three categories of impressions is not relevant to our project. However, the reader might note that they are: (a) impressions that convey mass and volume, (b) impressions that comprise sight, hearing, taste, smell, and touch and (c) impressions of pain and pleasure.
- 3.
Note that here, and for most of the remainder of “Of skepticism in regard to the senses,” Hume no longer distinguishes between impressions of type (a)–(c), but instead, refers to just impressions in general (with a partial exception being his discussion of constancy and coherence).
- 4.
To some degree, Price (1940, pp. 32–35) also distinguishes between Hume’s notion of an object and the impressions that we believe obtain of such objects, particularly in regard to T 1.4.2.18; SBN 194. However, Price does not argue that according to Hume, an “object” is an idea, but rather, is a mind-independent material object: “If we are to be accurate and avoid begging questions, we must define constancy entirely in terms of impressions (sense data). This Hume himself does not trouble to do; he speaks of mountains, houses, and trees, of his bed and table, books and papers, all of which are, of course, material objects.” However, Hume never explicitly asserts that there are mind-independent objects. In fact, all of 1.4.2 is devoted to explaining how we come up with ideas of objects, not to explaining the nature of mind-indepdent objects (for more on why Hume must be understood as an agnostic in regard to the mind-independent existence of objects, see Chap. 12). Also, Price conflates Hume’s account of how we may properly conceive of an object based on the constancy and coherence of our impressions with the vulgar position (parts 2 and 3 of Hume’s four-part system; see Chap. 8 for more detail). As a result, I think that Price’s account of constancy and coherence is fundamentally misleading; and to some degree, for the same reasons, I think that this is also the case with the majority of the analyses of Hume’s account of constancy and coherence. See for instance, Collier (1999) and Stroud (1977).
- 5.
Recall, as explained in Chap. 4, that Hume is certain that if an object admits of continuity, it must also admit of distinctness, and vice versa. As a result, his mention of continuity in the line cited above must be understood as standing for both continuity and distinctness. As a result, contrary to Bennett’s claim, it could not the case that at this point in the text, Hume abruptly begins to “deal with continuity only, independence being silently dropped” (Bennett 1971, p. 322). For recall that distinctness is elliptical for independence and externality (see Chap. 4) Therefore, any discussion of a continued body is, implicitly, a discussion of a distinct body, and so, also, a discussion of an external and independent body. Hume is simply assuming that we are keeping these implications in mind.
- 6.
In Hume’s words: “we may observe, that ‘tho those internal impressions, which we regard as fleeting and perishing, have also a certain coherence or regularity in their appearances, yet ‘tis of somewhat a different nature, from that which we discover in bodies” (T 1.4.2.20; SBN 195). Note that in regard to this passage, some scholars have, I think, fallen into the trap of Hume’s terminological carelessness explained above in Sect. 3.1.1. Some think that Hume does have impressions in mind when he refers to objects that admit of continuity and distinctness. See for instance, D.F. and M.J Norton, eds. Hume’s Treatise (Hume 2002): “[Here] Hume argues that some of our internal and perishing impressions have a coherence that others lack. If we believe the objects-impressions we are currently experiencing are real, it is because we take them to form a coherent set with countless other objects—impressions, some of which we only remember, and some which we may never have experienced” (p. 474, note # 20; emphasis added). The Nortons assume that when Hume speaks of objects here, he is simultaneously speaking of impressions, namely, “object-impressions.” See also Kemp Smith (1941): “It is quite otherwise with outer impressions, they must be supposed to have a continued existence, since otherwise they could not possibly have the regularity of operation which we in fact experience them as having” (p. 471; emphases added). Kemp Smith seems to think that Hume is implying that we may imagine that continuity is a property of certain impressions. However, as explained above, this cannot be the case.
- 7.
- 8.
For it seems as though Hume is actively comparing two ideas here, rather than reflexively concluding that q′n+1 is real. Recall that philosophical causal reasoning is based on natural causal reasoning, where we may classify both natural and philosophical causation as “ordinary causation.”
- 9.
Where, as noted above, I suggest that former process presupposes the latter process, and thus, contrary to Bennett’s claim does seem to “set the scene for an analysis of objectivity-concepts” (1971, p. 324).
- 10.
Recall that Hume also makes this point in T 1.2.6.8–9; SBN 67–68, and in fact, reminds us of as much at the very beginning of his discussion of constancy and coherence (T 1.4.2.3; SBN 188). Or, as Hume puts it on T 1.4.2.21; SBN 197: “For ‘twill readily be allow’d that since nothing is ever really present to the mind, besides its own perceptions, ‘tis not only impossible, that any habit shou’d ever be acquir’d otherwise than by the regular succession of these perceptions, but also that any habit shou’d ever exceed that degree of regularity. Any degree, therefore, of regularity in our perceptions, can never be a foundation for us to infer a greater degree of regularity in some objects, which are not perceiv’d; since this supposes a contradiction, viz. a habit acquir’d by what was never present to the mind.”
- 11.
- 12.
Some might argue that as a result, Hume is trotting out what he will characterize a bit further on in 1.4.2 as the “philosopher’s” position (T 1.4.2.43–1.4.2.57; SBN 209–218). However, we must realize that this is not the case, for a somewhat simple reason: According to the philosophers, thanks to just reason, we may conclude that objects must exist as the causes of our various interrupted and variable impression of them. As a result, the philosophers claim that external objects (objects that exist independent of our perceptions of them) must exist. However, here, Hume is not claiming that objects admitting of continuity and distinctness must exist. Rather, such objects are necessarily imagined, a point that the philosophers are never aware of. See Chap. 9 for more detail.
- 13.
- 14.
- 15.
Or as Hume puts it, “But as all reasoning concerning matters of fact arises only from custom, and custom can only be the effect of repeated perceptions, the extending of custom and reasoning beyond the perceptions can never be the direct and natural effect of the constant repetition and connexion, but must arise from the co-operation of some other principles” (T 1.4.2.21; SBN 198).
- 16.
- 17.
Granted, Hume only mentions coherence here. But note that shortly after this passage, he includes constancy as well: “But whatever force we may ascribe to this principle, I am afraid ‘tis too weak to support alone so vast an edifice, as is that of the continu’d existence of all external bodies; and that we must join the constancy of their appearance to the coherence, in order to give a satisfactory account of that opinion” (T 1.4.2.23; SBN 199). That is, in order to imagine a continuous and distinct object, impressions must be coherent and constant. He also claims that objects are also capable of being understood as “perfectly constant” on T 1.4.2.21; SBN 198.
- 18.
Hume is admittedly vague here in regard to just how this inspiration works, however, he does write that “the explication of [this process] will lead into a considerable compass of very profound reasoning” (T 1.4.2.24; SBN 199), where that explication is given in part 1 of his four-part system presented in 1.4.2. In Part III of this book, we see why this process is not to be confused with the vulgar position.
- 19.
However, Pears does not distinguish between Hume’s position and the vulgar position, and so, I think, does not effectively capture what is going on in 1.4.2. Meanwhile Mounce writes: “The naturalism which appears in the profounder aspects of Hume’s work is the same as the Scottish naturalists … It holds that the source of our knowledge lies not in our experience or reasoning but in our relations to the world which for the most part pass beyond our knowledge. Thus in all our experience or reasoning we presuppose our belief in causality or in an independent world” (Mounce 1999, p. 8; also see Kemp Smith (1941)). But this is not quite right. Rather, the constancy and coherence of our impressions (our experience) does, indeed, initially regulate us such that we can imagine the causes we do. See Parts III and IV of this book for more detail.
- 20.
However, our ability to think in terms of natural causal relations does not seem to presuppose our ability to think of continuous and distinct objects. Rather, as shown in Chap. 2, we need only appeal to elementary beliefs, or equivalently, proto-objects, which, as we saw in Chap. 4, are not continuous and/or distinct, and nor do we imagine them to be continuous and/or distinct. For more detail on this matter, see Chap. 12, Sect. 3.
- 21.
Think, for instance, of Kant’s “pure intuitions” of space and time. They are presupposed by our ability to have empirical intuitions and thus, are not to be identified with them; nevertheless, both are intuitions. Very generally speaking, Hume seems to have had something similar in mind in regard to perceptions, viz. perceptions of a continuous and distinct object that are presupposed by ordinary, i.e. empirical perceptions and thus, are not to be identified with such empirical perceptions.
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Rocknak, S. (2013). A Mysterious Kind of Causation: The Second Account of Transcendental Perfect Identity. In: Imagined Causes: Hume's Conception of Objects. The New Synthese Historical Library, vol 71. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-007-2187-6_6
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