Abstract
Legal argumentation, as originally outlined by Aristotle under the notion of rhetoric (and topic) and by Chaïm Perelman under the new rhetoric since the 1950s, occupies the mid-area “between the evident and the irrational”, i.e. between the analytical truths cherished by logic and mathematics, on the one hand, and any forms on sheer irrationality that evade the grip of rational argumentation, on the other. The key concept of the new rhetoric is that of the intended, universal audience. According to Perelman, the universal audience is a subjective thought construct of the speaker with the help of which he adjusts his arguments so as to convince the audience, while observing the general prerequisites of rationality. Because of the inherently subject-bound nature of the universal audience, it is argued that the universal audience is expressive of bounded rationality only, as modified by the diverse “scenes”, frames, settings, contextures, or approaches to the realm of reason and argumentation as conceived by the speaker. Aristotle’s classic rhetoric and Perelman’s notion of the new rhetoric both exemplify the ars disputationis, or the art and skill of argumentation and, possibly, reasonable disagreement among the participants to a dispute even after the full round of arguments presented. Aulis Aarnio’s quest for value-cognitivism in his reading of Perelman’s legal philosophy is open to critique, since it turns the realm of rhetoric into a domain of objective values, thereby leaving behind Aristotle’s idea of rhetoric is an expression of an ars disputationis, or the art or skill of reasonable disagreement that takes place “between the evident and the irrational”.
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Notes
- 1.
Kuhn’s conception of science deals mostly or exclusively with knowledge in the natural sciences, and the status of the human and social sciences is left out of consideration by him.
On Kuhn’s conception of the theory of science and its applicability in the science of law or, in more general terms, in the human and social sciences, Siltala, Oikeustieteen tieteenteoria, pp. 387–460. The French philosopher Michel Foucault defended a similar kind of conception of the societal character of human knowledge in his archaeology of knowledge under the auspices of a certain épistémè. Foucault, Les Mots et les choses. Une Archéologie des sciences humaines; Foucault, L’Archéologie du savoir; Siltala, Oikeustieteen tieteenteoria, p. 1 et seq.
- 2.
On the principled and pragmatic theories of legal reasoning, cf. Spaak, Guidance and Constraint, pp. 83–92. Spaak would seem to resuscitate H. L. A. Hart’s famous dichotomy of the nightmare and the noble dream in jurisprudence. Cf. Hart, “American Jurisprudence through English Eyes: The Nightmare and the Noble Dream”, passim.
- 3.
Wróblewski, The Judicial Application of Law.
- 4.
MacCormick, Legal Reasoning and Legal Theory.
- 5.
Peczenik, The Basis of Legal Justification; Peczenik, On Law and Reason; Peczenik, Vad är rätt? Om demokrati, rättssäkerhet, etik och juridisk argumentation.
- 6.
Alexy, A Theory of Legal Argumentation. The Theory of Rational Discourse as Theory of Legal Argumentation.
- 7.
Summers, Essays on the Nature of Law and Legal Reasoning; Summers, Essays in Legal Theory; Summers, The Jurisprudence of Law’s Form and Substance.
- 8.
Aarnio, The Rational as Reasonable. A Treatise on Legal Justification; Aarnio, Laintulkinnan teoria; Aarnio, Reason and Authority. A Treatise on the Dynamic Paradigm of Legal Dogmatics.
- 9.
MacCormick and Summers, eds., Interpreting Statutes. A Comparative Study; MacCormick and Summers, eds., Interpreting Precedents. A Comparative Study. On precedent-based law, Siltala, A Theory of Precedent. From Analytical Positivism to A Post-Analytical Philosophy of Law.
- 10.
“Quel est cet auditoire autour duquel est centrée l’argumentation? (…) Si l’on veut définir l’auditoire d’une façon utile pour le développement d’une théorie de l’argumentation, il faut le concevoir comme l’ensemble de ceux sur lesquels l’orateur veut influer par son argumentation.” Perelman, L’Empire rhétorique, p. 27. (Italics in original.) Cf. Perelman, The Realm of Rhetoric, pp. 13–14.
- 11.
“Quel est cet ensemble? Il est fort variable, et peut aller de l’orateur lui-même, dans le cas d’une deliberation intime, quand il s’agit de prendre une decision dans une situation délicate, jusqu’à l’humanité tout entière, du moins à ceux de ses members qui sont compétents et raisonnables, et que je qualifie d’auditoire universel, en passant par une infinie variété d’auditoires particuliers.” Perelman, L’Empire rhétorique, pp. 27–28; cf. Perelman, The Realm of Rhetoric, p. 14.
- 12.
Cf. Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca, Traité de l’Argumentation, pp. 40, 46–59.
- 13.
“L’auditoire présumé est toujours, pour celui qui argumente, une construction plus ou moins systématisée.” Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca, Traité de l’Argumentation, p. 25 (et seq.), where the two authors reflect upon the issue under the heading, L’auditoire comme construction de l’orateur.
- 14.
Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca, Traité de l’Argumentation, pp. 34–40.
- 15.
Perelman, L’Empire rhétorique, p. 31. – “The distinction between discourses that are addressed to some individual persons and those intended to be valid for everyone allows us to better understand how persuasive discourse differs from one that aims at being convincing. Instead of thinking that persuasive discourse is addressed to the imagination, sentiments, or unthinking reactions of a person, whereas a discourse that aims at convincing someone appeals to his reason, and instead of opposing the one as essentially subjective to the other as essentially objective, we can characterize them in a more technical, and also more exact, manner by stating that the discourse addressed to a specific audience aims at persuading [its addressees], while the discourse addressed to the universal audience aims at convincing [its addressees]. – Like the distinction now established does not depend on the number of individuals who listen to a speaker but on the speaker’s intentions (i.e. does he aim at the adherence of someones or of every reasonable being), it may well be that the speaker conceives of those to whom he speaks – even in the context of a private deliberation in his own mind – as a manifestation of the universal audience. A convincing discourse is one in which the premises and the arguments presented can be universalized, that is, being in principle acceptable to all the members of the universal audience. We immediately realize how in this way of looking into the issue the originality of philosophy, as traditionally associated with the notions of truth and reason, will best be understood in terms of its relation to the universal audience, and the manner in which this audience is conceived of by the philosopher.” (Translation by the present author.) – Cf. Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca, Traité de l’Argumentation, p. 34 et seq.
- 16.
Perelman refers to Pascal’s Pensées here.
- 17.
Perelman refers to Kant’s Kritik der reinen Vernunft here.
- 18.
Wihuri, “Auditorion käsitteestä ja auditoriosidonnaisesta argumentaatiosta”, p. 363, 364–365. (Italics by Wihuri; translation by the present author.) – Cf. Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca, Traité de l’Argumentation, pp. 25–30, with the subtitle: L’auditoire comme construction de l’orateur.
- 19.
Cf.: “… l’accord de l’auditoire universel. Il s’agit évidemment, dans ce cas, non pas d’un fait expérimentalement éprouvé, mais d’une universalité et d’une unanimité que se représente l’oratuer (…) L’accord d’un auditoire universel n’est donc pas une question de fait, mais du droit.” Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca, Traité de l’Argumentation, p. 41. (Italics in original.)
- 20.
The apt phase view from nowhere is borrowed from Thomas Nagel’s book with the same title. Nagel, The View from Nowhere; Foucault, Les Mots et les choses; Siltala, Oikeustieteen tieteenteoria, pp. 30–32, 731–732.
- 21.
On the notion of a deliberative practice, cf. Morawetz, “Epistemology of Judging. Wittgenstein and Deliberative Practices”, pp. 19–23.
- 22.
Cf. Perelman: “L’auditoire universel est constitué par chacun à partir de ce qu’il sait de ses semblambles, de manière à transcender les quelques oppositions dont il a conscience. Ainsi chaque culture, chaque individu a sa propre conception de l’auditoire universel, et l’étude de ces variations serait fort instructive, car elle nous ferait connaître ce que les hommes ont consideré, au cours de l’histoire, comme réel, vrai et objectivement valable.” Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca, Traité de l’Argumentation, p. 43.
- 23.
Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca, Traité de l’Argumentation, p. 41 in fine: “Une argumentation qui s’addresse à une auditoire universel doit convaincre le lecteur du caractère contraignant des raisons fournies, de leur evidence, de leur validité intemporelle et absolue, indépendante de contingences locales ou historiques.”
- 24.
Cf.: “… one must distinguish between justifying a practice as a system of rules to be applied and enforced, and justifying a particular action which falls under these rules; utilitarian arguments are appropriate with regard to question about practices, while retributive arguments fit the application of particular rules to particular case.” Rawls, “Two Concepts of Rules” (1955), in Collected Papers, pp. 20–46.
- 25.
Cf. Siltala, Oikeustieteen tieteenteoria, pp. 628–632.
- 26.
Aarnio, The Rational as Reasonable, p. 227.
- 27.
Aarnio, The Rational as Reasonable, p. 185 et seq.
- 28.
Aarnio, The Rational as Reasonable, pp. 202, 221–226 (on Perelman) and pp. 195–196, 224–225, 231–235 (on Habermas), Aarnio, Reason and Authority, pp. 202, 220–221 (on Perelman) and pp. 209, 210–211, 214–216 (on Habermas); Aarnio, Laintulkinnan teoria, pp. 278–279, 282 (on Perelman).
- 29.
Aarnio, The Rational as Reasonable, pp. 195–204; Aarnio, Reason and Authority, pp. 214–215, 222; Aarnio, Laintulkinnan teoria, pp. 211–216; cf. Alexy, A Theory of Legal Argumentation, pp. 187–206.
- 30.
Aarnio, Reason and Authority, p. 228; cf. Rawls, A Theory of Justice, pp. 136–142.
- 31.
Aarnio, The Rational as Reasonable, pp. 89–95; Aarnio, Laintulkinnan teoria, pp. 220–256; cf. Peczenik, Vad är rätt? pp. 209–288; Peczenik, On Law and Reason, pp. 319–371.
- 32.
Aarnio, The Rational as Reasonable, pp. 196–198; Alexy, A Theory of Legal Argumentation, pp. 187–206.
- 33.
Interestingly, John Searle has argued that if there is a language in a community, it entails that the speakers have already entered a social contract (in some sense of the term), to the effect that there can be no pre-contractual original position where language would be used as a means of communication: “… to have language is already to have a rich structure of institutions. Statement making and promising are human institutions as much as property or marriage. (…) If by ‘the state of nature’ we mean a state in which humans live like other animals without any institutional structures, then for language-using human beings there can be no such thing as the state of nature.” Searle, Making the Social World, p. 134. (Italics in original.)
- 34.
Rawls, A Theory of Justice, pp. 137–138.
- 35.
Aarnio, Laintulkinnan teoria, p. 279. (Italics by Aarnio; translation by the present author.) – I make use of the original, Finnish edition of Aarnio’s book here.
- 36.
Aarnio, The Rational as Reasonable, pp. 221–225; Aarnio, Laintulkinnan teoria, pp. 280–283.
- 37.
Aarnio, Laintulkinnan teoria, pp. 279, 282. (Italics by Aarnio; translation by the present author.)
- 38.
Aarnio, Laintulkinnan teoria, pp. 282–283.
- 39.
Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca, Traité de l’Argumentation, pp. 25–30: L’auditoire comme construction de l’orateur.
- 40.
On the self-evident truths of natural law philosophy, cf. Finnis, Natural Law and Natural Rights, pp. 64–65: “The good of knowledge is self-evident, obvious. It cannot be demonstrated, but equally it needs no demonstration.” Cf. Finnis, Natural Law and Natural Rights, p. 85.
- 41.
Cf. Perelman, “Une théorie philosophique de l’argumentation”, p. 255.
- 42.
Sampaio Ferraz, Jr., “Topique”, p. 615.
- 43.
Perelman, “Une théorie philosophique de l’argumentation”, p. 248: “Ce qui est évident est, à la fois, nécessairement vrai et immédiatement reconnaissable comme tel. La proposition évident n’a pas besoin de preuve, la preuve n’étant qu’une déduction nécessaire de ce qui n’est pas évident à partir de thèses évidents. – Dans un tel système, il n’y a nulle place pour l’argumentation.” (Translation by the present author.)
- 44.
In French: entre l’évident et l’irrationnel. Perelman, “Une théorie philosophique de l’argumentation”, p. 255 in fine.
- 45.
Foucault, Les Mots et les choses; Siltala, Oikeustieteen tieteenteoria, p. 1 et seq.
- 46.
“L’auditoire comme construction de l’orateur”, Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca, Traité de l’Argumentation, pp. 25–30.
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Siltala, R. (2011). “Between the Evident and the Irrational”: The New Rhetoric and Legal Argumentation Theory. In: Law, Truth, and Reason. Law and Philosophy Library, vol 97. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-007-1872-2_4
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