Abstract
This chapter examines the constitutional importance of the ruling in Altmark set in the context of the judicial application of the ruling.
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- 1.
See further to this evolutionary characteristic the opinion of A-G Stix Hackl in CJEU, Joined Cases C-34/01 to C-38/01 Enirisorse SpA [2003] ECR I-14243, para 157.
- 2.
There may be private parties interested in obtaining a more restrictive application of Altmark, whereas others may indeed ask for a more liberal reading, depending on their position concerning the service of general economic interest. Of course, the precise conditions attaching to the compensation scheme may differ between and even within the Member States.
- 3.
See, e.g. the article ‘Creation, Devolution and wisdom teeth’ available at http://www.jackcuozzo.com/.
- 4.
- 5.
Respectively, GC Case T-46/97 SIC [2000] ECR II-2125, para 84 and GC, Case T-106/95 FFSA [1997] ECR II-229, paras 165–169.
- 6.
E.g. Opinion of AG Jacobs in CJEU, Case 126/01 GEMO [2003] ECR I-13769, para 94. In fact, Jacobs AG proposes a third approach, the quid pro quo approach.
- 7.
CJEU, Case C-53/00 Ferring [2001] ECR I-9067, para 27.
- 8.
- 9.
Despite the decentralisation that has taken place as a result of Regulation 1/2003, OJ 2003 L1/1, the Commission is still very much the central authority. Cf. Case C-375/09 Tele2 Polska, Judgment of 3 May 2011, n.y.r., paras 27–29.
- 10.
Nevertheless, the judgment in Case C-110/02 Commission v. Council (Portuguese Pig Farms) [2004] ECR I-6333, shows that this power can only be used in exceptional cases, reinforcing the Commissions central position.
- 11.
Opinion of AG Léger in CJEU, Case C-53/00 Ferring [2001] ECR I-9067, paras 79, 80.
- 12.
Ibid, para 93.
- 13.
Opinion of AG Jacobs in CJEU, Case 126/01 GEMO [2003] ECR I-13769, para 113.
- 14.
E.g. Vedder 2009, pp. 69 and 70.
- 15.
This is only logical in view of the incentives that the undertakings in charge of the services of general economic interests and their competitors have.
- 16.
This is explained in the Opinion of AG Jacobs in CJEU, Case 126/01 GEMO [2003] ECR I-13769, paras 119, 120.
- 17.
- 18.
- 19.
- 20.
See Hancher and Larouche 2011, p 761.
- 21.
See Szyszczak 2004, p 989.
- 22.
- 23.
GC, Case T-274/01 Valmont [2004] ECR II-3150.
- 24.
Ibid, paras 132, 133.
- 25.
GC, Case T-274/01 Valmont [2004] ECR II-3150, paras 135, 136. See further CJEU, Joined Cases C-34/01 to C-38/01 Enirisorse [2003] ECR I-14234, para 34 where the Court lays down a strict standard.
- 26.
GC, Joined Cases T-309/04, T-317/04, T-329/04 and T-336/04 TV2/Danmark v. Commission [2008] ECR II-2935.
- 27.
Commission decision 2005/127, OJ 2006 L 85/1, para 71.
- 28.
GC, Joined Cases T-309/04, T-317/04, T-329/04 and T-336/04 TV2/Danmark v. Commission [2008] ECR II-2935, para 232.
- 29.
It can be argued that this would apply to Valmont.
- 30.
GC, Case T-388/03 Deutsche Post [2009] ECR II-199.
- 31.
GC, Case T-289/03 BUPA [2008] ECR II-81.
- 32.
A relatively bad risk profile would translate into high insurance premiums and thus reduced competitiveness.
- 33.
Case T-289/03 BUPA [2008] ECR II-81, para 283.
- 34.
Ibid, paras 96–100.
- 35.
Ibid, paras 167, 168.
- 36.
Ibid, para 124.
- 37.
Ibid, para 246.
- 38.
Ibid, para 247.
- 39.
Ibid, para 248.
- 40.
Ibid, para 249.
- 41.
Ibid, para 250.
- 42.
- 43.
Hancher and Larouche 2011, p. 764. See also Sauter and van de Gronden 2011, p. 618. Sauter and van de Gronden state that the GC substantially amended the Altmark criteria and that it, by moderating the fourth criterion, called into question the strict efficiency approach that the Commission adopted in four healthcare decisions.
- 44.
Ross 2009, p. 138.
- 45.
Buendia Sierra 2008, p. 200.
- 46.
See, on the absence of a requirement to award the service of general economic interest by means of a competitive tendering procedure, GC, Case T-442/03 SIC II [2008] ECR II-1161, para 145.
- 47.
CJEU, Joined Cases C-341/06 P and C-342/06 P Chronopost II [2008] ECR I-4777.
- 48.
The contested decision, Decision 98/365, OJ 1998 L 164/37 was annulled by the judgment in GC, Case T-613/97 Ufex and Others v. Commission [2000] ECR II-4055. This judgment was in turn appealed by Chronopost, la Poste and France.
- 49.
CJEU, Case C-39/94 SFEI [1996] ECR I-3547.
- 50.
Ibid, para 19.
- 51.
Ibid, para 33.
- 52.
Ibid, paras 34, 35.
- 53.
Ibid, para 38.
- 54.
Ibid, para 39.
- 55.
Ibid, para 40.
- 56.
Ibid, paras 148 and 149.
- 57.
CJEU, Joined Cases C-341/06 P and C-342/06 P Chronopost II [2008] ECR I-4777, Opinion of AG Sharpston, para 93.
- 58.
- 59.
CJEU, Case C-209/10 Post Danmark, judgment of 27 March 2012, n.y.r.
- 60.
Further examples are CJEU, Case C-202/07 P France Telecom (Wanadoo) [2009] ECR I-2369; CJEU, Case C-280/08 P Deutsche Telekom, [2010] ECR I-9555 and CJEU, Case C-52/09 TeliaSonera Sverige, judgment of 17 February 2011, n.y.r.
- 61.
Exclusionary abuse is a category of abuse designed to or having as its effect the exclusion of competitors from a market, see CJEU, Case C-209/10 Post Danmark, judgment of 27 March 2012, n.y.r., para 20.
- 62.
E.g. CJEU, Case C-209/10 Post Danmark, judgment of 27 March 2012, n.y.r., paras 21 and 23. For a critical discussion of this ‘special responsibility’ see: Allendesalazar 2008.
- 63.
CJEU, Case C-209/10 Post Danmark, judgment of 27 March 2012, n.y.r., para 23.
- 64.
Ibid, para 31. It may be noted that the Court appears to only endorse the incremental cost standard in this specific case, see, inter alia, the wording ‘in the specific circumstances of the case in the main proceedings’ in para 33. AG Mengozzi advocated a more general use of the incremental cost standard in cases involving a reserved sector, CJEU, Case C-209/10 Post Danmark, judgment of 27 March 2012, n.y.r. paras 33–35.
- 65.
CJEU, Case C-209/10 Post Danmark, judgment of 27 March 2012, n.y.r., paras 32 and 33.
- 66.
Ibid, paras 21, 22 and 38.
- 67.
Ibid, paras 41 and 42.
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Vedder, H., Holwerda, M. (2013). The European Courts’ Jurisprudence After Altmark; Evolution or Devolution?. In: Szyszczak, E., van de Gronden, J. (eds) Financing Services of General Economic Interest. Legal Issues of Services of General Interest. T.M.C. Asser Press, The Hague, The Netherlands. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-90-6704-906-1_3
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