Abstract
This chapter will seek to inject some sense of objectivity into the evaluation of the legitimacy of the special event laws in the preceding chapters, which may be refreshing if the reader feels that such objectivity is lacking in the sometimes scathing criticism of anti-ambushing laws and practices as contained in the earlier chapters. It will briefly examine the stock argument of event organisers that is so often invoked in support of aggressive campaigns to protect commercial rights to events against ambushes (namely that ambush marketing threatens the very existence of the mega-event through its potential to alienate the official sponsors-what will be referred to as the ‘survival of the Games’ argument). It will further examine the legitimacy of claims to rights and claims for their protection by law in the face of the commercial monopoly enjoyed by such event organisers, with reference also to the phenomenon of commercialisation of sport. This will include brief reference to the nature of the commercial sports industry and its history, including reference to the apparent level of corruption and dicey business practices, as background to the arguments in other chapters regarding the often-encountered ‘public good’ justifications for event commercial rights protection.
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Notes
- 1.
Dutch humanist scholar and theologian Desiderius Erasmus (1466–1536), as quoted in Mann Phillips 1967, p. 45.
- 2.
Lawton, J ‘Profit over people for Olympics and Champions League,’ 19 February 2011, The Belfast Telegraph—available online at http://www.belfasttelegraph.co.uk/sport/columnists/james-lawton/james-lawton-profit-over-people-for-olympics-and-champions-league-15089828.html.
- 3.
Matheson, as quoted by Megan McArdle on Business Insider—available online at the time of writing at http://articles.businessinsider.com/2010-02-15/wall_street/30056382_1_greece-gdp-fun-olympic.
- 4.
Howden, D ‘Hosts see red as World Cup bill soars—but Fifa is £1.7bn in black,’ 9 June 2010, The Independent—available online at the time of writing at http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/africa/hosts-see-red-as-world-cup-bill-soars-ndash-but-fifa-is-16317bn-in-black-1994958.html.
- 5.
FIFA’s Financial Report 2008.
- 6.
It was reported in March 2010 that FIFA declared a profit of USD 196 million and that it had increased its reserve fund to more than USD 1 billion in its Financial Report 2009. The organisation declared equity of USD 1.061 billion. It was reported that FIFA has focused on building its reserves in recent years to sustain it in the event that a World Cup is cancelled and commercial partners have to be repaid. It originally had a target of USD 800 million to be set aside by the end of 2010, but has already exceeded that—see the short report of 19 March 2010 available on the Business Report web site at http://www.busrep.co.za/index.php?fSectionId=552&fArticleId=5397601 (accessed 31 March 2010).
- 7.
The recognised revenue in 2008 from television broadcasting rights for the 2010 FIFA World Cup™ amounts to USD 550,085 million. The accumulated amount recognised (excluding hedge accounting effects, value-in-kind transactions and sales commissions) for the period 1 January 2007–31 December 2008 amounted to USD 1,105,360 million. Until 31 December 2008, the accumulated amount of USD 971,829 million had been collected—from Note 1: Revenue from Television Broadcasting Rights at 74 of the FIFA Financial Report 2008.
- 8.
Note F (‘Revenue Recognition’) of the Notes on the Consolidated Financial Statements contained in the FIFA Financial Report 2008 explains the revenue relating to events as follows:
Event-related revenue primarily relates to the sale of the following rights:
– Television broadcasting rights;
– Marketing rights;
– Hospitality rights; and
– Licensing rights.
Under these revenue-generating contracts, FIFA receives either fixed royalty payments or royalties in the form of guaranteed minimum payments plus additional sales-based payments (profit share). Revenue directly related to the FIFA World Cup™ event is recognised in the income statement using the percentage-of-completion method, if it can be estimated reliably. The stage of completion of the FIFA World Cup™ event is assessed as incurred evenly over the project preparation period, which is 4 years. While this generally applies to fixed royalty and guaranteed minimum payments, additional sales-based revenue (profit share) is included in the percentage-of-completion method only when the amount is probable and can be measured reliably. Revenue relating to other FIFA events is deferred during the preparation period and is recognised in the income statement when the event takes place. Ticket sales in connection with the 2010 FIFA World Cup South Africa™ and the FIFA Confederations Cup South Africa 2009 are not recognised, since the 2010 FIFA World Cup Organising Committee South Africa is the beneficiary of the net revenue.
- 9.
Rob Rose (writing in Schulz-Herzenberg 2010, p. 118) observes as follows:
‘For the 2010 World Cup, revenue generated through ‘sale of rights’ between 2007 and 2010 amounted to $3,2 billion, according to documents provided to the author. This was made up of $2 billion for TV rights (63% of the total), with $1 billion for the marketing rights, $120 million for the hospitality rights, and $80 million for licensing. World Cup sponsors, like beer brand Budweiser and cellular firm MTN, also pay FIFA a fee but this is included in the marketing rights.’
- 10.
See the Guardian report of 23 February 2011, available online at the time of writing at http://www.guardian.co.uk/football/2011/feb/23/fifa-world-cup-cash.
- 11.
Event-related expenses as recorded in FIFA’s financial report are the gross outflow of economic benefits that arise in the ordinary activity of organising an event. Since FIFA organises the FIFA World Cup™ event over a period of 4 years, expenses relating to the event are recognised based on the stage of completion of the event, as determined for event-related revenue recognition purposes. The end of 2008 reflected a point roughly halfway in the 4 year period between the 2006 and 2010 world cup events.
- 12.
From FIFA’s Financial Report 2008, as tabled at the 59th FIFA Congress, Nassau, 2–3 June 2009 (the most recent financial report for the organisation available on its web site at www.fifa.com).
- 13.
FIFA’s published financial report for the year 2008 as discussed here does not clarify or itemise expenses related to either events or to development projects. It should be mentioned here, just as a matter of interest, that allegations have been made regarding an apparent decision by FIFA’s executive committee, in or about sometime in 2000, that expense claims of members do not need to be supported by documentary proof. Andrew Jennings recounts one instance of an unnamed member who, allegedly, claimed a total of approximately USD 85,000 for travel and accommodation expenses without providing any proof of the actual expenses incurred—see Jennings 2006, pp. 101, 102. Without expressing a view on such allegations, it is interesting to speculate to what extent income from events finds its way back into the game of football.
- 14.
Compare Note E (‘Income Statement’) of the Notes on the Consolidated Financial Statements contained in the FIFA Financial Report 2008, which explains event-related revenue and expenses as follows:
‘Event-related revenue and expenses are directly related to the organisation and realisation of the FIFA World Cup™ and other FIFA events. For accounting purposes, FIFA defines other FIFA events as all other football events, such as the FIFA Women’s World Cup™, FIFA U-20 World Cup, FIFA U-17 World Cup, FIFA U-20 Women’s World Cup, FIFA U-17 Women’s World Cup, Olympic Football Tournaments, FIFA Futsal World Cup, FIFA Confederations Cup, FIFA Club World Cup, FIFA Beach Soccer World Cup, Blue Stars/FIFA Youth Cup, FIFA Interactive World Cup, etc.’
- 15.
FIFA Financial Report 2008 at 83.
- 16.
See the FIFA Financial Report 2008 at 96. FIFA ‘Partners’ are awarded the most comprehensive package of marketing rights; FIFA ‘Sponsors’ are granted the second most comprehensive package of rights, and FIFA ‘National Supporters’ are granted a package of specified marketing rights that are only exercisable within the borders of the host nation. In respect of the Olympic Games, the International Olympic Committee utilises six revenue-generating programmes:
– IOC-managed broadcast sponsorships;
– The TOP partners sponsorship programme (referred to elsewhere in this book, in Chap. 2);
– The IOC official supplier and licensing programme;
– Domestic sponsorship programmes run by the local Organising Committees for the Games (or ‘OCOGS’);
– Ticketing programmes in the host country; and
– Licensing programmes in the host country.
By way of example of the revenues generated through these streams between 2001 and 2004, broadcasting rights generated USD 2,232 million, the TOP programme USD 663 million, and domestic sponsorships USD 796 million—see Davis 2008, p. 157.
- 17.
According to the report (at 76), the accumulated revenue from marketing rights recognised (excluding value-in-kind transactions and sales commissions) in 2008 amounted to USD 437 million. The accumulated revenue from marketing rights collected in the period from 1 January 2007 to 31 December 2008 amounted to USD 474 million.
- 18.
Note K (‘Income Taxes’) of the Notes on the Consolidated Financial Statements contained in the FIFA Financial Report 2008 at 67.
- 19.
Motosyklesistiki Omospondia Ellados NPID (MOTOE) v Elliniko Dimosio, Case C-49/07 at par. 41–43.
- 20.
Article 2(e) of FIFA’s Statutes (August 2009 version currently in force at the time of writing), entitled ‘Objectives.’
- 21.
Compare Andrew Jennings’s entertaining read on alleged corruption within FIFA and world football, in Jennings 2006.
- 22.
Schwab 2006.
- 23.
Ibid. 7.
- 24.
‘South Africa’s World Cup: Who profits most?,’ 13 May 2010, The Economist—available online at the time of writing at http://www.economist.com/node/16117134.
- 25.
Owen Dean ‘Defending its turf: FIFA combats ambush marketing’ WIPO Magazine, July 2009—available online at http://www.wipo.int/wipo_magazine/en/2009/04/article_0003.html.
- 26.
Magdalinski and Nauright ‘Commercialisation of the Modern Olympics’ in Slack 2004, p. 194.
- 27.
Ibid.
- 28.
Ibid.
- 29.
Ibid.
- 30.
Dollinger, MJ; Li, X; Mooney, C H ‘Mega-events and entrepreneurial rents: Lessons from the Beijing Olympics’ (draft document, April 2009—available online at the time of writing at http://www.indiana.edu/~rccpb/uschinacooperation/papers/P8%20Dollinger.pdf).
- 31.
Magdalinski and Nauright in Slack 2004, p. 195.
- 32.
Ibid. 202.
- 33.
Nafziger 1988, pp. 155, 156.
- 34.
See Chap. 2.
- 35.
Grayson 1999, p. 445.
- 36.
Grayson 1999, p. 446 describes how John Wisden, a Worcester sports outfitter, decided in 1863 to underwrite the publication of the Wisden Cricketers’ Almanack (and how the name ‘Wisden’ has become more synonymous with cricket than with the sponsor’s business).
- 37.
The word ‘derby,’ which has of course assumed much wider usage in modern times, originated from Lord Derby’s financial patronage of horse-racing in England.
- 38.
For more on a brief history of sponsor involvement in sport, see Boyle and Haynes 2009, p. 44 et seq.
- 39.
From the FIFA Financial Report 2008 (at 105):‘FIFA organises the FIFA World Cup™ and other FIFA events. In connection with these competitions, FIFA offers financial support to local organising committees and compensates teams for travel and accommodation expenses. For the FIFA World Cup™, the qualifying teams also receive a subsidy to cover the cost of their preparations.’
- 40.
FIFA’s Financial Assistance Programme is a financial aid programme, under which USD 1 million is granted to each member association and USD 10 million to each confederation during the 4-year cycle to improve their administrative and technical infrastructure—FIFA Financial Report 2008 at 81.
- 41.
See the FIFA 2010 Financial Report (at 14) available on the organisation’s website at the time of writing at http://www.fifa.com/mm/document/affederation/administration/01/39/20/45/web_fifa_fr2010_eng[1].pdf.
- 42.
Blitz, R ‘Olympic bodies resolve cash dispute,’ 19 April 2011, Financial Times—available online at the time of writing at http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/81bbb742-6a77-11e0-a464-00144feab49a.html#axzz1dOZuYJ6K.
- 43.
Ibid.
- 44.
From a report on the gamesbids.com website, 14 October 2011, available online at http://www.gamesbids.com/eng/other_news/1216135928.html.
- 45.
James and Osborn 2010.
- 46.
Tripodi and Sutherland 2000, pp. 412–422.
- 47.
Grady et al. 2010, p. 152.
- 48.
Davis 2008, p. 157.
- 49.
Dollinger, MJ; Li, X; Mooney, C H ‘Mega-events and entrepreneurial rents: Lessons from the Beijing Olympics’ (draft document, April 2009—available online at the time of writing at http://www.indiana.edu/~rccpb/uschinacooperation/papers/P8%20Dollinger.pdf).
- 50.
Available on the web site of the organisation at www.fifa.com.
- 51.
Michael Payne, former IOC marketing director, writing in Payne 2006, p. 116.
- 52.
http://penguinsix.com/2008/08/09/how-much-did-the-olympic-opening-ceremony-cost/. Another online source puts the figure closer to USD 300 million—see http://www.sports-reference.com/olympics/blog/?p=9.
- 53.
- 54.
During the playing of the 2010 football World Cup event there appeared to be a growing feeling of disillusionment and even anger at FIFA amongst South Africans. A Cape Town artist was reported as doing a brisk trade in ‘Fick Fufa’ t-shirts as a non-profit venture. Local satirical news site Hayibo.com was also selling a range of t-shirts that lampooned FIFA’s copyright and other IP rights to phrases and other things, with the logo ‘FEEFA 2.010 WHIRLED CUP SOWTH AFRIKA’—from a report by Raborife, M ‘Fick Fufa!’, Mail and Guardian, 18–24 June 2010.
- 55.
Price, ME ‘On Seizing the Olympic Platform,’ in Price and Dayan 2008, p. 106.
- 56.
See the Times of India report of 7 September 2010, available online at the time of writing at http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/CWG-balloon-show-at-opening-ceremony-to-cost-Rs-70cr/articleshow/6508276.cms.
- 57.
Schmitz 2005, p. 208.
- 58.
Pelanda, BL ‘Ambush marketing: Dissecting the discourse,’ undated 2011 paper available online at the time of writing at http://works.bepress.com/brian_pelanda/, with reference to McKelvey et al. 2010, p. 23; Donatuti 2007, p. 207.
- 59.
Ibid.
- 60.
It has been reported that the organisers of the 2014 World Cup in Brazil estimate that infrastructure investment for the event will be in the region of USD 9.5 billion, or more than double the infrastructure investment for the 2010 FIFA World Cup South Africa.
- 61.
Matheson, V ‘Bad economics from FIFA,’ 3 March 2011, The Sports Economist—available online at the time of writing at http://thesportseconomist.com/page/7/.
- 62.
Seth 2010, p. 456.
- 63.
Ibid. At 462 n 15.
- 64.
Palomba, M ‘Is ambush marketing dead?’ Reed Smith Advertising Compliance Team Client Update (May 2010)—available online at the time of writing at http://www.advertisingcompliancelaw.com/uploads/file/10-097%20ReACTS%20-%20Is%20ambush%20marketing%20dead.PDF.
- 65.
Ellen, L ‘Protecting Sponsors at the London 2012 Olympics,’ January 2010 (at 4), available online at the time of writing at http://www.mishcon.com/assets/managed/docs/downloads/doc_2413/Protecting_Sponsors_at_the_London_2012_Olympics_doc_(2).pdf.
- 66.
From the country report on the United Kingdom prepared for the Working Committee of the International Association for the Protection of Intellectual property (AIPPI), Project Q210 (‘The protection of major sports events and associated commercial activities through trademarks and other IPR’; reports compiled for purposes of a draft resolution to be submitted to the AIPPI Exco meeting in Buenos Aires, October 2009)—available online at the time of writing at https://www.aippi.org/download/commitees/210/GR210united_kingdom.pdf.
- 67.
De Carvalho 2010, p. 52.
- 68.
Source: The London 2012 website, available online at the time of writing at http://www.london2012.com/making-it-happen/funding-the-games/index.php.
- 69.
Leone, L ‘Ambush marketing: Criminal offence or free enterprise?’ Asser International Sports Law Centre (2008)—available online at the time of writing at http://www.thefreelibrary.com.
- 70.
Cooper Dreyfuss 1996, p. 139.
- 71.
AIPPI Resolution on Question Q210: ‘The protection of major sports events and associated commercial activities through Trade Marks and other IPR,’ adopted at the AIPPI Executive Committee meeting in Buenos Aires, 14 October 2009—English version available online at the time of writing at https://www.aippi.org/download/commitees/210/RS210English.pdf.
- 72.
Scaria 2008, p. 44.
- 73.
Chartered Institute of Marketing Ambush Marketing and the Law, April 2011 at 10—see http://www.cim.co.uk/resources/emergingthemes/home.aspx.
- 74.
Tripodi and Sutherland 2000.
- 75.
From Scott, M ‘FIFA crisis: Storm clouds gather as big hitters fight to clear names,’ 29 May 2011 in The Guardian—available online at the time of writing at http://www.guardian.co.uk/football/2011/may/29/fifa-crisis-storm-clouds-gather?INTCMP=ILCNETTXT3487.
- 76.
David Becker, at the time of writing the Head of Legal for the International Cricket Council, from personal e-mail correspondence with the author, December 2011.
- 77.
Ellis et al. 2011, p. 302.
- 78.
Price, M E ‘On Seizing the Olympic Platform,’ in Price and Dayan 2008, p. 90.
- 79.
Ibid. 91–92.
- 80.
Kobel 2007, pp. 7, 8.
- 81.
Klein 2000.
- 82.
See Lury, C ‘Trade mark style as a way of fixing things,’ in Bently et al. 2008, p. 206.
- 83.
Ibid.
- 84.
Klein 2000, p. 24.
- 85.
Ibid.
- 86.
In e.g. the UK’s Trade Marks Act, 1994.
- 87.
- 88.
Owen, D ‘The great Olympic ambush—led by David Cameron,’ 22 September 2011—available online at http://www.insidethegames.biz/blogs/14344-david-owen-the-great-olympic-ambush.
- 89.
Scaria 2008, pp. 46, 47.
- 90.
Chartered Institute of Marketing Ambush Marketing and the Law, April 2011 at 7—see http://www.cim.co.uk/resources/emergingthemes/home.aspx.
- 91.
Price, M E ‘On Seizing the Olympic Platform,’ in Price and Dayan 2008, p. 88.
- 92.
Grady et al. 2010, p. 151.
- 93.
See Chap. 2 for discussion of the TOP sponsorship programme of the Olympic Games.
- 94.
Séguin and O’Reilly 2008.
- 95.
Grady et al. 2010, p. 151.
- 96.
Ibid.
- 97.
Tripodi and Sutherland 2000.
- 98.
Yang, H ‘Non-law enforcement methods to tackle Olympic ambush marketing,’ China Intellectual Property Magazine (June 2008)—available online at the time of writing at http://www.chinaipmagazine.com/en/journal-show.asp?id=381.
- 99.
See the discussion in Sect. 4.4.9 of Chap. 4.
- 100.
Available online at the time of writing at http://www.culture.gov.uk/images/consultations/ConsDoc_Regulations_on_Advertising_and_Trading_London_2012.pdf.
- 101.
See Séguin and O’Reilly 2008, p. 62.
- 102.
The following has been observed in respect of sponsorship exclusivity in the context of the United States sports sponsorship market:
For sponsors of sport, categorical exclusivity is crucial for achieving [the objective of blocking competition] because it prevents the competition from entering into a sponsorship arrangement with a team, event, or governing body whose exposure is large and whose demographics fit the target market of the industry … [T]he pursuit of categorical exclusivity is driving service industry sponsorship within highly competitive business sectors such as banking, insurance and telecommunications. A survey of active sport sponsors found that almost half considered exclusivity to be an important aspect of their sponsorship agreements, with 40 percent indicating willingness to pay a 9 percent premium for the right to block the competition.
Irwin et al. 2008, pp. 169, 170.
- 103.
See Johnson 2008, p. 24.
- 104.
- 105.
Ibid. 24–25. The Winter Games in Albertville in 1992 reportedly made a USD 57 million loss. By way of example, the Sydney 2000 Summer Games cost an estimated USD 3.24 billion to present (including a bid cost of USD 12.6 million) and broke even; The Salt Law Winter Games of 2002 cost an estimated USD 1.3 billion to present (including a USD 7 million bid cost) and showed an estimated USD 100 million profit—see Davis 2008, p. 68.
- 106.
See Davis 2008, pp. 163, 164.
- 107.
Nixon, A ‘The Sport Lawyer—Olympic funding dispute heads to IOC mediation, 19 August 2011—available online at the time of writing at http://www.mondaq.com/x/140794/Arbitration+Dispute+Resolution/The+Sport+Lawyer+Olympic+Funding+Dispute+Heads+To+IOC+Mediation.
- 108.
- 109.
Slack, T and Amis, J ‘Money for nothing and your cheques for free? A critical perspective on sports sponsorship,’ in Slack 2004, p. 274.
- 110.
Katz 1994, p. 24.
- 111.
International Olympic Committee member Dick Pound, writing in Pound 2006, pp. 141, 142.
- 112.
The idea of selling exclusivity of marketing rights to a limited number of sponsors apparently predates Peter Ueberroth’s efforts at the 1984 Olympics and originated in Britain in the 1970s with Nally and his associate Peter West’s media agency, West Nally. Its executives went on to hold leading positions in a number of international sports federations, which earned the agency the title ‘the global sports marketing university’—see Horne and Manzenreiter 2006, p. 7; Payne 2006, p. 21.
- 113.
Coca-Cola has, of course, long recognised the benefits of involvement in sport for building and maintaining its brand value; it is the longest running Olympic sponsor and has been directly involved in all the Games since 1928.
- 114.
From an interview with Patrick Nally available as ‘Patrick Nally: Godfather to an Industry,’ 7 January 2011 on the web site of Sports Pro Media at http://www.sportspromedia.com/quick_fire_questions/patrick_nallys_sports_business_answers/.
- 115.
Patrick Nally, as quoted by Tomlinson in Silk et al. 2005, p. 46.
- 116.
In Sect. 6.2.1.2 of Chap. 6.
- 117.
From a piece in The Independent by David Owen, 28 October 2007—available online at the time of writing at http://www.independent.co.uk/news/people/profiles/jr244me-valcke-he-scored-the-worstever-own-goal-now-hes-running-football-398086.html.
- 118.
Tomlinson, A ‘The Making of the Global Sports Economy: ISL, Adidas and the Rise of the Corporate Player in World Sport,’ in Silk et al. 2005, pp. 59, 60.
- 119.
Quoting Hampton, M ‘Where Currents Meet: The Offshore Interface between Corruption, Offshore Finance Centres and Economic Development,’ in Harriss-White and White 1996.
- 120.
Scott, M ‘FIFA crisis: Storm clouds gather as big hitters fight to clear names,’ 29 May 2011 in The Guardian—available online at the time of writing at http://www.guardian.co.uk/football/2011/may/29/fifa-crisis-storm-clouds-gather?INTCMP=ILCNETTXT3487.
- 121.
See, for example, Matheson and Baade 2004; see also the report entitled ‘An African Football World Cup at Last! But what will be the effects? Maximising positive impact of the 2010 FIFA World Cup™’ Results of the International Symposium on the Impact of Mega Sports Events on Developmental Goals 5–7 March 2008, Stellenbosch, South Africa; Mabugu and Mohamed 2008.
- 122.
Compare Baade and Matheson 2004.
- 123.
Davis 2008, p. 72.
- 124.
See Bohlmann 2006, p. 13. Cottle (‘Workers battle and CEOs cream it while World Cup costs soar’ Cape Times 13 July 2009) observed the following:
‘In 2004, the financial impact report for the South African World Cup bid committee (prepared by Grant Thornton) estimated the cost of infrastructure and stadiums to the taxpayer would be about R2.3 billion. By October 2006 this amount had increased to R8.35 billion. The current estimated costs to the taxpayer of the stadiums and related infrastructure is R17.4 billion.’
- 125.
From a report on SABC News, 9 April 2010. This is rather surprising and disappointing, when one considers that the study commissioned by the South African bid committee for the (unsuccessful) bid to host the FIFA World Cup in 2006 reportedly claimed that the event would generate USD 483 million in tax revenues (see Alegi 2001, p. 11) and the bid committee in preparation of the successful 2010 bid reportedly predicted that the 2010 FIFA World Cup would generate USD 1 billion (see Bohlmann 2006, p. 13). The author is not in possession of figures in respect of the extent of the South African government’s investment in the 2010 World Cup event (it was reported by the South African government in February 2008 that such investment in terms of contributions to the 24 World Cup projects amounted (at that time) to ZAR 28 billion).
- 126.
Federation Internationale de Football Association (FIFA) v Metcash Trading Africa (Pty) Ltd [2009] ZAGPPHC 123 (Gauteng North High Court)—see the discussion in Sect. 4.4.5 in Chap. 4.
- 127.
At par. 29.4—29.6 of the Applicant’s Heads of Argument.
- 128.
See the report entitled ‘IOC members escape ethics scandal with hardly any punishment,’ 8 December 2011—available online at http://sportsillustrated.cnn.com/2011/olympics/12/08/IOC-ethics-case.ap/.
- 129.
See the report entitled ‘FIFA blames legal problems for delay to publish legal document in kickbacks scandal case’ The Washington Post, 6 December 2011—available online at http://www.washingtonpost.com/sports/dcunited/fifa-blames-legal-problems-for-delay-to-publish-court-document-in-kickbacks-scandal-case/2011/12/06/gIQAvgPCZO_story.html.
- 130.
David Becker, from personal e-mail correspondence with the author, December 2011.
- 131.
Ellis et al. 2011, p. 302.
- 132.
Scassa 2011, p. 364.
- 133.
Compare the relevant and often-quoted sections from the USA Shooting & Quigley v UIT case (May 23, 1995 (CAS 94/129)).
- 134.
Longdin 2009.
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Louw, A.M. (2012). In Defence of the Monopoly?. In: Ambush Marketing & the Mega-Event Monopoly. ASSER International Sports Law Series. T.M.C. Asser Press, The Hague, The Netherlands. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-90-6704-864-4_9
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