Abstract
One crucial question for the Natural Law Theory of ethics that has been advocated by Joseph Boyle over the course of his distinguished career is: Exactly what is to count as (minimal) respect for a good or value? Under what circumstances do we fail to reach the threshold even of respect for some good, and so count as violating it? I take this to be the hardest question of all for the New Natural Law Theory; it is obvious from Boyle’s writings that he takes it to be a crucial question too, and that he has done more than most to clarify it.
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Chappell, T. (2011). The Action-Omission and Double Effect Distinctions. In: Tollefsen, C. (eds) Bioethics with Liberty and Justice. Philosophy and Medicine(), vol 110. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-90-481-9791-0_7
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