Little People: Higher-Order Capacities and the Argument from Potential

DiSilvestro, Russell

doi:10.1007/978-90-481-8537-5_4

Russell DiSilvestro²

Part of the book series: Philosophy and Medicine ((PHME,volume 108))

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Abstract

If the arguments of Chapters 2 and Chapters 3 are sound, then even human infants, fetuses, embryos, and zygotes have the typical human capacities that are sufficient to generate serious moral status. This conclusion was reached by arguing that, as an adult human organism undergoes temporary changes that are more and more serious, the order of the capacities we must appeal to in generating serious moral status gets higher and higher. We eventually reach a point where the adult in the middle of a temporary change has an order of capacities that is just as high as the order of capacities possessed by the most undeveloped human organisms.

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Notes

1.
Of course, there is nothing in the concept of potential that strictly demands that it be construed as “mere” potential: after all, an entity could be both actually P and potentially P at the same time. Indeed, as I argued in Chapters 2 with David Hume and David Robinson, the fact that something is actually P usually is good evidence for the idea that it is potentially P: if you ask me whether I have the potential to lift a one hundred pound barbell over my head, it usually settles the matter for me to reply “yes, of course I do—in fact, I’m lifting such a barbell over my head right now.”
2.
Tooley (1983, p. 169).
3.
For example, in Tooley (1983, Section 3, pp. 40–49), Tooley argues against the idea that a woman’s right to control what goes on in her own body (an idea reflected, for instance, in Judith Jarvis Thomson’s argument from unplugging the violinist) is the central moral issue in the abortion debate.
4.
For example, in Tooley (1983, Section 4, pp. 50–86), Tooley argues against the moral relevance of species membership.
5.
Stone (1987, p. 815).
6.
Wreen (1986, p. 137).
7.
Harman (2003, p. 194).
8.
Harman (2003, p. 193).
9.
The reason for saying not all precursors rather than no precursors is that, as we shall see below, in cases of embryonic fission and fusion, some precursors to undeveloped human organisms are themselves undeveloped human organisms.
10.
Tooley (1983, p. 168).
11.
Rea (1997).
12.
Warren (1997, p. 105) emphasis mine.
13.
In this paragraph I am relying on David Oderberg for details about parthenogenesis. See Oderberg (1997), especially pp. 282–292.
14.
Norcross (1990, p. 272).
15.
Norcross (1990, p. 272).
16.
What follows is adapted from DiSilvestro (June 2006).
17.
Reichlin (January 1997, pp. 1–23).
18.
Charo (2001).
19.
McInerney (1990) and Peters (2001, pp. 127–128).
20.
Every Sperm is Sacred. Lyrics by M. Palin and T. Jones; composed by D. Howman and A. Jacquemin.
21.
Charo (2001, p. 82).
22.
Charo (2001, pp. 83, 87).
23.
Yet even this first stage of her essay contains arguments that cannot be fully addressed here: for example, she argues that certain oft-invoked criteria for moral status (e.g. genetic uniqueness) do not cleanly entail that each early embryo has moral status, since these criteria run afoul of certain biological phenomena (e.g. the possibility that an early embryo can undergo fission (to form twins) or fusion (to form mosaics)).
24.
Charo (2001, p. 83).
25.
Charo (2001, p. 83).
26.
Charo critiques other possible answers to Q1 as well.
27.
However, Charo does not seem to notice that Reichlin does not think the gametes have either passive or active potential, but “rather the possibility that two entities unite in order to form a new individual which is distinct from the two originals” (Reichlin, January 1997, p. 4).
28.
Charo (2001, p. 85).
29.
Reichlin (January 1997, p. 14).
30.
Charo (2001, p. 86).
31.
Charo (2001, p. 86).
32.
Charo (2001, p. 86).
33.
Some might object here that the phrase “generate” sometimes does indicate something of one kind producing something else of the same kind. While there may be a sense in which “generate” has such a meaning—namely, that of “begotten, not made” (as in the sentence “did these cats generate this entire litter of kittens?”), it is also true that the more common meaning of “generate” is much more neutral—namely, that of “made, not begotten” (as in the sentence “can this machine generate any electricity?”).
34.
I realize there are complications with referring to a pair of entities with a singular variable; let the variable apply to the gametes “considered jointly”.
35.
Buckle (1990).
36.
Hoffman and Rosenkrantz (1997, pp. 74–75). They in turn credit Roderick Chisholm for first employing “this rather droll figure” in a 1973 Brown University metaphysics class: see p. 201, footnote 2.
37.
Moreland and Rae (2000, p. 350), footnote 31.
38.
In addition, this way of answering Q2 is also a way of answering the question about kinds without appealing to stuff and count senses of “human”. For that matter, this way of answering Q2 is also a way of answering Q1 without appealing to “active” potential.
39.
Charo (2001, p. 86).
40.
Charo (2001, p. 86).
41.
Charo (2001, p. 86).
42.
My emphasis.
43.
Charo (2001, p. 86).
44.
Charo (2001, p. 87).
45.
Charo (2001, p. 87).
46.
Tooley (1983, p. 170).
47.
Tooley (1983, p. 170).
48.
Charo (2001, p. 87).
49.
Charo discusses embryo splitting Charo (2001, pp. 87–88).
50.
Quinn (Winter 1984, p. 28).
51.
Oderberg (1997, p. 297). The meaning of “human being” for Oderberg is the same as the meaning of “human organism” in my discussion above.
52.
Oderberg (1997, p. 280).
53.
Oderberg (1997, p. 292).
54.
Benn (1984, p. 143).
55.
Singer (1993, p. 153).
56.
Feinberg (1980, p. 186), emphasis mine.
57.
Feinberg (1980, p. 187), first two emphases mine.
58.
Benn (1984, p. 141).
59.
Feinberg (1980, p. 194).
60.
Wreen (1986, p. 138).
61.
Wiggins (1967, p. 7, 1980, 2001).

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Department of Philosophy, California State University, Sacramento, 6000 J Street, Mendocino Hall 3016, Sacramento, CA, 95819, USA
Russell DiSilvestro

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DiSilvestro, R. (2010). Little People: Higher-Order Capacities and the Argument from Potential. In: Human Capacities and Moral Status. Philosophy and Medicine(), vol 108. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-90-481-8537-5_4

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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-90-481-8537-5_4
Published: 30 January 2010
Publisher Name: Springer, Dordrecht
Print ISBN: 978-90-481-8536-8
Online ISBN: 978-90-481-8537-5
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