Abstract
A model of the activities of groups with a normative unity of type (I) is proposed by expanding the simple model of the previous chapter. The main addition to the initial model is quite straightforward: participants believe that the collective activity is valuable in relation to others, and think that there is a normative consideration according to which one must do one’s part of a joint action which is valuable. This expanded model allegedly captures some instances of institutional practices, and of legal practice in particular. Yet not all of them can be captured by this approach. For in many cases, perhaps in most, members of institutions do not think of the collective activity as valuable in the sense explained. To understand the latter an account of the activities of groups with a normative unity of type (II) should be proposed.
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Notes
- 1.
Recall that, throught, when referring to attitudes such as believe/think/conceive/regard etc, I mean actual or counterfactual attitudes.
- 2.
It seems that not all other-regarding, non-developed institutions are groups which act with a certain degree of normative unity of type (I). There might be cases where all must think that they have a duty qua members for the group to qualify as an institution. For instance, cases where, if one individual did not think that he has a duty qua member, the rest would not consider him a member.
- 3.
That said, I deploy and discuss below (Chapters 9 and 10) an account of developed instances of legal practice, and most of the claims I make there by way of discussion are applicable here too.
- 4.
For reasons of space, I shall ignore the other prominent account of collective intentional activities that, if correct, would perhaps capture the activities of groups with a normative unity of type (II), namely Tuomela’s. See nevertheless n 176 below.
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Sánchez Brigido, R.E. (2010). The Activities of Groups with a Normative Unity of Type (I). Non-developed Instances of Legal Practice. In: Groups, Rules and Legal Practice. Law and Philosophy Library, vol 89. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-90-481-8770-6_6
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-90-481-8770-6_6
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