Abstract
This chapter analyses the problems which arise with regard to the political and legal accountability of independent national regulatory authorities which work together with each other and with the Commission in the European networks of national regulators or the ‘European networks plus’. It devotes attention to the political monitoring by and accountability to the European Parliament and/or the national parliaments at the European and national level, respectively, and to the potential role of judicial oversight by the European Court of Justice and the national courts. A distinction is consistently drawn between the present situation of more informal co-operation between the national regulatory authorities in the European networks and the strengthened co-operation within the ‘European networks plus’. As part of the reform of European legislation in the network sectors, the Commission is currently looking at the possibilities for uniform application of European law in the member states and looking at ways of improving the co-ordination between the different national regulatory authorities. The Commission wishes to increase its own ex ante powers and is examining whether the role of the European networks of national regulators could be further strengthened by the creation of ‘European networks plus’. It recently published a proposal for a Regulation founding a European Agency for the Co-operation between Energy Regulators. Owing to the hybrid nature of the European networks and their actions, there are a number of ‘accountability gaps’ both in the present situation and in the proposals for the ‘European networks plus’. The chapter concludes with a number of proposals for improving the accountability of the ‘European networks plus’.
Saskia Lavrijssen is Professor of Consumer and Energy Law University of Amsterdam. At the time of her contribution to the project, she was Assistant Professor, Department of International and European Public Law, Tilburg Law School, Tilburg University, and the research coordinator of the Tilburg Law and Economics Center (TILEC).
A version of this chapter was published as “Networks on track: From European regulatory networks to European regulatory ‘network agencies’” (2009) 36 Legal Issues of Economic Integration, 23–55.
The authors thank prof. A.T. Ottow and prof. A. Prechal for their valuable comments on earlier versions of this chapter. Of course the content of the chapter remains the responsibility of the authors.
This chapter was closed in 2008, and accordingly it does not discuss the subsequent steps in the legislative process leading to the adoption of the legislative packages reforming EU energy law and EU electronic communications law, both in 2009. For the ease of reference, references to the Treaties have been updated to reflect the new numbering after the Treaty of Lisbon. However, the content of the chapter has not been adapted to reflect changes in Article 263 TFEU (formerly Article 230 EC).
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- 1.
- 2.
Commission Decision 2003/796/EC of 11 November 2003 establishing the European Regulators Group for Electricity and Gas, OJ 2003 L 296/34.
- 3.
Commission Decision 2002/727/EC of 29 July establishing the European Regulators Group for Electronic Communications Networks and Services (ERG), OJ 2002 L 200/38, as amended by Commission Decision 2004/3445/EC of 14 September 2004, OJ 2003 L 296/34, as amended by Commission Decision 2007/804/EC, OJ 2007 L 323/43.
- 4.
Van Ooik, 134.
- 5.
Proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council establishing an Agency for the Cooperation of Energy Regulators (ACER), COM(2007)530 final. The Commission has also put forward proposals for the amendment of the energy directives and regulations: See http://ec.europa.eu/energy/electricity/package_2007/index_en.htm. Accessed 14 May 2012.
- 6.
Proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council establishing the European Electronic Communications Markets Authority (EECM), COM(2007)699rev2. The Commission has also put forward proposals for the amendment of the electronic communications directives. See: http://ec.europa.eu/information_society/policy/ecomm/library/proposals/index_en.htm. Accessed 14 May 2012.
- 7.
- 8.
For a detailed conceptual analysis of the notion of accountability, see Bovens 2007.
- 9.
Lavrijssen-Heijmans 2006.
- 10.
See for electronic communications, Cave 2007, 405–424.
- 11.
Article 5a of Directive 97/51/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 6 October 1997 amending Council Directives 90/387/EEC and 92/44/EEC for the purpose of adaptation to a competitive environment in telecommunications, OJ 1997 L 295/23.
- 12.
Articles 21 and 22 of Directive 98/30/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 June 1998 concerning common rules for the internal market in natural gas, OJ 1998 L 204/1 and Articles 20 and 22 of Directive 96/92/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 19 December 1996 concerning common rules for the internal market in electricity, OJ 1996 L 27/2.
- 13.
Article 22 of Directive 98/30/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 June 1998 concerning common rules for the internal market in natural gas, OJ 1998 L 204/1 and Article 22 of Directive 96/92/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 19 December 1996 concerning common rules for the internal market in gas, OJ 1996 L 27/2.
- 14.
Article 21 of Directive 98/30/EC and Article 20 of Directive 96/92/EC.
- 15.
Articles 3–8 of Directive 2002/21/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 7 March 2002 on a common regulatory framework for electronic communications networks and services (Framework Directive), OJ 2003 L 108/33, Article 23 of Directive 2003/54/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2003 concerning common rules for the internal market in electricity and repealing Directive 96/92/EC, OJ 2003 L 176/37 and Article 25 of Directive 2003/55/EC of the European Parliament and the Council of 26 June 2003 concerning common rules for the internal market in gas and repealing Directive 98/30/EC, OJ 2003 L 176/57.
- 16.
Hancher 1996, 60.
- 17.
In most Member States, NRAs should follow the policy lines formulated by the legislator and the government, but they are independent in applying European law in an individual case. The actual and formal independence of the NRAs of their governments may vary across the different Member States. See e.g. the several articles in: Caranta et al. 2004.
- 18.
However, the Commission does attend all meetings, plays an active part in them and provides the secretariat for the ERG, the ERGEG and the ECN.
- 19.
European legislation leaves the detailed design of the networks to the Commission.
- 20.
ECJ, Joined Cases C-359 and C-397/95P, Ladbroke ECR [1997] I-62225.
- 21.
Coen and Thatcher 2008.
- 22.
See e.g. European Commission, Communication from the Commission on Prospects for the Internal Gas and Electricity Market, COM(2006)841 final and European Commission, Communication from the Commission on the Review of the EU Regulatory Framework for Electronic Communications Networks and Services, COM(2006)334 final.
- 23.
See the letter from Commissioner Reding to the Chairman of the ERG, Request for advice of the European Regulators Group in the context of the Review of the Regulatory Framework for Electronic Communications Networks and Services, D(2006)2685, Brussels, 20 November 2006.
- 24.
ERG, Advice in the context of the Review of the Regulatory Framework for Electronic Communications Networks and Services, 27 February 2007 and ERGEG’s response to the European Commission’s Communication “An Energy Policy for Europe”, ref. C06-BM-09-05, 6 February 2007. See also Thatcher and Coen 2008.
- 25.
ERGEG, ‘3rd Legislative Package Input, Paper 2: Legal and Regulatory Framework for a European system of Energy Regulation, An ERGEG public document’, Ref: C07-SER-13-06-02-PD, 5 June 2007 and ERG 2006.
- 26.
See Articles 7 and 8 of the proposal for the amendment of Directive 2002/21/EC, Article 22b of the proposal for the amendment of Directive 2003/54/EC and Article 24a of the proposal for the amendment of Directive 2003/55/EC.
- 27.
Article 3 of the proposal for the amendment of Directive 2002/21/EC, Article 22a of the proposal for the amendment of Directive 2003/54/EC and Article 24a of the proposal for the amendment of Directive 2003/55/EC.
- 28.
In this contribution, the term general measures refers to measures that have general applicability and that apply to an unidentified group of cases/persons. The term specific or individual measures refers to measures that relate to a specific situation and that have specific addressees.
- 29.
See Article 11 of the proposed Regulation on ACER and Article 27 of the proposed Regulation on EECMA.
- 30.
Article 13 of the proposed Regulation on ACER and Article 29 of the proposed Regulation on EECMA.
- 31.
Article 9 of the proposed Regulation on ACER and Article 29 of the proposed Regulation on EECMA.
- 32.
See Articles 17 of the Regulation on ACER and 35 of the Regulation on EECMA. The admissibility conditions are stricter than the admissibility conditions for locus standi against actions of the Office for the Harmonization of the Internal Market, where individuals have locus standi to challenge decisions in case their interests are adversely affected. See Curtin 2005. There are also wider possibilities for locus standi for third parties against actions of the Community Plant Variety Office (CPVO) on the basis of the basic regulation (see ECJ, T-95/06, Anecoop, n.y.r.).
- 33.
See Article 15 of the proposed Regulation on ACER and Article 35 of the proposed regulation on EECMA.
- 34.
EP legislative resolution of 18 June 2008, Amendments 61, 62, 64 and 65.
- 35.
EP legislative resolution of 18 June 2008, Amendment 44. The Council has reached a political agreement on the establishment of ACER (Council, 15 October 2008, inter-institutional file 2007/0197, document 1414208) and does not support the EP’s involvement in the appointment of members of the AB.
- 36.
EP legislative resolution of 24 September 2008, Amendments 47, 107, 108, 114, 131.
- 37.
See supra note 30.
- 38.
See for a discussion of the characteristics of comitology: Curtin 2007, 529–531. See also Article 8 of Regulation 1228/2003/EC, OJ 2003 L 176/1, Article 9 of Regulation 1775/2005, OJ 2005 L 289/1, and Articles 5, 7 and 8 of Council Decision 1999/468/EC of 28 June 1999 laying down the procedures for the exercise of implementing powers conferred on the Commission, OJ 1999 L184/023 as amended by Council Decision 2006/512/EC of 17 July 2006, OJ 2006 L200/11.
- 39.
ERGEG, ‘Guidelines on Congestion management’, 18 July 2005. These guidelines flesh out the Regulation principles and guidelines in relation to the management and allocation of transport capacity in the cross-border electricity networks (interconnectors).
- 40.
This Committee consists of representatives of the Member States. Depending on the topic, the responsible ministries can decide whether a representative of a ministry or a representative of the national authority takes part in the Committee.
- 41.
Decision 2006/770/EC of 9 November 2006 amending the Annex to Regulation (EC) No 1228/2003 on conditions for access to the network for cross-border exchanges in electricity, OJ 2006 L 312/59.
- 42.
Article 15, para 4 and Article 16, para 5 Directive 2002/21/EC.
- 43.
Article 3 of Commission decision 2002/727/EC.
- 44.
See Articles 15 and 16 of Directive 2002/21/EC.
- 45.
In the Grimaldi case, the Court considered that the national courts must take account of Commission recommendations which clarify and supplement European law in order to settle disputes placed before the Court. ECJ, Case C-322/88, Grimaldi [1989] ECR I-4407. See Senden 2004, 386–393. Also relevant is that the obligation for loyal cooperation between the Commission and the national authorities, now found at Article 4 TEU, is worked up into specific provisions in the European directives and in Council Regulation 1/2003. See also Lavrijssen-Heijmans 2006, 343–344.
- 46.
Here inspiration is drawn from CESR, ‘The Role of CESR at ‘level 3’ under the Lamfalussy Process, Action plan for 2005’, CESR/04-527b, October 2004.
- 47.
See supra note 30.
- 48.
See e.g. ERGEG, ‘Obstacles to Switching in the Gas Retail Market, Guidelines of Good Practice and Status Review’, Ref: E06-CSW-05-03, 18 April 2007, ERGEG, ‘Guidelines for Good Practice and Open Season Procedures (GGPOS)’, Ref: C06-GWG-29-05c, 21 May 2007, ERG, ‘Common Position on Best Practice in Wholesale Unbundled Access (including shared access)’ and ERG (06)70Rev1, ERG, ‘Common Position on Best Practice in Bitstream Access Remedies’.
- 49.
ERG, ‘Revised ERG Common position on the Approach to Appropriate Remedies in the ECNS Regulatory Framework’, ERG (06)33.
- 50.
Article 7, para 2, Directive 2002/21/EC.
- 51.
The decisions of the Commission formulate the tasks of the networks very broadly. See e.g. Article 2 of Commission Decision 2003/796/EC and Article 3 of Commission Decision 2002/627/EC.
- 52.
Compare e.g. ECJ, Case C-189/02P, Dansk Rorindustri A/S [2005] ECR I-5425.
- 53.
See for a more loosely formulated co-operation obligation: Article 23, para 12, of Directive 2003/54/EC.
- 54.
Compare Senden 2004, 434–436 and 448.
- 55.
Article 7, paras 3 and 5 of Directive 2002/21/EC.
- 56.
See Article 7 of Directive 2002/21/EC. Currently, the veto power of the Commission only relates to the definition of the relevant market and the market power assessment. The Commission proposes that its veto power will also cover the imposition of regulatory remedies.
- 57.
See also CESR, ‘A proposed evolution of EU Securities supervision beyond 2007’, REF 07-783.
- 58.
European Parliament legislative resolution of 18 June 2008 on the proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council establishing an Agency for the Cooperation of Energy Regulators, A6-0226/2008, Amendment 76. The Council is not in favour of giving the power to adopt general binding measures to ACER, see note 37.
- 59.
European Parliament legislative resolution of 24 September 2008 on the proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council establishing the European Electronic Communications Market Authority, A6-0316/2008, Amendment 57.
- 60.
See footnote 30.
- 61.
Article 7, para 7 of the proposed Regulation on ACER. See also Von Rosenberg 2008.
- 62.
Article 7, para 1 of the proposed Regulation on ACER. See Von Rosenberg 2008, 6.
- 63.
Article 8 of the proposed Regulation on ACER.
- 64.
See Article 7 of the proposed Regulation on ACER.
- 65.
Resolution of the EP of 24 September 2008, Amendments 52 and 53. The involvement of BERT differs depending on the type of measure of the NRA. The EP creates a prominent role for BERT in supervising the remedies that NRAs want to impose on market parties. The text of the EP amendments seems to indicate that a NRA may only adopt a remedy if BERT (and in the case of functional separation also the Commission) has confirmed the appropriateness and effectiveness of the draft measure.
- 66.
See Article 5 of the proposed Regulation on ACER and Article 4 of the proposed Regulation on EECMA.
- 67.
Article 5 of the proposed Regulation on ACER and Article 4 of the proposed Regulation on EECMA. The EP has proposed amendments to limit the extension of the Commission’s power to adopt general binding measures in both the energy and the electronic communications sector.
- 68.
Articles 2a–2h of the proposal for the amendment of Regulation 1775/2005 and Articles 2a–2h of the proposal for the amendment of Regulation 1228/2003. See also amendment 32 of the EP resolution of 18 June 2008 on the proposal for amending Regulation 1228/2003, A6-0228/2008.
- 69.
See for energy: Article 7, para 4 of the proposed regulation on ACER.
- 70.
See Article 4 of the proposed Regulation on EECMA, in conjunction with Article 7 of the proposed Directive amending Directive 2002/21/EC and amendment 52 of the EP resolution of 24 September 2008.
- 71.
ECJ 1958, Case 9/56, Meroni [1958] ECR-1, ECJ, joined Cases C-154/04 and C-155/04, The Queen on the application of Alliance for Natural Health [2005] ECR I-6451. See Lenaerts and Verhoeven 2002, 44–45 and Communication from the Commission, ‘European Agencies—The way forward’, SEC (2008) 323, Com (2008) 135 final, 11.3.2008.
- 72.
See Joined Cases C-154/04 and C-155/04. For an analysis of the case-law: Griller and Orator 2007.
- 73.
- 74.
Lenaerts and Verhoeven 2002, 39–44.
- 75.
See also ECJ, Case C-217/04, ENISA [2006] ECR I-3771 and joined Cases C-154/04 and C-155/04.
- 76.
Griller and Orator 2007, 17.
- 77.
- 78.
Compare: Van Ooik 2005, 134.
- 79.
European Commission, COM (2008) 135 final.
- 80.
The Council has reached political agreement on the establishment of ACER, notes 37 and 60.
- 81.
Of course the Commission can also exercise its traditional Treaty powers (Article 258 TFEU, Articles 101 and 102 TFEU and Article 106(3) TFEU) to force the MS, their NRAs and the market parties to respect European law. See Larouche 2000, 295 ff.
- 82.
The seventh Madrid Forum for example, encouraged by the Commission and following extensive stakeholder consultation, adopted the revised version of the ‘Guidelines on Good Third Party Access Practice’ (Conclusions of the 7th meeting of the European Gas Regulatory Forum, Madrid, 24–25 September 2003). Although these guidelines cannot impose binding obligations on market players, the Commission and the ERGEG verified whether network administrators were complying with them. Owing to the deficient application in practice, the Commission ultimately embedded the guidelines in Regulation 1775/2005.
- 83.
- 84.
This concept is used by Coen and Thatcher 2008. In a strict legal sense, delegation often does not occur because the European legislation does not contain explicit principles for the delegation of powers of the NRAs and the Commission to the European networks. However, the founding of the networks leads to the de facto delegation of powers. In case, the European regulatory agencies will be founded, the European legislator will formalise the delegation of powers and tasks of the Commission and the NRAs to the network agencies.
- 85.
Compare Bovens 2007, 455–457.
- 86.
Bovens 2007, 457. See also Lavrijssen-Heijmans 2006, 100–101. Usually, the stakeholders have limited means to force the networks/agencies to render account, because the possibility of judgment and sanctioning often are lacking. Therefore, it remains the question whether these mechanisms can be full accountability mechanisms (Bovens 2007, 457).
- 87.
Bovens 2007, 456.
- 88.
Article 228 TFEU. Of course any citizen of the EU or any legal person residing or having its registered office in a Member State may lodge a complaint with the Ombudsman dealing with the alleged maladministration of the Commission regarding the cooperation with the European regulatory networks.
- 89.
See Articles 23 and 27 proposed regulation on ACER and Articles 40 and 47 proposed Regulation on EECMA. The EP has however deleted the provision which makes the electronic communications agency subject to control by the European Ombudsman.
- 90.
Hofmann and Türk 2007, 268.
- 91.
Hofmann and Türk 2007, 268. See e.g. ECJ case C-12/03P, Tetra Laval [2005] ECR I-987.
- 92.
See also Lavrijssen-Heijmans 2006, 413 ff.
- 93.
Compare also General Court, Case T-133/03, Schering Plough, n.y.r. and General Court, Case T-123/00, Thomae [2002] ECR II-05193, in which the General Court imputed certain acts adopted by the EMEA to the Commission on the grounds that the basic Regulation No 2309/93 only provides for advisory powers for the EMEA.
- 94.
Scott and Sturm 2007, 14.
- 95.
Scott and Sturm 2007, 14. See e.g. General Court, Case T-13/99, Pfizer [2002] ECR II-3305, para 101.
- 96.
This is also confirmed by General Court, Case T-326/99, Olivieri [2003] ECR II- 6053.
- 97.
Lavrijssen-Heijmans 2006, 350 ff.
- 98.
General Court, Case T-109/06, Vodafone, [2007] ECR II-5151.
- 99.
Scott and Sturm 2007 refer in this regard to the catalyst function of the courts.
- 100.
Case T-13/99, para 159.
- 101.
Case T-13/99, para 199.
- 102.
Scott and Sturm 2007. See e.g. also ECJ, Case C-269/90, Technische Universität München-Mitte [1991] ECR I-5469.
- 103.
See e.g. CBB 30 November 2006, AWB 05/758 and 05/815, Gas Transport Services versus NMa, LJN:AZ3365.
- 104.
Cf. Senden 2004, 386–392. This path was also followed by the Dutch Trade and Industry Appeals Tribunal (CBB) in the so-called LUP case with regard to the significance that the DTe (Dutch Energy regulator) could attach to the arrangements made in the Florence Forum, CBB 2 August 2002, AWB 00/641, Electrabel et al. versus DTe, LJN:AE7773.
- 105.
When reviewing national administrative decisions the courts should judge that the NRAs cannot rely on the non-binding measures of the networks or the agencies in the event of a conflict with directly effective European law and on that basis annul the national decision.
- 106.
See also Larouche and de Visser 2005.
- 107.
ECJ, Case C-344/98, Masterfoods [2000] ECR I-11369.
- 108.
CBB (Dutch Trade and Industry Appeals Tribunal) 11 May 2007, AWB 06/125, 06/127, 06/128 and 06/129, Tele2 et al. versus OPTA, LJN: BA4880 and CBB 29 August 2006, AWB 05/903 and 05/921 to 05/931, KPN et al. versus OPTA, LJN: AY7997, CAT (Competition Appeal Tribunal) 29 November 2005, Hutchinson 3G UK Limited versus OFCOM, [2005] CAT 39 and ECAP (Irish Electronic Communications Appeals Panel), decision No: 03/05 of the ECAP in respect of Appeal numbers ECAP6/2005/03,04,05, Vodafone, O2 and Meteor versus Comreg. See also Lavrijssen-Heijmans 2006, 355 ff.
- 109.
On the basis of Articles 230 and 234 TFEU.
- 110.
See Articles 2, paras b, 5, 7 and 8 of Decision 1999/468/EC.
- 111.
See Decision 2006/512/EC amending Decision 1999/468/EC. See also Bradley 2008.
- 112.
Article 230 TFEU.
- 113.
Netherlands Court of Audit, ‘Toezicht op markten’, Kamerstukken II, 2004–2005, 29960, no 1–2, p. 32.
- 114.
See also Ministry of Economic Affairs, ‘Visie op markttoezicht’, June 2004, p. 4.
- 115.
For example, in the energy sector the NRAs will retain the power to regulate the tariffs for access to the national energy networks.
- 116.
The example of the ‘gas roundabout affair’ of the Dutch Energy Regulator (DTe), for instance, showed that it can on the one hand be in the European interest for the transit of gas through the Netherlands to be encouraged as far as possible and that the Dutch consumer connected to the energy networks should help pay for the investments in the transport network needed to achieve this. On the other hand, however, it may be in the national public interest for the consumer not to be confronted with increases in end user tariffs leading to unaffordable energy prices. See DTe 22nd September 2006, Informele zienswijze uitbreiding H-gas transportsysteem, kenmerk 102259/39.B828.
- 117.
- 118.
See Council Regulation 58/2003 of 19 December 2002, laying down the statute for executive agencies to be entrusted with certain tasks in the management of Community programmes, OJ 2003 L 11/1 and Commission, Com(2008) 135 final, 11.3.2008.
- 119.
Commission, Com(2008) 135 final, 11.3.2008.
- 120.
General Court, Case T-188/97, Rothmans [1999] ECR II-2463.
- 121.
Dehousse 2002, 227 ff.
- 122.
See Curtin 2007, 532.
- 123.
Bovens 2007, 13.
- 124.
See e.g. the ERGEG Rules of procedure (Ref: E05-EP-08-03). A separate document outlines the consultation process followed by ERGEG (Ref: E07-Ep-16-03). See www.ergeg.org. Accessed 14 May 2012.
- 125.
With regard to the ERG and the ERGEG, for example, the question rises to what extent Regulation 1049/21/EC applies to their activities (Regulation 1049/2001/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 30 May 2001 regarding public access to European Parliament, Council and Commission documents, OJ 2001 L 145/53). See also Lavrijssen-Heijmans 2006, 409–410.
- 126.
Response of the European Ombudsman, P. Nikiforos Diamandouros, to the Commission’s Green Paper ‘Public Access to Documents held by Institutions of the European Community: A Review’, 11 July 2007.
- 127.
Article 4, para 5 of Regulation 1049/2001 offers a MS the possibility of requesting an institution not to publish a document originating from that MS without its prior permission, and the option of refusing to give that permission.
- 128.
ECJ, Case C-64/05P, Sweden [2007] ECR I-11389. See also General Court, Case T-237/02, TGI v. Commission [2006] ECR II-5131 and ECJ, Case C-266/05 Sison [2007] ECR I-1233.
- 129.
Compare Article 27 of the proposed regulation on ACER with Articles 42, 45 and 47 of the Regulation on EECMA.
- 130.
Stakeholder is a broad notion which refers to different parties with divergent interests (competitors, consumers and the regulated market players). It would go beyond the scope of this chapter to set out in detail what the interests of all stakeholders are and how those interests can be accommodated in terms of representation and legal protection.
- 131.
See for criticism on the practice of EMEA: Garattini and Bertele 2010. See also the memorandum of G. Shuttleworth, submitted to the House of Lords Select Committee on Economic Regulation, 20 May 2007.
- 132.
Scott and Sturm 2007, 18.
- 133.
Hofmann and Türk 2007, 267.
- 134.
Harlow and Rawlings 2007.
- 135.
Harlow and Rawlings 2007, 546 ff.
- 136.
Harlow and Rawlings 2007, 558 ff.
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Lavrijssen, S., Hancher, L. (2013). Networks of Regulatory Agencies in Europe. In: Larouche, P., Cserne, P. (eds) National Legal Systems and Globalization. T.M.C. Asser Press, The Hague, The Netherlands. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-90-6704-885-9_8
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-90-6704-885-9_8
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Publisher Name: T.M.C. Asser Press, The Hague, The Netherlands
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