Skip to main content
SpringerLink
Log in
Book cover

Financing Services of General Economic Interest pp 53–67Cite as

The European Courts’ Jurisprudence After Altmark; Evolution or Devolution?

  • Chapter
  • First Online:

  • 616 Accesses

Part of the book series: Legal Issues of Services of General Interest ((LEGAL))

Abstract

This chapter examines the constitutional importance of the ruling in Altmark set in the context of the judicial application of the ruling.

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution.

Chapter
USD   29.95
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
eBook
USD   84.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as EPUB and PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
Softcover Book
USD   109.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Compact, lightweight edition
  • Dispatched in 3 to 5 business days
  • Free shipping worldwide - see info
Hardcover Book
USD   109.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Durable hardcover edition
  • Dispatched in 3 to 5 business days
  • Free shipping worldwide - see info

Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout

Purchases are for personal use only

Learn about institutional subscriptions

Notes

  1. 1.

    See further to this evolutionary characteristic the opinion of A-G Stix Hackl in CJEU, Joined Cases C-34/01 to C-38/01 Enirisorse SpA [2003] ECR I-14243, para 157.

  2. 2.

    There may be private parties interested in obtaining a more restrictive application of Altmark, whereas others may indeed ask for a more liberal reading, depending on their position concerning the service of general economic interest. Of course, the precise conditions attaching to the compensation scheme may differ between and even within the Member States.

  3. 3.

    See, e.g. the article ‘Creation, Devolution and wisdom teeth’ available at http://www.jackcuozzo.com/.

  4. 4.

    See e.g., Sinnaeve 2003, p. 351, Thouvenin 2009; Winter 2004, p. 475.

  5. 5.

    Respectively, GC Case T-46/97 SIC [2000] ECR II-2125, para 84 and GC, Case T-106/95 FFSA [1997] ECR II-229, paras 165–169.

  6. 6.

    E.g. Opinion of AG Jacobs in CJEU, Case 126/01 GEMO [2003] ECR I-13769, para 94. In fact, Jacobs AG proposes a third approach, the quid pro quo approach.

  7. 7.

    CJEU, Case C-53/00 Ferring [2001] ECR I-9067, para 27.

  8. 8.

    The necessity of a substantive refinement of the compensation approach adopted in Ferring is clearly argued by Nicolaides 2002, pp. 313–319; Nicolaides 2003a, p. 572 and Nicolaides 2003b, pp. 183–209.

  9. 9.

    Despite the decentralisation that has taken place as a result of Regulation 1/2003, OJ 2003 L1/1, the Commission is still very much the central authority. Cf. Case C-375/09 Tele2 Polska, Judgment of 3 May 2011, n.y.r., paras 27–29.

  10. 10.

    Nevertheless, the judgment in Case C-110/02 Commission v. Council (Portuguese Pig Farms) [2004] ECR I-6333, shows that this power can only be used in exceptional cases, reinforcing the Commissions central position.

  11. 11.

    Opinion of AG Léger in CJEU, Case C-53/00 Ferring [2001] ECR I-9067, paras 79, 80.

  12. 12.

    Ibid, para 93.

  13. 13.

    Opinion of AG Jacobs in CJEU, Case 126/01 GEMO [2003] ECR I-13769, para 113.

  14. 14.

    E.g. Vedder 2009, pp. 69 and 70.

  15. 15.

    This is only logical in view of the incentives that the undertakings in charge of the services of general economic interests and their competitors have.

  16. 16.

    This is explained in the Opinion of AG Jacobs in CJEU, Case 126/01 GEMO [2003] ECR I-13769, paras 119, 120.

  17. 17.

    See, e.g. Thouvenin 2009, p. 107 and Santamato and Pesaresi 2004, p. 17.

  18. 18.

    See, e.g., Sinnaeve 2003 p. 352 and Nicolaides 2003a, p. 572. See further on the restricted discretion as part of the State aid rules: Sauter and Vedder 2012, pp. 10–12.

  19. 19.

    See Nicolaides 2003a, p. 572, and Hancher and Larouche 2011, p. 760.

  20. 20.

    See Hancher and Larouche 2011, p 761.

  21. 21.

    See Szyszczak 2004, p 989.

  22. 22.

    See Hancher and Larouche 2011, p 760 and Szyszczak 2004, p 990.

  23. 23.

    GC, Case T-274/01 Valmont [2004] ECR II-3150.

  24. 24.

    Ibid, paras 132, 133.

  25. 25.

    GC, Case T-274/01 Valmont [2004] ECR II-3150, paras 135, 136. See further CJEU, Joined Cases C-34/01 to C-38/01 Enirisorse [2003] ECR I-14234, para 34 where the Court lays down a strict standard.

  26. 26.

    GC, Joined Cases T-309/04, T-317/04, T-329/04 and T-336/04 TV2/Danmark v. Commission [2008] ECR II-2935.

  27. 27.

    Commission decision 2005/127, OJ 2006 L 85/1, para 71.

  28. 28.

    GC, Joined Cases T-309/04, T-317/04, T-329/04 and T-336/04 TV2/Danmark v. Commission [2008] ECR II-2935, para 232.

  29. 29.

    It can be argued that this would apply to Valmont.

  30. 30.

    GC, Case T-388/03 Deutsche Post [2009] ECR II-199.

  31. 31.

    GC, Case T-289/03 BUPA [2008] ECR II-81.

  32. 32.

    A relatively bad risk profile would translate into high insurance premiums and thus reduced competitiveness.

  33. 33.

    Case T-289/03 BUPA [2008] ECR II-81, para 283.

  34. 34.

    Ibid, paras 96–100.

  35. 35.

    Ibid, paras 167, 168.

  36. 36.

    Ibid, para 124.

  37. 37.

    Ibid, para 246.

  38. 38.

    Ibid, para 247.

  39. 39.

    Ibid, para 248.

  40. 40.

    Ibid, para 249.

  41. 41.

    Ibid, para 250.

  42. 42.

    Bartosch 2008, p. 211; Hancher and Larouche 2011, p. 765.

  43. 43.

    Hancher and Larouche 2011, p. 764. See also Sauter and van de Gronden 2011, p. 618. Sauter and van de Gronden state that the GC substantially amended the Altmark criteria and that it, by moderating the fourth criterion, called into question the strict efficiency approach that the Commission adopted in four healthcare decisions.

  44. 44.

    Ross 2009, p. 138.

  45. 45.

    Buendia Sierra 2008, p. 200.

  46. 46.

    See, on the absence of a requirement to award the service of general economic interest by means of a competitive tendering procedure, GC, Case T-442/03 SIC II [2008] ECR II-1161, para 145.

  47. 47.

    CJEU, Joined Cases C-341/06 P and C-342/06 P Chronopost II [2008] ECR I-4777.

  48. 48.

    The contested decision, Decision 98/365, OJ 1998 L 164/37 was annulled by the judgment in GC, Case T-613/97 Ufex and Others v. Commission [2000] ECR II-4055. This judgment was in turn appealed by Chronopost, la Poste and France.

  49. 49.

    CJEU, Case C-39/94 SFEI [1996] ECR I-3547.

  50. 50.

    Ibid, para 19.

  51. 51.

    Ibid, para 33.

  52. 52.

    Ibid, paras 34, 35.

  53. 53.

    Ibid, para 38.

  54. 54.

    Ibid, para 39.

  55. 55.

    Ibid, para 40.

  56. 56.

    Ibid, paras 148 and 149.

  57. 57.

    CJEU, Joined Cases C-341/06 P and C-342/06 P Chronopost II [2008] ECR I-4777, Opinion of AG Sharpston, para 93.

  58. 58.

    Szyszczak 2004, pp. 990–991 and Sinnaeve 2003, p. 358, who argue that Chronopost is at odds with Altmark. See, on the other hand Bartosch 2003, p. 15, who argues that Chronopost is a lex specialis for the general rule laid down in Altmark.

  59. 59.

    CJEU, Case C-209/10 Post Danmark, judgment of 27 March 2012, n.y.r.

  60. 60.

    Further examples are CJEU, Case C-202/07 P France Telecom (Wanadoo) [2009] ECR I-2369; CJEU, Case C-280/08 P Deutsche Telekom, [2010] ECR I-9555 and CJEU, Case C-52/09 TeliaSonera Sverige, judgment of 17 February 2011, n.y.r.

  61. 61.

    Exclusionary abuse is a category of abuse designed to or having as its effect the exclusion of competitors from a market, see CJEU, Case C-209/10 Post Danmark, judgment of 27 March 2012, n.y.r., para 20.

  62. 62.

    E.g. CJEU, Case C-209/10 Post Danmark, judgment of 27 March 2012, n.y.r., paras 21 and 23. For a critical discussion of this ‘special responsibility’ see: Allendesalazar 2008.

  63. 63.

    CJEU, Case C-209/10 Post Danmark, judgment of 27 March 2012, n.y.r., para 23.

  64. 64.

    Ibid, para 31. It may be noted that the Court appears to only endorse the incremental cost standard in this specific case, see, inter alia, the wording ‘in the specific circumstances of the case in the main proceedings’ in para 33. AG Mengozzi advocated a more general use of the incremental cost standard in cases involving a reserved sector, CJEU, Case C-209/10 Post Danmark, judgment of 27 March 2012, n.y.r. paras 33–35.

  65. 65.

    CJEU, Case C-209/10 Post Danmark, judgment of 27 March 2012, n.y.r., paras 32 and 33.

  66. 66.

    Ibid, paras 21, 22 and 38.

  67. 67.

    Ibid, paras 41 and 42.

References

  • Allendesalazar R (2008) Can we finally say farewell to the “special responsibility” of dominant companies? In: Ehlermann C-D, Marquis M (eds) (2007) European competition Law annual 2007: a reformed approach to Article 82 EC. Hart Pub, Oxford

    Google Scholar 

  • Bartosch A (2003) Clarification or confusion? How to reconcile the ECJ’s rulings in Altmark and chronopost? CLaSF working paper series Number 2, 2003, available at http://www.clasf.org/assets/CLaSF%20Working%20Paper%2002.pdf

  • Bartosch A (2008) The ruling in BUPA—clarification or modification of Altmark? EStAL 7:211

    Google Scholar 

  • Buendia Sierra JL (2008) Finding the right balance: state aid and services of general economic interest. In Liber amicorum Francesco Santaolalla Gadea, EC State aid law, Alphen a/d Rijn. Kluwer Law International, The Hague

    Google Scholar 

  • Hancher L, Larouche P (2011) The coming of age of EU regulation of network industries and services of general economic interest. In: Craig P, de Búrca G (eds) The evolution of EU Law. OUP, Oxford

    Google Scholar 

  • Nicolaides P (2002) The distortive effects of compensatory aid measures: a note on the economics of the ‘Ferring’ judgement’. ECLR 23:313–319

    Google Scholar 

  • Nicolaides P (2003a) Compensation for public service obligations: opening the floodgates of state aid? ECLR 24:561–573

    Google Scholar 

  • Nicolaides P (2003b) Competition and services of general economic interest in the EU: reconciling economics and law. EStAL 3:183–209

    Google Scholar 

  • Ross M (2009) A healthy approach to services of general economic interest? The BUPA judgment of the Court of first instance. ELRev 34:127–140

    Google Scholar 

  • Santamato S, Pesaresi N (2004) Compensation for services of general economic interest: some thoughts on the Altmark ruling, CPL 17–21, available at: http://ec.europa.eu/competition/publications/cpn/2004_1_17.pdf

  • Sauter W, van de Gronden JW (2011) State aid, services of general economic interest and universal service in healthcare. ECLR 32:615–620

    Google Scholar 

  • Sauter W, Vedder HHB (2012) State aid and selectivity in the context of emissions trading: an examination of the ECJ’s 2011 NOx Case, ELRev 37:327–339 available also at: http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2005755

  • Sinnaeve A (2003) State financing of public services: the Court’s dilemma in the Altmark case. EstAL 3:351–364

    Google Scholar 

  • Szyszczak E (2004) Financing services of general economic interest. MLR 67:982

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Thouvenin JM (2009) The Altmark case and its consequences. In: Krajewski M, Neergaard U, van de Gronden J (eds) The changing legal framework for services of general economic interest in Europe—between competition and solidarity. TMC Asser Press, The Hague

    Google Scholar 

  • Vedder HHB (2009) Of jurisdiction and justification; why competition is good for ‘non-economic’ goals, but may need to be restricted. CompLRev 6:51–75

    Google Scholar 

  • Winter JA (2004) Re(de)fining the notion of state aid in Article 87(1) of the EC treaty. CMLRev 41:475, 504

    Google Scholar 

Download references

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. Department of European and Economic Law, Groningen Centre for Energy Law, University of Groningen, Po Box 716, 9700 AS, Groningen, The Netherlands

    Hans Vedder & Marijn Holwerda

Authors
  1. Hans Vedder
    View author publications

    You can also search for this author in PubMed Google Scholar

  2. Marijn Holwerda
    View author publications

    You can also search for this author in PubMed Google Scholar

Corresponding author

Correspondence to Hans Vedder .

Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

  1. , School of Law, University of Leicester, University Road, Leicester, LE1 7RH, United Kingdom

    Erika Szyszczak

  2. , Faculty of Law, Radboud University, Comeniuslaan 4, Nijmegen, 6525 HP, Netherlands

    Johan Willem van de Gronden

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

Copyright information

© 2013 T.M.C. Asser Press, the Hague, the Netherland, and the authors

About this chapter

Cite this chapter

Vedder, H., Holwerda, M. (2013). The European Courts’ Jurisprudence After Altmark; Evolution or Devolution?. In: Szyszczak, E., van de Gronden, J. (eds) Financing Services of General Economic Interest. Legal Issues of Services of General Interest. T.M.C. Asser Press, The Hague, The Netherlands. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-90-6704-906-1_3

Download citation

Publish with us

Policies and ethics

Societies and partnerships

Search

Navigation