Abstract
Logit dynamics are a family of randomized best response dynamics based on the logit choice function [21] that is used to model players with limited rationality and knowledge. In this paper we study the all-logit dynamics, where at each time step all players concurrently update their strategies according to the logit choice function. In the well studied one-logit dynamics [7] instead at each step only one randomly chosen player is allowed to update.
We study properties of the all-logit dynamics in the context of local interaction games, a class of games that has been used to model complex social phenomena [7,23,26] and physical systems [19]. In a local interaction game, players are the vertices of a social graph whose edges are two-player potential games. Each player picks one strategy to be played for all the games she is involved in and the payoff of the player is the (weighted) sum of the payoffs from each of the games.
We prove that local interaction games characterize the class of games for which the all-logit dynamics are reversible. We then compare the stationary behavior of one-logit and all-logit dynamics. Specifically, we look at the expected value of a notable class of observables, that we call decomposable observables.
Vincenzo Auletta and Giuseppe Persiano are supported by Italian MIUR under the PRIN 2010-2011 project ARS TechnoMedia – Algorithmics for Social Technological Networks. Diodato Ferraioli is supported by ANR, project COCA, ANR-09-JCJC-0066. Francesco Pasquale is supported by EU FET project MULTIPLEX 317532.
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Auletta, V., Ferraioli, D., Pasquale, F., Penna, P., Persiano, G. (2013). Logit Dynamics with Concurrent Updates for Local Interaction Games. In: Bodlaender, H.L., Italiano, G.F. (eds) Algorithms – ESA 2013. ESA 2013. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 8125. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-40450-4_7
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