Abstract
The recent debate on skepticism has devoted much attention to the question of whether or not the problem of skepticism is an intuitive one. An intuitive problem can be described as one that (a) occurs automatically as soon as we start to reflecting upon certain concepts, ideas or theories, and (b) is plausible insofar as it does not seem to presuppose a great deal of theoretical reasoning. If skepticism were an intuitive problem, there would be no chance to overcome philosophical doubt. For in this case we would automatically be confronted with skepticism as soon as we start to reflect upon the possibility of knowledge, such that philosophical doubt is plausible insofar as we are able to understand it without presupposing the whole theoretical background the problem may involve.
This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.
Access this chapter
Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout
Purchases are for personal use only
Notes
- 1.
- 2.
The formal structure of an argument based on the skeptical hypothesis (sh) looks like this: (1) I do not know that not-sh; (2) If I do not know that not-sh, I do not know that p; (3) conclusion: I do not know that p.
- 3.
- 4.
Cf. Garve and Feder (1991).
- 5.
Cf. Feder (1787, §§ 2; 14; 15; 16 ff.; 25).
- 6.
Cf. Hamann (1951: 284).
- 7.
Cf. Schulze (1911: 10 ff.; 197 ff.; 223 ff.).
- 8.
Cf. Heidemann (1998).
- 9.
All translations of the Critique of Pure Reason are from Guyer and Wood (Kant 1998).
- 10.
For a detailed discussion of the differences between transcendental and ‘common’ or metaphysical idealism see Heidemann (1998: 100 ff.).
- 11.
- 12.
- 13.
Cf. Prauss (1974: 32 ff.).
- 14.
Cf. Allison (2004: 50–73).
- 15.
Cf. Van Cleve (1999: 71 ff.; 123 ff.; 134 ff.).
- 16.
Cf. Collins (1999: 8 ff.; 20–30).
- 17.
Cf. Langton (1998: 12 ff.).
- 18.
Cf. Rosefeldt (2007: 184 ff.).
- 19.
- 20.
The transcendental idealist does, of course, not deny that there is a causal relation between mind and world, that is, between representations and external objects. However, the transcendental idealist denies that we know about the existence of external objects by means of a causal inference from representations to things outside us. In perception we are rather directly aware of the existence of the external object. Unfortunately, Kant does not tell us a lot about the character of this unmediated relation, and how exactly the (direct) empirical realist explains the possibility of hallucinations or illusions.
- 21.
For a clear account of the contemporary (scientific) relevance of such an account of idealism and realism in particular with respect to the “completeness principle” see Brittan (2001).
- 22.
Cf. Logic Blomberg, AA 24/1: 81 ff.; Logic Philippi; AA 24/1: 386 ff. See also Logic Dohna-Wundlacken, AA 24/2: 718 ff. and Vienna Logic, AA 24/2: 822.
- 23.
Empirical and transcendental dualism correspond to what the early Putnam (1981: 49 ff., 72 ff.). called internal and metaphysical realism. Hence, an internal idealist subscribes to ontological independence, epistemic dependence and truth-theoretical coherence, whereas a metaphysical realist subscribes to ontological independence, epistemic independence and truth-theoretical correspondence. Cf. Heidemann (2004: 283 ff.). See also Van Cleve (1999: 214 ff.).
Abbreviations
- ED:
-
Empirical Dualism
- TD:
-
Transcendental Dualism
References
Allais, L. 2004. ‘Kant’s One World. Interpreting Transcendental Idealism’. British Journal for the History of Philosophy 12: 655–684.
Allais, L. 2007. ‘Kant’s Idealism and the Secondary Quality Analogy’. Journal of the History of Philosophy 45: 459–484.
Allison, H. 2004. Kant’s Transcendental Idealism. An Interpretation and Defense. Enlarged and Revised edition. New Haven: Yale University Press.
BonJour, L. 1985. The Structure of Empirical Knowledge. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
Brittan, G. 2001. ‘Transcendental Idealism, Empirical Realism, and the Completeness Principle’. In V. Gerhardt, R.-P. Horstmann and R. Schumacher (eds.), Kant und die Berliner Aufklärung. Akten des IX. Internationalen Kant-Kongresses Berlin 2000, Vol. 2. Berlin and New York: de Gruyter, pp. 541–548.
Collins, A. 1999. Possible Experience. Understanding Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason. Berkeley: University of California Press.
Feder, J. G. H. 1787. Ueber Raum und Caussalitaet. Zur Pruefung der Kantischen Philosophie. Göttingen: Dieterich.
Garve, C., Feder, J. G. H. 1991. Zugabe zu den Göttingischen Anzeigen von gelehrten Sachen. Göttingen 1770–82. 3. Stück, den 19. Januar 1782. S. 40–48: Riga. Critik der reinen Vernunft. Von Imman. Kant. 1781. 856 S. Octav. In Rezensionen zur Kantischen Philosophie 1781–87. Ed. A. Landau. Bebra: Landau, pp. 10–17.
Hamann, J.G. 1951. ‘Metakritik über den Purismus der Vernunft’. In J. G. Hamann, Sämtliche Werke, Vol. III. Wien: Herder, pp. 280–289.
Heidemann, D. 1998. Kant und das Problem des metaphysischen Idealismus. Berlin and New York: de Gruyter.
Heidemann, D. 2004,‘Metaphysik und Realismus in der Erkenntnistheorie. Eine Problemanalyse bei Kant und Putnam’. In K. Gloy (ed.), Unser Zeitalter – ein postmetaphysisches?. Würzburg: Könighausen und Neumann, pp. 277–290.
Hoyos Jaramillo, L. 1995. Kant und die Idealismusfrage. Eine Untersuchung über Kants Widerlegung des Idealismus. Mainz: Gardez.
Hume, D. 1978. A Treatise of Human Nature. Second Edition. Ed. L. A. Selby-Bigge and P. H. Nidditch. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Jacobi, F. H. 1976. ‘David Hume über den Glauben, oder Idealismus und Realismus’. In F. H. Jacobi, Werke, Vol. II. Ed. F. Roth and F. Köppen, Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft.
Kant, I. 1998. Critique of Pure Reason. Trans. and ed. P. Guyer and A. Wood. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Kant, I. 2002. Theoretical Philosophy After 1781. Trans. and ed. H. Allison and P. Heath. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Langton, R. 1998. Kantian Humility. Our Ignorance of Things in Themselves. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Nozick, R. 1981. Philosophical Explanations. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Prauss, G. 1974. Kant und das Problem der Dinge an sich. 2nd edition. Bonn: Bouvier.
Putnam, H. 1981. Reason, Truth and History. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Rosefeldt, T. 2007. ‘Dinge an sich und sekundäre Qualitäten’. In J. Stolzenberg (ed.), Kant in der Gegenwart. Berlin and New York: De Gruyter, pp. 167–209.
Schulze, G. E. 1911. Aenesidemus oder über die Fundamente der von dem Herrn Professor Reinhold in Jena gelieferten Elementar-Philosophie. Nebst einer Vertheidigung des Skepticismus gegen die Anmaassungen der Vernunftkritik (1792). Berlin: Reuther & Reichard.
Tiedemann, D. 1794. Theaetet oder ueber das menschliche Wissen. Ein Beytrag zur Vernunftkritik. Frankfurt am Main: Varrentrapp & Wenner.
Vaihinger, H. 1884. ‘Zu Kants Widerlegung des Idealismus’. In Straßburger Abhandlungen zur Philosophie (Eduard Zeller zu seinem siebenzigsten Geburtstage), pp. 85–164.
Van Cleve, J. 1999. Problems from Kant. New York: Oxford University Press.
Williams, M. 1996. Unnatural Doubts. Epistemological Realism and the Basis of Skepticism. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Corresponding author
Editor information
Editors and Affiliations
Rights and permissions
Copyright information
© 2010 Springer Science+Business Media B.V.
About this chapter
Cite this chapter
Heidemann, D.H. (2010). Appearance, Thing-in-Itself, and the Problem of the Skeptical Hypothesis. In: Schulting, D., Verburgt, J. (eds) Kant's Idealism. The New Synthese Historical Library, vol 66. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-90-481-9719-4_10
Download citation
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-90-481-9719-4_10
Published:
Publisher Name: Springer, Dordrecht
Print ISBN: 978-90-481-9718-7
Online ISBN: 978-90-481-9719-4
eBook Packages: Humanities, Social Sciences and LawPhilosophy and Religion (R0)