Abstract
Chinese society is infamous for the standing it gives to “social networks” (guan-xi,關係), such as relatives (qin-qi, 親戚), classmates (tong-xue, 同學), and regional mates (lao-xiang, 老鄉). All these networks, in great measure, are modeled after affective familial relationships, involving intimacy, closeness, and informality. They cut across class lines and interest groups and permeate all political, legal, and economic institutions. Although contemporary China has made tremendous progress in industrialization and in developing the market economy, it is not unusual to hear Westerners’ complaints that the Chinese society is not a society that emphasizes cordial, trustful relations between strangers. For some critics, it is due to the influence of affective social networks that China has not established a civil society which cherishes a general, diffuse spirit of fellowship shared by all citizens (Metzer, p. 215).
This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution.
Buying options
Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout
Purchases are for personal use only
Learn about institutional subscriptionsNotes
- 1.
For instance, John Ehrenberg identifies three different ideas of civil society in Western history: (1) classical and medieval thought equated civil society with law-governed commonwealths protected by the coercive power of the state; (2) modern thought conceptualized civil society as a civilization made possible by production, individual interest, competition, and need; and, (3) contemporary thought identifies it as intermediate associations that serve individual liberty and limits the power of central institutions. See his 1999, p. xi. This latter sense received its first influential articulation by G.W.F. Hegel in his Philosophy of Right. See, for example, Avineri (1973); Engelhardt (1994). Civil society or bürgerliche Gesellschaft is for Hegel a social space intermediate between the nuclear family and the state regulated by law and contract, where individuals can enter into the market and other relationships. This social space is not set aside by the state, but finds its full realization when the participants in civil society find their protection as citizens of the state.
- 2.
For an assessment of contemporary Chinese social networks as well as their relation to the rule of law, see Randy Peerenboom’s chapter in The Politics of Affective Relations: East Asia and Beyond, ed. Daniel A. Bell and Chaihark Hahm, Lexington Books: Oxford, 2004.
- 3.
This chapter assumes a non-foundationalist, though anti-positivist account of the rule of law, recognizing that both contemporary Confucian and liberal accounts consider legal systems as justified in a set of moral commitments that they accept as normative.
- 4.
I have borrowed Jonathan Wolff’s definition of ethos for the sake of this account, although his concern is with a quite different issue. See his 1998, p. 105.
- 5.
For instance, American Justice Brandeis wrote in 1928: “The makers of our Constitution … sought to protect Americans in their beliefs, their thoughts, their emotions and their sensations. They conferred, as against the Government, the right to be let alone – the most comprehensive of rights and the right most valued by civilized men” (Brandeis, 1928).
- 6.
Social psychologists have done a great deal of work in showing the differences between the individualist view of the independent self held by European-Americans and the collectivist view of the interdependent self held by East-Asians (e.g., some recent summaries made in Markus and Kitayama, 1994 and in Singelis, 1994). Regarding decision-making, the former emphasizes (a) internal abilities, thoughts, and feelings, (b) being unique and expressing the self, (c) realizing internal attitudes and promoting one’s own goals, and (d) being direct in communication; whereas the latter emphasizes (a) external, public features such as status, roles, and relationships, (b) belonging and fitting in, (c) occupying one’s proper place and engaging in appropriate action, and (d) being indirect in communication and “reading others’ minds” (Singelis, pp. 580–581).
- 7.
Beginning with a robust distinction between “the public” and “the private”, Western politics hoped to establish an egalitarian political sphere and at the same time leave the family (“the private”) intact. Aristotle was successful with this goal at the cost of excluding women and slaves from the polis. We can still see a trace of this distinction in Rawls’ hypothetical parties in the so-called original position who consider themselves heads of families. But the distinction is destined to collapse, as soon as people begin to bring concern with justice to the sphere of the private (as they have good reason to do). For liberal democratic civil society, it is now a time of justice gone private – the feminist literature and movement are among the best evidence.
- 8.
The general conclusion drawn here is based on the research of Mainland Chinese legal scholars in recent decades regarding the history of Chinese law as well as its relation to Confucianism and imperial courts. In particular, I have drawn a great deal from Ronggeng Yu’s work (1992). However, although I take this general conclusion to be warranted, two qualifications are needed about the emperor’s discretional power: (1) there were institutional checks and balances on the emperor’s power in Chinese dynasties, which played very productive function in certain dynasties or periods of history; (2) the situation varied from emperor to emperor and from dynasty to dynasty.
- 9.
Cedric Chou (1998, p. 235) mentioned something like this reading of Mencius in his book. Unfortunately, he still primarily saw Mencius’ point in the passage from a perspective of discretion, rather than legislation.
- 10.
See Chapter 14 for the relevant discussion.
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Corresponding author
Rights and permissions
Copyright information
© 2010 Springer Science+Business Media B.V.
About this chapter
Cite this chapter
Fan, R. (2010). A Family-Oriented Civil Society: Treating People as Unequals. In: Reconstructionist Confucianism. Philosophical Studies in Contemporary Culture, vol 17. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-90-481-3156-3_3
Download citation
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-90-481-3156-3_3
Published:
Publisher Name: Springer, Dordrecht
Print ISBN: 978-90-481-3155-6
Online ISBN: 978-90-481-3156-3
eBook Packages: Humanities, Social Sciences and LawPhilosophy and Religion (R0)