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Causation

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Theory and Applications of Ontology: Philosophical Perspectives

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Abstract

In this article, I introduce some main strands in the philosophical debate on the nature of causation. I begin by sketching David Hume’s influential discussion of causation (1739–1740). I then outline some modern descendants of Hume’s regularity theory, most importantly the necessary and sufficient conditions approach, and counterfactual theories, highlighting along the way the various problems faced by such accounts. I then introduce the main competitor to these theories, namely process-based accounts, and end by discussing problematic cases of causation by absence.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    This approach is also sometimes named the epistemic approach, because of its initial motivation by epistemic concerns. As we shall see, however, in more recent developments of the conditional approach, the focus on epistemic concerns has receded, making the more neutral term ‘conditional’ more appropriate.

  2. 2.

    Ducasse (1926) actually defends a version this view, but it has few modern adherents.

  3. 3.

    For a recent exposition and discussion of Hume’s theory of causation, see Beebee (2006)

  4. 4.

    For a selection of such theories, see Mill (1843), Braithwaite (1953), Hempel (1965) and Hart and Honere (1959).

  5. 5.

    For a selection of influential proposals, see Reichenbach (1956), Salmon (1980a), Cartwright (1979), and Hitchcock (1993).

  6. 6.

    For a recent discussion and modification, see Ramachandran (2004).

  7. 7.

    For more on Lewis’ ban on ‘backtracking conditionals’, see Lewis (1979; 1986); for criticism, see in particular Fine (1975), Horwich (1989), and Price (1992).

  8. 8.

    Wesley Salmon develops a very similar theory in his (1998).

  9. 9.

    Lewis employs a more complicated definition of biff, designed to satisfy the further desiderata of making causation an intrinsic relation, but I will not go into that here. For more on biff and intrinsicness, see Menzies (1999) and Lewis (2004b).

  10. 10.

    I have changed his notation in accordance with the convention adopted in this article.

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Acknowledgements

I wish to thank Johanna Seibt for helpful comments on an earlier draft of this article, and the Danish Research Council for Culture and Communication for financial support.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Institute for Philosophy and History of Ideas, University of Aarhus, Aarhus C, Denmark

    Asbjørn Steglich-Petersen

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  1. Asbjørn Steglich-Petersen
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Correspondence to Asbjørn Steglich-Petersen .

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  1. Dipto. Sociologia e Ricerca Sociale, Universita di Trento, Via Verdi 26, Trento, 38100, Italy

    Roberto Poli

  2. Dept. Philosophy, University of Aarhus, Jens Chr. Skousvej 7, Aarhus C, 8000, Denmark

    Johanna Seibt

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Steglich-Petersen, A. (2010). Causation. In: Poli, R., Seibt, J. (eds) Theory and Applications of Ontology: Philosophical Perspectives. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-90-481-8845-1_4

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