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Mistake of Law pp 133–166Cite as

Applying the Theory of Mistake of Law: An Analysis of Elements of Crimes and a Survey of Dilemmas on the Battlefield

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Abstract

This chapter first contains an analysis of the structure of international crimes, with an emphasis on the element of criminal intent. Section 6.3 of this chapter contains a survey of situations in which the defendant acts under an understandable and relevant mistake of the law, but which are not covered by Article 32(2) ICC Statute. The aim of this final substantive chapter is to demonstrate that what is at stake is not merely a theoretical argument, for there are situations conceivable which, under the current provision on mistake of law, could lead to unjust convictions.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    The international crime of genocide is excluded from this analysis, not because I believe the defence of mistake of law should categorically be excluded in case of genocide, but because the specific intent required for this crime, the intent to destroy a group, seriously complicates formulating an example of good faith belief that this was lawful.

  2. 2.

    Jescheck 2004, p. 44.

  3. 3.

    Ambos 2006, p. 668.

  4. 4.

    See Boister 2005, pp. 32–33.

  5. 5.

    Wise 1998, p. 52.

  6. 6.

    Ambos 2006, p. 668.

  7. 7.

    Ambos 2006, p. 668.

  8. 8.

    Hebel 2001, p. 3. But see Weigend 2008, pp. 472–474 (reflecting on the debate about the status of the EOC and describing how the ICC Pre-Trial Chamber has confirmed its status to be “as ‘law’ to be applied by the Court, with a rank equal to the Statute itself”).

  9. 9.

    See also Eser 2002, pp. 909–910; Ambos 2004, p. 764; and Sliedregt 2003, pp. 56–57 and 307.

  10. 10.

    Piragoff 1999, p. 529. See also Kelt and Hebel 2001b, p. 14.

  11. 11.

    Kelt and Hebel 2001b, p. 15.

  12. 12.

    Kelt and Hebel 2001a, pp. 27 + 34.

  13. 13.

    Ambos 2004, p. 813.

  14. 14.

    Ambos 2004 p. 814.

  15. 15.

    Clark 2001, p. 323.

  16. 16.

    See also Kelt and Hebel 2001a, p. 34.

  17. 17.

    See also Werle and Jessberger 2005, footnote 44, at p. 43.

  18. 18.

    Ambos 2002a, p. 783. See also Heller 2008, p. 434.

  19. 19.

    Heller 2008, p. 439. See for a discussion of his arguments Sect. 4.2.2 supra.

  20. 20.

    Or should have been aware of (footnote in the original text, AvV).

  21. 21.

    Kelt and Hebel 2001a, p. 34.

  22. 22.

    Kelt and Hebel 2001a, p. 36.

  23. 23.

    See alsoSect. 2.3.2.3, (1) supra.

  24. 24.

    See also Werle and Jessberger 2005, pp. 49–50.

  25. 25.

    Ambos 2003, p. 27. See also Robinson 2001, p. 72.

  26. 26.

    Ambos 2003, pp. 31–32. See also Robinson 2001, p. 73.

  27. 27.

    Robinson 2001, p. 72.

  28. 28.

    Article 7(2)(e) ICC Statute.

  29. 29.

    Article 7(2)(g) ICC Statute.

  30. 30.

    See Kelt and Hebel 2001a, p. 38.

  31. 31.

    See para 2 of the general introduction to the EOC.

  32. 32.

    Roxin 2006, p. 489, Rn 105. See also Sect. 2.3.2.3 supra.

  33. 33.

    Ambos 2003, p. 15. But see Olásolo 2008, p. 28 (arguing that it must be established the perpetrator was aware “of the facts that established the character of the conflict as international or non-international”).

  34. 34.

    Dörmann 2003, p. 118.

  35. 35.

    Dörmann 2003, p. 118.

  36. 36.

    I agree with Cottier that the ‘should-have-known’-test also allows for these factors being taken into account, see Cottier 2008, p. 355.

  37. 37.

    This actually depends on the system applied. As we saw in Chap. 2 supra the Anglo-American system does not require reasonableness in case of crimes of intent or recklessness, and some civil law system require reasonableness in all cases. See Sliedregt 2003, in footnote 402 on p. 316. I think the reasonableness standard in case of crimes of intent can be explained by the objective and normative application of the intent requirement. Whether the defendant acted with the required intent is determined by applying an objective standard. This standard is in this sense also normative, but not to the same extent as the negligence standard. It is not an issue of should have known, but rather of must have known. See also Wilt 2000, pp. 127–129, and Hullu 2006, pp. 216–217.

  38. 38.

    Cottier 2008, p. 354.

  39. 39.

    Heller 2008, pp. 436 + 444. See also Ambos 2004, p. 789; and Weigend 2004, p. 327.

  40. 40.

    Cottier 2008, p. 354.

  41. 41.

    Werle and Jessberger 2005, p. 48.

  42. 42.

    See also Weigend 2008, p. 485.

  43. 43.

    See also Weigend 2008, p. 485 (Weigend speaks of an ‘accompanying circumstance’).

  44. 44.

    SeeSect. 4.2.2supra.

  45. 45.

    To the contrary Heller 2008, p. 444 (Heller resists the incorporation of should have known elements also because of "a widespread disposition to avoid responsibility based on either negligence or recklessness").

  46. 46.

    Weigend 2004, p. 332.

  47. 47.

    Saland 1999, p. 210.

  48. 48.

    Boister 2005, p. 38.

  49. 49.

    Fletcher 2007, p. 31.

  50. 50.

    See element 3 in the EOC.

  51. 51.

    Article 8(2)(b)(iv) ICC Statute. According to Werle and Jessberger the defendant's beliefs are relevant on the basis of Element 3, footnote 37 EOC, Werle and Jessberger 2005, footnote 44, at p. 43.

  52. 52.

    Ambos 2004, p. 818. See also Fletcher 2007, p. 85.

  53. 53.

    Ambos 2004, p. 818.

  54. 54.

    See alsoSect. 2.3.2.3, (2) supra.

  55. 55.

    See e.g. Article 8(2)(b)(i) and (ii) ICC.

  56. 56.

    See Article 8(2)(b)(i), (e)(i) and (b)(ii) ICC.

  57. 57.

    Article 48 AP I. The other principles are: military necessity, humanity and proportionality, see e.g. The Manual of the Law of Armed Conflict 2004, pp. 21–26. See also Gill and Sliedregt 2005, p. 29, footnote 2 and accompanying text. On the principle of distinction see also Olásolo 2008, pp. 13–14 + 104–105.

  58. 58.

    Melzer 2009, p. 27. See also Kleffner 2008, p. 69.

  59. 59.

    See Henckaerts and Doswald-Beck 2005a, Rule 1, pp. 5–8. See also Ducheine and Pouw 2010, pp. 88–89; and Kleffner 2008, p. 70.

  60. 60.

    Ducheine and Pouw 2010, pp. 89–100; and Pouw 2009, pp. 24–25.

  61. 61.

    Melzer 2009, p. 27. As Pouw notes, the IGDPH is clearly not a binding text, but “it is currently the single most comprehensive document on the notion of direct participation in hostilities”, Pouw 2009, p. 18.

  62. 62.

    See NATO 2010. See also Ducheine and Pouw 2010, pp. 92–93; and Pouw 2009, pp. 8–9 + 11.

  63. 63.

    Ducheine and Pouw 2010, p. 93; and Pouw 2009, p. 27.

  64. 64.

    Melzer 2009, pp. 71–73. See also Pouw 2009, p. 25.

  65. 65.

    Melzer 2009, pp. 70–71.

  66. 66.

    Melzer 2009 p. 47. See also Pouw 2009, pp. 31–32.

  67. 67.

    Melzer 2009, p. 51. See also Pouw 2009, pp. 32–33.

  68. 68.

    Melzer 2009 p. 58. See also Pouw 2009, pp. 33–34.

  69. 69.

    Which is to be awaited because the notion of direct participation in hostilities is a “highly contentious and paradoxic subregime of LOAC”, Pouw 2009, p. 17.

  70. 70.

    See also Rogers 2005.

  71. 71.

    "Attacks shall be limited strictly to military objectives. In so far as objects are concerned, military objectives are limited to those objects which by their nature, location, purpose or use make an effective contribution to military action and whose total or partial destruction, capture or neutralization, in the circumstances ruling at the time, offers a definite military advantage", Article 52(2) API.

  72. 72.

    Article 51(5)(b) API and Article 57(2)(a)(iii) API.

  73. 73.

    The use of the term "proportionality" is debateable. As Kalshoven indicates, the term does not figure in Protocol I, Kalshoven 2003, p. 498.

  74. 74.

    OTPICTY 2000, § 48–50.

  75. 75.

    OTPICTY 2000, §71.

  76. 76.

    See also W. Fenrick in reaction to C. Garraway in: Duyx et al. 2000, p. 99.

  77. 77.

    HRW 2000.

  78. 78.

    OTPICTY 2000, § 76.

  79. 79.

    OTPICTY 2000, § 77.

  80. 80.

    OTPICTY 2000, § 78. See also Olásolo 2008, pp. 130–131.

  81. 81.

    HRW 2000, p. 15, footnote 80 and accompanying text.

  82. 82.

    See also Rogers 2005, p. 174.

  83. 83.

    Rogers 2005, p. 174.

  84. 84.

    Best 1994, p. 275.

  85. 85.

    See also footnote 36 under element 2 of Article 8(2)(b)(iv) EOC (according to this footnote the advantage may or may not be temporally or geographically related to the object of the attack).

  86. 86.

    See also Rogers 2005.

  87. 87.

    Fletcher 1998, p. 167.

  88. 88.

    Fletcher 1985, p. 976.

  89. 89.

    See also Eser 2008, pp. 865–866.

  90. 90.

    Sliedregt 2003, pp. 264–266.

  91. 91.

    Sliedregt 2003 pp. 264–265.

  92. 92.

    Other related and (theoretically) interesting issues that will not be addressed here are: the requirement of knowledge of the attack (see on this issue, e.g. Fletcher 1998, pp. 101–106; Eser 2008, p. 883; Ambos 2002b, p. 1035; Ambos 2008b, p. 177) and the distinction between individual self-defense and collective self-defense or the right of self-defense under public international law, see e.g. Ambos 2002b, p. 1034; Sliedregt 2003, pp. 254–255; Eser 2008, pp. 879–880; Fletcher and Ohlin 2008; and a symposium on this book in the JICJ, July 2009.

  93. 93.

    Wilt 2009a, p. 539.

  94. 94.

    Eric Pouw pointed out to me that this example is purely theoretical because it unjustly presumes that a soldier knows what constitutes a crime against humanity.

  95. 95.

    Ambos 2004, p. 819.

  96. 96.

    Ambos 2004, p. 819.

  97. 97.

    Van Sliedregt sees "a growing awareness [in American codes] of the distinction between duress and choice of evils as one between excuse and justification", as the distinction is known is civil law systems, in particular the German system; she warns, however, that the majority of American states still seem to adhere to the common law, Sliedregt 2003, pp. 270–271. For the civil law distinction between choice of evils as a justification and duress as an excuse, see Sliedregt 2003, pp. 276–279. On this defense in the Dutch legal system see Dolman 2006.

  98. 98.

    See also Ambos 2008b, p. 183 (on the difference between justifying necessity and excusing duress).

  99. 99.

    This can also happen on the basis of a mistake of fact.

  100. 100.

    See for a recent case on such a ticking bomb scenario, a case before the Israeli Supreme Court, H.C. 5100/94 1999. See also, Jessberger 2005 and Gaeta 2004.

  101. 101.

    Or perhaps whether this was a situation of duress.

  102. 102.

    Prosecutor v. Norman 2004b, § 46. On this dissent see also Sect. 5.2.4.2 supra.

  103. 103.

    Sands 2008, p. 89.

  104. 104.

    Sands 2008, p. 86.

  105. 105.

    Sands 2008, p. 90.

  106. 106.

    Sands 2008, p. 192.

  107. 107.

    Sands 2008, p. 108.

  108. 108.

    See Jessberger 2005, p. 1068.

  109. 109.

    Sliedregt 2003, p. 296.

  110. 110.

    See also Sliedregt 2003, pp. 293–294.

  111. 111.

    See also Ambos 2008b, pp. 98–99.

  112. 112.

    See also Kalshoven 2005, p. 366; Lippman 1996, pp. 59 + 64; Dörmann 2008, p. 312.

  113. 113.

    Hampson 2007, p. 298.

  114. 114.

    Sliedregt 2003, p. 297.

  115. 115.

    Dörmann 2008, p. 313, footnote 126; Lippman 1996, p. 62.

  116. 116.

    Lippman 1996, pp. 62 + 64, List (The Hostages Case) 1948, TWC XI, p. 1297.

  117. 117.

    Prosecutor v. Krstić 2001, § 527 ("The evacuation [of the Bosnian Muslim population from the Srebrenica enclave] was itself the goal and neither the protection of the civilians nor imperative military necessity justified the action."). This reasoning recognizes the two grounds of justification for forcible transfer; the justifications were denied on the facts of the case. See Zahar and Sluiter 2008, p. 432

  118. 118.

    Prosecutor v. Blagojević and Jokić 2005, §§ 598–602 (§ 601: "The fact that no step is taken by the perpetrator to secure the return of those displaced, when the circumstances that necessitated the evacuation have ceased, is among the factors that may prove an intent to permanently displace the victims rather than the intent to secure the population through a lawful—and therefore temporary—evacuation"). See Dörmann 2008, pp. 316–318. (This case also concerns destruction of property not justified by military necessity, §615.)

  119. 119.

    See an example by Nill-Theobald, Nill-Theobald 1998, p. 131 (mistake as to military necessity in case of the destruction of a village).

  120. 120.

    Baarda 2002, pp. 61–62.

  121. 121.

    Robinson 2001, p. 86. See also Saland 1999, p. 209.

  122. 122.

    See the war crimes of: (Article 8(2)(a)(vii)(unlawful deportation), 8(2)(b)(viii)(deportation), 8(2)(e)(viii)(ordering the displacement for reasons related to the conflict, unless security or imperative mil. reasons); and the crime against humanity of: (Article 7(1)(d) jo (2)(d), deportation without grounds permitted under international law).

  123. 123.

    If it concerns an internal armed conflict.

  124. 124.

    Baarda 2002, p. 73.

  125. 125.

    Baarda 2002, pp. 71–72 (referring to Article 147 GC IV, which prohibits deportation as a ‘grave breach’ unless ‘justified by military necessity’).

  126. 126.

    Baarda 2002, p. 74.

  127. 127.

    Baarda 2002, pp. 73–74. According to Jescheck deportation of the civilian population cannot be justified by military necessity, Jescheck 2004, p. 51.

  128. 128.

    Baarda 2002, pp. 81–85.

  129. 129.

    Kalshoven and Zegveld 2001, pp. 143–146. See also Osiel 2009, pp. 35–36+55; and Kalshoven 2003, pp. 492+505.

  130. 130.

    Greenwood 2006b, pp. 322–324; Greenwood 2006a, pp. 332, 336, 342–351.

  131. 131.

    Kalshoven 2003, p. 504. Greenwood 2006a, p. 339.

  132. 132.

    Jescheck 2004, p. 52.

  133. 133.

    Saland 1999, p. 209; Ambos 2002b, p. 1028; Ambos 2008b, p. 174, Rn. 84; Ambos 2004, p. 829. See also Sliedregt 2003, p. 291; Greenwood 2006a, p. 332.

  134. 134.

    See also Kalshoven 2003, p. 509.

  135. 135.

    Sliedregt 2003, p. 292; as to the last requirement Greenwood comments that this is more a matter of military discipline than international law, Greenwood 2006b, p. 300, footnote 16.

  136. 136.

    Ambos 2008b, p. 99.

  137. 137.

    Greenwood 2006b, p. 299.

  138. 138.

    Kalshoven finds this term more accurate because it reflects that reprisals are "imperfect means of supporting international law", Kalshoven 2005, p. 24.

  139. 139.

    Greenwood 2006b, pp. 324–325.

  140. 140.

    Kalshoven 2003, p. 492. See also on the same decisions of the ICTY: Greenwood 2006a, p. 332 (both authors find the findings of the Trial Chamber inaccurate and unnecessary).

  141. 141.

    Prosecutor v. Martić 1996.

  142. 142.

    Prosecutor v. Martić 1996, § 17.

  143. 143.

    Prosecutor v. Martić 1996, § 15.

  144. 144.

    Prosecutor v. Martić 1996, § 16.

  145. 145.

    Prosecutor v. Martić 1996, § 16.

  146. 146.

    Kalshoven 2003, p. 491. See also Greenwood 2006a, pp. 348–349.

  147. 147.

    Kalshoven 2003, p. 491.

  148. 148.

    Kalshoven 2003, p. 492.

  149. 149.

    Kalshoven 2003, p. 492.

  150. 150.

    Prosecutor v. Kupreškić et al. 2000.

  151. 151.

    Prosecutor v. Kupreškić et al. 2000, §§ 527–536, Kalshoven 2003, p. 500.

  152. 152.

    Prosecutor v. Kupreškić et al. 2000, § 527.

  153. 153.

    Kalshoven 2003, p. 500.

  154. 154.

    Kalshoven 2003, p. 502.

  155. 155.

    Kalshoven 2003, p. 502.

  156. 156.

    Kalshoven 2003, p. 502.

  157. 157.

    Kalshoven 2003, p. 502.

  158. 158.

    Kalshoven 2003, p. 503, fn. 75.

  159. 159.

    Kalshoven 2003, p. 504.

  160. 160.

    Prosecutor v. Kupreškić et al. 2000, § 534.

  161. 161.

    Kalshoven 2003, p. 504.

  162. 162.

    Kalshoven 2003, p. 504.

  163. 163.

    Kalshoven 2003, p. 505.

  164. 164.

    Prosecutor v. Kupreškić et al. 2000, § 535; Kalshoven 2003, p. 505.

  165. 165.

    Kalshoven 2003, pp. 493–494 and 505.

  166. 166.

    Kalshoven 2005, p. 41.

  167. 167.

    Kalshoven 2005 p. 41.

  168. 168.

    See also Olásolo 2008, p. 243.

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  1. Criminal Law Department, University of Amsterdam, Oudemanhuispoort 4-6, 1012 DL, Amsterdam, The Netherlands

    Annemieke van Verseveld

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  1. Annemieke van Verseveld
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van Verseveld, A. (2012). Applying the Theory of Mistake of Law: An Analysis of Elements of Crimes and a Survey of Dilemmas on the Battlefield. In: Mistake of Law. T.M.C. Asser Press, The Hague, The Netherlands. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-90-6704-867-5_6

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