Abstract
This chapter takes a specific objective: to identify and analyze the philosophical and conceptual conditions that are involved in postulating causal relations among meso-historical entities, structures, and processes. What is the nature of the causal relations among structures and entities that make up the social world? What sorts of mechanisms are available to substantiate causal claims such as “population pressure causes technological innovation,” “sharecropping causes technological stagnation in agriculture,” or “limited transport and communication technology causes infeudation of political power”? What are the causal mechanisms through which social practices, ideologies and systems of social belief are transmitted? How are structures and practices instantiated or embodied, and how are they transmitted and maintained? Do causal claims need to be generalizable? How do historians identify and justify causal hypotheses?
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This is an extension of the formulation offered in Little (1991, p. 15).
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Little, D. (2010). Causal Mechanisms. In: New Contributions to the Philosophy of History. Methodos Series, vol 6. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-90-481-9410-0_5
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-90-481-9410-0_5
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