Abstract
The Italian economy has been experiencing a serious slowdown of labour productivity growth since the end of the 1990s, when it started to diverge from the trend of other industrialized countries, and has become even negative in most recent years.
I wish to thank Area Studi Capitalia for generously giving me access to their firms’ database. I am grateful to Marcella Corsi, Alfred Kleinknecht, Paolo Piacentini, Andrea Salvatori and Leonello Tronti for useful comments and discussions.
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Notes
- 1.
For details, see Appendix A.
- 2.
The values are not fully comparable owing to a break in the Istat Labour Force Survey (LFS) in 2004.
- 3.
Functional flexibility is not considered in this paper owing to the absence of information in the dataset used for the empirical estimation. However, various studies (Bassanini and Ernst 2002; Michie and Sheehan 2003; Kleinknecht et al. 2006; Cristini et al. 2003) suggest that the linkage between functional flexibility and firm performance may act with an opposite sign, i.e. it provides a favourable environment for productivity increases.
- 4.
Note that the dynamic substitution between capital and labour, in this context, differs from the static substitution, with constant technology, implied by the neoclassical theory as a response to the relative variation in the prices of factors. The former, in fact, involves technological change incorporated in new capital goods (Sylos Labini 1993).
- 5.
Most of these studies observe a positive effect of employment protection (measured by the Oecd index or other indicators) on productivity growth or innovation indicators. Auer et al. (2005) find a positive (though decreasing) relation between job stability, measured as average tenure, and labour productivity. Scarpetta and Tressel (2004), however, report a negative effect of employment protection, mainly in countries with sectoral and uncoordinated wage bargaining. The distinction among different industrial relations models is also considered by Bassanini and Ernst (2002), who conclude that Epl (employment protection) strictness is significantly correlated to technological specialization in countries with coordinated relations.
- 6.
No attempt was made to merge with the previous wave of the survey (which covered the period 1998–2000) because, given the high incidence in this survey of missing values in flexibility variables, the number of firms for which full information was available over the 6 years was remarkably low (around 350).
- 7.
This limitation would be more serious if I had been trying to explain the determinants of the labour productivity level, instead of its growth rate. However, attempts to take account of the number of part-time employees in measuring labour productivity (e.g. considering a part-time worker to be half a full-time worker) did not produce significant changes in the coefficient estimates. Therefore, in order to avoid too demanding assumptions, the straightforward indicator of value added per employee was used for the estimations.
- 8.
Unfortunately, the short time horizon (3 years) and the presence of the lagged dependent variable among the regressors precluded the use of panel methodologies to take individual firms’ effects into account.
- 9.
The inclusion of lagged productivity, which was always highly significant, probably also allowed control for the (unobserved) variation in the utilisation of productive capacity during the period. This consideration can be easily explained. If, for instance, a firm has an abnormally low (or high) productivity level at the beginning of the period for transitory reasons (e.g. restructuring, temporary difficulties, etc.), and then returns to its ‘normal’ level, one might erroneously infer that its productivity has strongly increased (decreased), whereas the variation has been mainly induced by the fluctuation in the utilisation of its productive capacity. The inclusion of lagged productivity, at least theoretically, could allow one to control for this phenomenon.
- 10.
- 11.
This variable was considered to be exogenous, assuming as irrelevant the effect of the single firm’s performance on value added at industry level. However, this may be false for larger firms and in more concentrated sectors. Nonetheless, all the specifications were also estimated without this variable in order to make comparison possible.
- 12.
Different innovation indicators were tested in order to include these interaction terms: in particular, two dummies for firms declaring that they had introduced process or product innovations during the reference period. However, the dummy for firms performing R&D activities appears to discriminate the coefficients under the two headings better, maybe because it more closely reflects the attitude to continuous innovative activity inside firms.
- 13.
Regional controls are indeed significant in explaining labour productivity levels, where Southern regions rank behind Northern and Central ones.
- 14.
Moreover, if R&D expenditures are idiosyncratic to sectors rather than to individual firms, their effect could be captured by industry controls: in fact, on removing industry dummies, the effect of R&D turns positive, yet not statistically significant.
- 15.
The number of employees in AIDA is counted as an average over the whole year, while in the Capitalia survey it measures the stock at the end of the year.
- 16.
The model with growth rates of labour cost per employee yielded comparable results.
- 17.
According to the Schumpeterian paradigm, the second solution may be preferable in inducing technological laggards (whose performance in terms of productivity is worse) to adopt innovations so that they are not forced out of the market.
- 18.
On the individuals’ side, in particular for young people, this also translates into lower expectations for future pensions.
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Appendices
Appendix A: Labour Productivity Decomposition
This appendix explains the decomposition of labour productivity growth presented in Fig. 13.1. Since labour productivity, at an aggregate level, is a weighted average of sectoral productivity levels with weights corresponding to the employment shares of each sector, its trend depends both on the variation of productivity in each sector and on the variation of the sectoral composition of employment. Therefore, productivity growth between two periods can be algebraically decomposed into a between component, a within component, and a residual. The first component represents the contribution to productivity growth made by the reallocation of labour from low-productive to high-productive industries, corresponding to the increased productivity that would be observed maintaining productivity levels constant within sectors. The second identifies the growth of productivity due merely to intra-sectoral increases, in the absence of labour reallocation. Finally, the residual captures the interaction effects between productivity and employment at the industry level, taking a positive sign if the two variables are positively correlated, a negative one in the opposite case. The formula used for the decomposition is the following:
where \( \pi_{t} \) is aggregate labour productivity at time t, \( \pi_{it} \) is labour productivity in sector i at time t, and \( q_{it} \) is the share of employed in sector i at time t. The first term in the square brackets is the ‘structural change’ (between) effect in sector i; the second term is the ‘productivity growth’ (within) effect in sector i; finally, the last term is the interaction effect in sector i.
The decomposition between 1984 and 2004 (by 5-year intervals) was performed using value added per equivalent labour unit (at constant prices) as the labour productivity index, and sectors were selected according to the Ateco 2002 classification at 1-digit level (sections and subsections, 30 sectors). Table 13.5 summarizes the results of the analysis.
Appendix B: Variables Definitions and Descriptive Statistics
Value added per worker: value added was calculated as the value of production (net sales ± variation of inventories, + capitalized costs) less net consumption (materials ± variation of inventories) and services. It was deflated using value added deflator disaggregated at 2-digit level, and divided by the number of workers declared by firms in the questionnaire. Firms reporting negative or zero value added were not considered.
Investment per worker: investment in equipment and machinery as declared in the questionnaire, deflated with the gross investment deflator at 2-digit level of disaggregation and divided by the number of workers.
Labour cost per worker: labour costs deflated with the consumer price index and divided by the number of workers. When considered in the interval 1998–2000, the average number of employees during the year (taken from balance sheet data) was considered.
R&D/Sales ratio: R&D expenditure divided by the amount of sales, both derived from questionnaires Table 13.6.
Share of fixed term contracts: percentage of workers (both full-time and part-time) on fixed-term arrangements.
Total labour turnover: sum of hirings and layoffs divided by the number of workers.
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Lucidi, F. (2012). Is There a Trade-off Between Labour Flexibility and Productivity Growth? Some Evidence from Italian Firms. In: Addabbo, T., Solinas, G. (eds) Non-Standard Employment and Quality of Work. AIEL Series in Labour Economics. Physica-Verlag HD. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-7908-2106-2_13
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