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Preference, Priorities and Belief

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Part of the book series: Theory and Decision Library ((TDLA,volume 42))

In this paper we consider preference over objects. We show how this preference can be derived from priorities, properties of these objects, a concept which is initially from optimality theory. We do this both in the case when an agent has complete information and in the case when an agent only has beliefs about the properties. After the single agent case we also consider the multi-agent case. In each of these cases, we construct preference logics, some of them extending the standard logic of belief. This leads to interesting connections between preference and beliefs. We strengthen the usual completeness results for logics of this kind to representation theorems. The representation theorems describe the reasoning that is valid for preference relations that have been obtained from priorities. In the multi-agent case, these representation theorems are strengthened to the special cases of cooperative and competitive agents. We study preference change with regard to changes of the priority sequence, and change of beliefs. We apply the dynamic epistemic logic approach, and in consequence reduction axioms are presented. We conclude with some possible directions for future work.

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Jongh, D.d., Liu, F. (2009). Preference, Priorities and Belief. In: Grüne-Yanoff, T., Hansson, S.O. (eds) Preference Change. Theory and Decision Library, vol 42. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-90-481-2593-7_4

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