Abstract
With the general concepts of impressions, ideas, cause and effect, belief and reality in mind, we may now turn to Hume’s notion of an object. In this chapter, we focus on a traditionally overlooked sense in which he uses the word ‘object’—“objects” that are either impressions or are ideas that “exactly represent” impressions. I show that such objects could not be what Hume has in mind by ideas of objects that admit of a “perfect identity.” This is the case because impressions and ideas that exactly represent impressions (simple or complex) do not represent both of the properties of uninterruptedness and invariability, while ideas of objects that we imagine to admit of perfect identity do. In fact, as we will see in the following chapters, impressions, and ideas that exactly represent impressions (simple or complex) must be understood as the necessary psychological building blocks for ideas of objects with a perfect identity. Accordingly, we may think of, and hereafter refer to, those impressions, and ideas that exactly represent impressions as “proto-objects.”
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Notes
- 1.
At times, Hume uses the words ‘body’ and ‘object’ interchangeably. For the most part, however, he uses the word ‘object’ and thus, so do I.
- 2.
Recall that an impression does not admit of mind-independent qualities, e.g. an impression of a mile-long line is not literally a mile long. Rather, somehow, it represents the quality of being a mile long (see Chap. 1, Sect. 7).
- 3.
To keep matters as clear as possible, realize that by “de dicto,” I simply mean, exists as an idea, while by “de re” I mean exists as a mind-independent thing.
- 4.
“Perfect identity” is a term that has been largely overlooked in Hume scholarship. Identity simpliciter, has been discussed at length, as well as personal identity (see for instance, Kemp Smith 1941; Stroud 1977; Pears 1990; Fogelin 1993; Baxter 1998; Roth 2000; Winkler 2007; Ainslie 2001). But there has been no careful discussion of perfect identity.
- 5.
One might argue that nevertheless, Hume thought that there are invariable and uninterrupted objects—it’s just that we cannot apprehend them through our senses or reason. Generally speaking, this is what has recently been called the skeptical realist reading of Hume, which pertains to the mind-independent existence of objects and causality (see Read and Richman 2007). But whether or not Hume was a skeptical realist is much too large a project to take on in this Chapter. Either way, we may conclude that Hume thinks that perfect identity is an idea, which may or may not refer to mind-independent invariable and uninterrupted objects. For more on skeptical realism, see Chap. 12 of this book.
- 6.
- 7.
See Chap. 12 where we discuss this remark in more detail.
- 8.
We must note that here, Hume is presenting what I take to be his own account of how we typically conceive of objects—as opposed to paraphrasing a vulgar and/or philosophical account. We may understand that this is the case simply because Hume makes no mention of either of these positions here, where his first mention of the “vulgar” does not occur until T 1.4.2.31; SBN 201–2, where Hume introduces part 2 of his four-part “system.” See Chaps. 6, 7, 8, and 9 for more detail.
- 9.
However, a bit further on in 1.4.2, Hume does seem to suggest that the vulgar do experience a certain kind of impression of uninterruptedness (continuity) (T 1.4.2.29; SBN 200–1). However, he ultimately retracts this claim, where this retraction squares with Hume’s announcement on T 2.1.4.2; SBN 283 that: “‘Tis impossible for the mind to fix itself steadily on upon one idea for any considerable time; nor can it by its utmost efforts ever arrive at such a constancy” (see Chaps. 7 and 8 for more detail).
- 10.
Here Hume makes a direct reference to T 1.2.6, “Of the idea of existence, and external existence,” which, recall, we discussed in some detail in Sect. 2 of this Chapter. In these passages, Hume argued that existence is not added to an idea, either in the form of another idea or an impression. Rather, as noted, to conceive of an idea is to simultaneously conceive of it as existent (de dicto); recall: “The idea of existence, then, is the very same with the idea of what we conceive to be existent, are nothing different from each other. That idea, when conjoin’d with the idea of any object, makes no addition to it. Whatever we conceive, we conceive to be existent. Any idea we please to form is the idea of being; and the idea of a being is any idea we please to form” (T 1.2.6.4; SBN 66–7). With this in mind, realize however, that the question Hume is attempting to answer in 1.4.2, “Of skepticism with regard to the senses,” is: Why do we typically believe in the existence of an object? He is not asking: Do objects exist (de re)? For “‘tis in vain to ask whether there be body or not” (T 1.4.2.1; SBN 187).
- 11.
See T 1.4.2.2. The reader should also note that some have recently argued that Hume’s claim that continuity implies distinctness and “vice versa” is not as coherent as it could be, e.g. Dicker (2005). However, a discussion of this matter takes us well beyond the scope of this chapter. Meanwhile, we should realize that [(C ⊃ D) • (D É C)] is equivalent to [(∼D É ∼C) • (∼C É ∼D)] where ‘C’ stands for “continuous” and ‘D’ stands for “distinctness.” Thus, if I believe that an idea is not distinct, then I also believe that it is not continuous and vice versa.
- 12.
As already suggested above, this faculty is the transcendental imagination, which will be explained in more detail in the following chapters.
- 13.
One might object that regardless of all of Hume’s efforts to show that we cannot have an impression that admits of continuity and distinctness, according to his own system, it is nevertheless possible. For instance, what if I simply stare at an object, say a violet, for an extended period of time (even while my perceptions around it might change, e.g. someone walks behind it)? Wouldn’t this give me an impression of at least, continuity (i.e. uninterruptedness)? However, in the course of discussing the vulgar position on objects just a bit further on in 1.4.2, Hume acknowledges this possibility and dismisses it (T 1.4.2.29; SBN 200–1). And as mentioned in an earlier footnote in this chapter, he dismisses it again on at least T 2.1.4.2; SBN 283 (see Chaps. 7 and 8 for more detail).
- 14.
- 15.
Note: I am not claiming that impressions are interchangeable with ideas that exactly represent impressions. Rather, I am claiming that impressions and ideas that exactly represent impressions are proto objects, and thus, they are also what I call “elementary beliefs.”
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Rocknak, S. (2013). Proto-Objects. In: Imagined Causes: Hume's Conception of Objects. The New Synthese Historical Library, vol 71. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-007-2187-6_4
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