Constant-Round Maliciously Secure Two-Party Computation in the RAM Model

Conference paper

DOI: 10.1007/978-3-662-53641-4_20

Volume 9985 of the book series Lecture Notes in Computer Science (LNCS)
Cite this paper as:
Hazay C., Yanai A. (2016) Constant-Round Maliciously Secure Two-Party Computation in the RAM Model. In: Hirt M., Smith A. (eds) Theory of Cryptography. TCC 2016. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 9985. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg


The random-access memory (RAM) model of computation allows program constant-time memory lookup and is more applicable in practice today, covering many important algorithms. This is in contrast to the classic setting of secure 2-party computation (2PC) that mostly follows the approach for which the desired functionality must be represented as a boolean circuit. In this work we design the first constant round maliciously secure two-party protocol in the RAM model. Our starting point is the garbled RAM construction of Gentry et al. [16] that readily induces a constant round semi-honest two-party protocol for any RAM program assuming identity-based encryption schemes. We show how to enhance the security of their construction into the malicious setting while facing several challenges that stem due to handling the data memory. Next, we show how to apply our techniques to a more recent garbled RAM construction by Garg et al. [13] that is based on one-way functions.

Copyright information

© International Association for Cryptologic Research 2016

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Bar Ilan UniversityRamat GanIsrael