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Knowledge, Politics, and Commerce: Science Under the Pressure of Practice

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Part of the book series: Boston Studies in the Philosophy of Science ((BSPS,volume 274))

Abstract

The most questionable aspect of commercialized research is its biased research agenda, while its epistemic characteristics mostly agree with epistemic research. This claims runs counter to a widespread sentiment that economically driven or “instrumental” research suffers from a decline in credibility and depth. Epistemic and application-driven research can be distinguished by their institutional research goals, which provide different stop-rules for projects and modes of topic selection. Application-oriented research is not beset with a general tendency toward superficiality, nor does it generally lack creativity and innovativeness. Only under specific circumstances is the quality of knowledge degraded by its production in the context of application. Yet the external determination of the research agenda which characterizes application-oriented research may produce biases that need to be compensated for moral reasons by science in the public interest.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    It is under debate whether Merton’s “ethos of science” was meant in a descriptive or a normative sense. However, Merton was well aware that two of his four values were violated by the science of his period. “Universalism” (the irrelevance of personal traits of scientists for the evaluation of their findings) was not respected by Nazi science (which was among the motives for working out or reaffirming the ethos) and communalism was infringed by the capitalist economy (Merton, 1942, 270–271, 275). It follows that a purely descriptive reading is ruled out.

  2. 2.

    In fact, phase-III clinical trials do not even constitute research in the proper sense since no discoveries are aimed at. Rather, the expectation is that earlier research outcome is confirmed and that a cumbersome legal procedure is completed smoothly. Clinical trials are obstacles to be overcome by pharmaceutical companies in order to get market access. The exceptional factor is that no genuine epistemic interests exist among those who pay for the study. The sponsors don’t want to know, rather they believe they know and want to pass an inconvenient and economically risky examination quickly and without much ado (Carrier, 2009).

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Acknowledgements

My heartfelt thanks go to Torsten Wilholt and Cornelis Menke for their perceptive remarks which did a lot to improve the text.

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Correspondence to Martin Carrier .

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Carrier, M. (2011). Knowledge, Politics, and Commerce: Science Under the Pressure of Practice. In: Carrier, M., Nordmann, A. (eds) Science in the Context of Application. Boston Studies in the Philosophy of Science, vol 274. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-90-481-9051-5_2

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