Abstract
By a refutation system N we mean an inference system consisting of refutation axioms and refutation rules. Refutation axioms are non-valid formulas, and refutation rules are rules preserving non-validity.
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Skura, T. (2011). Refutation Systems in Propositional Logic. In: Gabbay, D., Guenthner, F. (eds) Handbook of Philosophical Logic. Handbook of Philosophical Logic, vol 16. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-007-0479-4_2
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