Abstract
A model of the activities of groups with a normative unity of type (II), which draws on the conclusions arrived at so far, is proposed in this chapter. It is argued that it captures most instances of institutional practices in general, and of legal practice in particular. The main idea is that, in these cases, participants think that content-independent normative considerations require that they perform their parts. This is paradigmatically the case when, as happens normally in institutions, participants have voluntarily undertaken (e.g. by agreeing) the obligation to perform their parts of a joint action. It is also shown how the model can be expanded to capture other aspects of complex institutions (such as there being mechanisms of replacement of members, de-personalized relationships, etc.).
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Notes
- 1.
There might be cases where participants think that they have agreed but, in reality, no agreement has been reached. To capture these possibilities clause (a) should be construed as (a)’: “… they think that they have agreed…”. I do not state this in the model explicitly because the possibility is far-fetched.
- 2.
When the model is construed in terms of clause (a)’, i.e. “they think that they have agreed…”, clause (c) should be construed as implying that participants intend to fulfil the agreement they think that they have reached.
- 3.
For an analysis along Razian lines of vows and their normative differences with promises (Lamond 1996, 127–129). Cf Robins’ (1984, 14, 85–87, 96–104).
- 4.
The principle should be further elaborated. It should not entail that leading another individual, purposively, to expect that one will perform an intrinsically immoral act (say, kill innocent children) creates a duty to follow through.
- 5.
This is only a coarse adaptation of Raz’s characterization of content-independent reasons. Cf VONP 95; MF 35–36.
- 6.
VONP 95; MF 35–36.
- 7.
Notice that this allows for the possibility of groups whose members are not linked by exactly the same normative relation (e.g. some might have agreed, others might have purposively created expectations, etc).
- 8.
It seems that not all other-regarding, developed institutions are groups which act with a certain degree of normative unity of type (I). There might be cases where all must think that they have a duty qua members for the group to qualify as an institution. For instance, cases where, if one individual did not think that he has a duty qua member, the rest would not consider him a member.
- 9.
Cf p 112 above, where the charity was a non-developed institution. The new individuals were not seen as acquiring any duty when becoming members.
References
Lamond, Grant. “Commitments and Practical Reason.” DPhil thesis, University of Oxford, 1996
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Sánchez Brigido, R.E. (2010). The Activities of Groups with a Normative Unity of Type II. Other-Regarding, Developed Institutions. Developed Instances of the Judiciary. In: Groups, Rules and Legal Practice. Law and Philosophy Library, vol 89. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-90-481-8770-6_9
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