Abstract
Our analysis of Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz’s (1646–1716) position on the world soul will be restricted here to his mature views, as they are expounded in three texts, in which he is explicitly confronted with, and either rejects or just tolerates the theory of an anima mundi or ame du monde:the short manuscript note God is Not the Soul of the World (Deum non esse mundi animam, of appr. 1683–1686); the better known Nature Itself, or, The Inherent Force and Activity of Created Things (De ipsa natura, sive de vi insita actionibusque creaturarum, published in the Acta eruditorum, Leipzig 1698, as a contribution to the philosophical debate on the concept of ‘nature’ between Altdorf professor J. Ch. Sturm and chief physician of the city of Kiel and professor of medicine G. Ch. Schelhammer);2 the lesser cited Considerations of the Doctrine of a Unique Universal Spirit (Considerations sur la doctrine d’un Esprit Universel Unique, a manuscript of 1702). We have chosen these texts because, together, they present Leibniz’s most important, mature arguments against the soul of the world theory in the context of his natural as well as moral philosophy. In fact, however, he had dealt much more with this theory, which attracted his philosophical interest from his earlier years till the very end of his life. Probably the last, unfavourable mentions of the Ame du Monde theory are found in his famous 1715–1716 debate by correspondence with Samuel Clarke concerning space as the sensorium of God (cf.Section 9 of Chapter 6).
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Notes
- 1.
Most of Leibniz’s works are cited from the editions of C. I. Gerhardt (see under Gerhardt, C. I., 1965 and Gerhardt, C. I., 1971, respectively, in the bibliography), since the critical edition (see under AV in the bibliography) of his philosophical works has not yet reached the period relevant for us. De ipsa natura…, then, is in vol. 4 of Gerhardt, C. I., 1965, pp. 504–516; the Considerations… in vol. 6, pp. 529–538.
By contrast, the Deum non esse mundi animam, an earlier text, is cited from the critical edition (AV), in which it is in VI. Reihe, IV. Band, Teil B, p. 1492 (№ 293). – In our citations, we follow Leibniz’s original orthography everywhere, which only accidentally indicates the various accents of the letter ‘e’ etc. in texts written in French.
- 2.
The important Sturm-Schelhammer debate had gone through the following five stages of development:
1. It had been ignited by famed chemist Robert Boyle’s semi-anonymous De ipsa natura sive libera in receptam naturae notionem disquisitio ad amicum (1687; a translation from English, with the English original written by 1682). This relatively long treatise discarded the scientific usage of the term ‘nature’ in its Peripatetic acceptation, as “Principium & Causa Motus & Quietus ejus, in quo est, primo per se, & non secundum accidens” (cf. sectio tertia; p. 22), and proposed the apologetical theory that God does not rely on the particular internal naturae of things when operating the physical universe, but maintains the regular course of natural teleological processes by establishing universal laws of motion, which can locally control the mechanism of the world (cf. sectio prima, p. 4; sectio octava, p. 187). Boyle sees an analogy between the respective philosophical functions of the Peripatetic idea of ‘internal nature’ (φύσις), and the concept of anima mundi, but he rejects both (cf. pp. 8, 52, 166).
2. Next, Altdorf professor J. Ch. Sturm wrote a sharp, 43-page-long treatise Idolum naturae similiumque nominum vanorum… deturbandi conatus philosophicus (1692; see an analysis in Section 1 of Chapter 3) in favour of Boyle’s position.
3. Sturm’s booklet was countered by G. Ch. Schelhammer’s lengthy Natura sibi et medicis vindicata sive De Natura Liber bipartitus (1697), which defended, especially from a medical point of view, the notion of ‘nature’ in the sense of a principium movendi (see his thesis in cap. V/xx: “Dantur ergo omnino praeter Deum quae movent, etsi prius mota…”; p. 103), and pretended explicitly to refute Sturm’s Idolum naturae (cf. p. 57).
4. This in turn elicited Sturm’s reaction, a 30-page-long essay directed exclusively against Schelhammer, published in (or soon after) April 1698 under the title Exercitatio philosophica de natura sibi incassum vindicata etc. Here Sturm precisely circumscribes what usage of the term natura he rejects (cf. caput III), and makes his point clear again that “…hujus unius 〈scil. legis sive voluntatis Dei〉 efficacia & virtute, nulla alia uspiam interveniente, peragantur omnia…” (cap. IV/vi; p. 19).
5. It was at this point that Leibniz intervened in the debate in defence of Schelhammer, with his study De ipsa natura…, in September 1698, contending that every finite thing has received from God an intrinsic principle of activity. – See our bibliography under 〈Boyle〉, Schelhammer, Sturm 1692 and Sturm 1697, respectively, for further bibliographical details of these texts.
- 3.
As L. Carlin (see bibliography) points out, Leibniz, in an even earlier phase of his career, while studying at Altdorf university, repeatedly called God the ‘mind of the universe’, “Mens Universi”. In Demonstrationum catholicarum conspectus (1668–69), a project of a systematic treatise on Catholic doctrines, this concept of God presents itself in the context of a definition of beatific vision, as follows: “c. 51. Visio beatifica seu intuitio DEI de facie in faciem est contemplatio universalis Harmoniae rerum quia DEUS seu Mens Universi nihil aliud est quam rer. Harmonia, seu principium pulchritudinis in ipsis.” (AV, VI/1, p. 499) – In De transsubstantiatione (1668), then, a study about the reasonability of the Catholic doctrine of the transsubstantiation of the Eucharistic wine and bread, Leibniz suggests that the universal mind that is God acts as the substantial form of the physical bodies bereaved of reason (i.e., of non-human bodies). This is possible insofar as the divine mind consists of the ideas of all things: “Ita Substantia corporis humani est unio cum mente humana; Substantia corporum ratione carentium est unio cum mente universali seu Deo…” (ibid., p. 509; cf. also p. 511 on the divine mind as consisting of the ideas of all things).
- 4.
On this early period of Leibnizian thought concerning the soul of the world, see section I: The ‘Anima Mundi’ of the ‘De Summa Rerum’, of Carlin’s article. Carlin’s careful analysis, which concerns the concept of the world soul in Leibniz’s almost entire oeuvre, has been repeatedly challenged by Gregory Brown (see Brown 1998, 2000, 2005), and defended by Richard Arthur (see Arthur 1999 and 2001).
- 5.
“〈Videtur〉 esse… quandam Mentem perfectissimam sive Deum. Hanc ut animam totam in toto esse corpore Mundi; huic menti etiam existentiam deberi rerum” (AV, series VI, vol. 2, p. 474; text № 60. Transl. by L. Carlin, p. 2).
- 6.
In De unione animae et corporis, Leibniz proposes the anima mundi theory more hypothetically, as he considers how the human soul moves nerve fluid in the cavities of the brain by generating vortices in it: “Porro in cerebri cavitatibus videtur omnis peragi gyratio, et anima tueri Vorticem suum. … Sed animam ipsam agitare vorticem, hoc vero mirum est. Facit tamen, agimus enim non per simplicem machinam, sed ex illis reflexionibus, sive actionibus in nos ipsos. An forte ipse totus vortex magni 〈orbis〉 simili anima vivificatur, quae causa est, cur systematis leges observantur, et 〈compensentur〉 omnia. Totus Mundus unus Deo vortex” (ibid., p. 480; text № 62).
- 7.
“Anima Mundi nulla est, quia non potest continuum quoddam componi ex mentibus, ut ex spatiis componi potest. Dices imo certo etiam modo, quatenus sese sentiunt. Respondeo et dico Animam non esse ens per aggregationem, Spatium autem universum esse Ens per aggregationem. Unde mirum non est nullam esse Animam universi.” (AV, series VI, vol. 3, p. 52; text 74. Transl. by L. Carlin, p. 5, slightly modified by M. Vassányi, in so far as sese seems to carry not a reflexive but a reciprocal meaning in this context. Carlin translates “in so far as minds sense themselves”. Roman characters by M. Vassányi).
- 8.
“Corporum omnium Aggregatum dicitur Mundus, qui si infinitus est ne unum quidem Ens est non magis quam linea recta infinita aut numerus maximus. Itaque Deus non potest intelligi anima Mundi, non finiti, quia ipse Deus infinitus est, non infiniti quia corpus infinitum non potest unum Ens intelligi, quod autem non est unum per se id nec formam substantialem adeoque nec animam habet. Itaque recte Deus a Martiano Capella appellatur intelligentia extramundana” (AV, series VI, vol. IV, p. 1509; text № 301).
- 9.
“De essentia numeri, lineae et cujuscunque Totius est, esse terminatum. Hinc etsi magnitudine infinitus esset mundus, unum totum non esset, nec cum quibusdam veteribus fingi posset Deus velut anima mundi, non solum quia causa mundi est, sed etiam quia mundus talis unum corpus non foret, nec pro animali haberi posset, neque adeo nisi verbalem haberet unitatem. Est igitur loquendi compendium, cum unum dicimus, ubi plura sunt quam uno toto assignabili comprehendi possunt, et magnitudinis instar efferimus, quod proprietates ejus non habet” (Gerhardt ed. 1965, vol. II, pp. 304–305).
- 10.
“…de ipsa natura, si dispiciamus, et quid non sit, et quid sit, assentior quidem, nullam dari animam Universi ; concedo etiam, miranda illa, quae occurrunt quotidie, de quibus dicere merito solemus, opus naturae esse opus intelligentiae, non esse adscribenda creatis quibusdam Intelligentiis, sapientia et virtute proportionali ad rem tantam praeditis; sed naturam universam esse, ut sic dicam, artificium Dei, et tantum quidem, ut quaevis machina naturalis (…) organis constet prorsus infinitis, infinitamque adeo sapientiam potentiamque auctoris rectorisque postulet” (De ipsa natura… point 2; Gerhardt, C. I., 1965, vol. 4, pp. 504–505. Transl. by R. Ariew and D. Garber, eds., p. 156. Underlining added; other highlighting by Leibniz.)
- 11.
In the edition of Wolff’s Gesammelte Werke by École et al., the Theologia naturalis comprises voll. 7.1–7.3; i.e., roughly 1,800 pages.
- 12.
“Deus est ens simplex, & corporeus esse nequit. Etenim Deus est ens a se (§ 67). Ens vero a se simplex est (§ 49). Ergo & Deus ens simplex est. Porro ens a se compositum esse nequit (§ 47), adeoque nec Deus compositus esse potest. Quamobrem cum corpus omne sit ens compositum (§ 119 Cosmol.); Deus quoque corporeus esse nequit” (École et al., eds., II. Abt., vol. 7.1, p. 63. Transl. by M. Vassányi).
- 13.
Cf. Leibniz: Principes de la nature et de la grace, fondés en raison, Point 7 (appr. 1712–1714; Gerhardt, C. I., 1965, vol. VI, p. 602). See also Leibniz’s De rerum originatione radicali (1697).
- 14.
For Wolff, the three chief operations of God in respect of the universe are creation, preservation and causality of change (i.e. through the active forces of finite individual substances, God is the ultimate efficient cause of all events that happen in the world). Hence, incarnation and redemption are not discussed in the frame of Wolffian natural theology.
To see the complexity of the relation between natural and supernatural theology, cf. also §§ 18–19 of Theologia naturalis, I/1 (Theologiae naturalis prolegomena), where Wolff affirms that “Theologia naturalis inservit divinitati S. S. evincendae” and “ad Theologiam revelatam nos manuducit”; and the fact that he systematically underpins his theses of natural theology by references to Scripture.
Baumgarten’s Metaphysica does not make any reference to the person or the act of the Saviour, either.
- 15.
was the year of the first edition. Kant used and annotated the fourth edition (1757) of this book (cf. AK XVII), which is fully identical with the seventh edition (1779) we used (cf. bibliography, Baumgarten).
- 16.
“das Wesen ausser der Welt” (Baumgarten’s note).
- 17.
“§ 388. Mundus nec est substantia infinita, … nec determinatio eius interna… hinc nec essentia entis infiniti… nec attributum, nec modus… nec modificatio… Hinc omnis mundus extra substantiam infinitam ponendus est, adeoque hic etiam mundus exsistit extra ens infinitum, quod ideo vocatur ens extramundanum, ens extra hunc mundum actuale” (Baumgarten, p. 348. Transl. by M. Vassányi).
- 18.
“§ 334. Omne ens contingens & finitum est ens ab alio… Ergo exsistenti exsistentia non inhaeret per vim ipsi propriam… hinc vis aliena extra finitum & contingens reale posita est ratio sufficiens inhaerentis enti finitae & contingenti reali exsistentiae… Ergo substantia extra ipsum posita in illud agit exsistentiam influendo… Hinc omne ens contingens & finitum reale est effectus… & habet caussam efficientem…” (ibid., p. 102. Transl. by M. Vassányi).
- 19.
Ploucquet occupies a Leibnizian-Wolffian position in metaphysics in his early (1753) systematic treatise Principia de substantiis et phaenomenis (see bibliography under Ploucquet 1753 for further details). This claim is evidenced by his concept of substance as an active and manifestative entity (cap. II), by his conception of the commerce between body and mind (cap. XVIII), by his proof of the immortality of soul (cap. XIX) etc.
- 20.
For the full title of Ploucquet’s disputatio, see bibliography under Ploucquet 1775. The name “Joannes Fridericus Oetinger, Vinsbergensis” (i.e., “from Weinberg”) figures, among five others, on the title page of the booklet, under the heading “Publice disputabunt”. Ötinger is associated with the village of Weinberg where he worked as a pastor for a certain time. We leave open the question of the identity of this respondent, until further research can be done.
- 21.
We learn from a letter addressed to his parents (4 September 1797, AA III 1, p. 137; not included in Fuhrmans, ed.) that Schelling knew of, and had an interest in De hylozoismo precisely when he was collecting material for his Von der Weltseele.
- 22.
§ 1 of De hylozoismo.
- 23.
Ploucquet: De hylozoismo, p. 48.
- 24.
Whatever is in ontological terms an ens incompletum, is in terms of substantiality a substantia incompleta: it is not a subiectum and cannot bear accidental qualities. Therefore, Ploucquet seems to contradict himself when he calls the hypothetical universal soul a substantia in § XVII: “Cum fingitur substantia omnes mundi partes animans…”
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Vassányi, M. (2011). Presentation of the Texts Relevant for the Concept of ananima mundi. The Immediate Natural Theological Setting of the Problem. In: Anima Mundi: The Rise of the World Soul Theory in Modern German Philosophy. International Archives of the History of Ideas / Archives internationales d'histoire des idées, vol 202. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-90-481-8796-6_2
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