A Counterintuitive Efficiency Divide Between Common Law and Civil Law: Rules and Structures of Civil Procedure in Eight Developed or Newly Industrialized Countries

Abstract

Substantive law such as contract law, corporate law and securities law would be dead letter as mere “law on the books” without efficient procedures in judicial or alternative structures offering access to justice at low cost and without undue delay. I argue that any measure of the economic effect of substantive law needs to be controlled for procedural efficiency. This chapter collects data and surveys legal history and comparative law analyses required for such control in the eight countries selected by Boucekkine et al. (in Chap. 3) for their salience as mother countries of legal origins, financial centers, leaders of industrial development or newly industrialized countries: France, Germany, Japan, South Korea, Switzerland, Taiwan, UK and the US. Following the design of the Louvain questionnaire, the data are divided in eight categories comprising a total of 55 indicators of procedural rules and judicial or alternative structures capturing the distinctive features of common law and civil law as well as their commonalities. To invite dynamic panel analysis, the procedural rules and judicial or alternative structures are identified as far as available by the year of their precedent, codification or establishment. I submit the hypothesis of a counterintuitive efficiency divide between common law and civil law.