Experimental Systems, Investigative Pathways, and the Nature of Discovery

Abstract

There have been many calls in recent years, from historians, philosophers, and sociologists of science, to be more attentive to the role of experimentation in the development of science. Allan Franklin’s complaint in 1986 about the “general neglect of experiment and the dominance of theory in the literature on the history and philosophy of science” (Franklin, 1986, p. 1) has been repeatedly cited and echoed (Le Grand, 1990, p. ix). Although earlier historical studies of experimental science are themselves neglected in some of these calls for a new start, there seems little doubt that in recent years there has been a shift in balance between an earlier emphasis on scientific thought and a current interest in scientific practice which highlights experimental practice.

Often those who reexamine experimentation in a historical setting focus on a single experiment, or a “crucial experiment” supported by a small set of “subsidiary” experiments. Certain experiments, such as the Michelson-Morley, or the Millikan oil drop experiment have achieved historical recognition approaching that of major theories. In 1981 the philosopher Rom Harré published a book entitled Great Scientific Experiments: 20 Experiments that Changed our View of the World. Harré was careful to point out that experiments are not “isolated events”, but “steps in a sequence of studies through which a delineated subject matter is explored” (Harré, 1981, p. 12). Nevertheless, in each case one experiment stands out as the climactic event, for which the preceding steps serve mainly as preparation.