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Legitimacy Needs as Drivers of Business Exit pp 35–64Cite as

Theory and Hypotheses

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Abstract

Many studies illustrate that restructuring efforts such as business exit have a strategic dimension. This point of view is based on several assumptions: “The first assumption is that strategic restructuring is typically a response to changing environmental and/or organizational conditions. The second assumption is that environmental and organizational pressures are largely, but not totally, identifiable and unambiguous in initiating such restructuring. The third and fourth assumptions are that many organizations currently face these clear pressures for a strategic adaptive response, and that many of these organizations seek to respond by restructuring. A fifth and final assumption is that restructuring generally enhances organizational performance. Taken together, these assumptions form the basis for a strategic perspective on restructuring: namely, that there are pressures that provide a stimulus for corporate restructuring, that these forces affect many organizations, many of whom respond by restructuring, which enhances performance.” Specifically, what is then the strategic dimension of the asset restructuring transaction “business exit”?

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(2008). Theory and Hypotheses. In: Legitimacy Needs as Drivers of Business Exit. Gabler. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-8349-9759-3_3

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