Abstract
Trust in an electronic voting system is an essential premise for electronic elections. Trust in a system can be strengthened by controlling its correct functioning. There are two ways to assure the correct functioning of a system. Firstly, before using a system, neutral experts can evaluate and certify the security of its implementation. Secondly, while using the system, its users can verify its outcome by appropriate verification tools. Verifiability is a specific security function, which is subject to certification itself. This paper presents a formal security requirements model for the verifiability of electronic voting systems by means of a Bulletin Board that publishes all important communication steps without violating the secrecy of voting.
This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.
Access this chapter
Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout
Purchases are for personal use only
Preview
Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.
References
Adida, B., Neff, C.: Ballot casting assurance. In: USENIX/Accurate Electronic Voting Technology Workshop, p. 7. USENIX Association, Berkeley (2006)
Volkamer, M., Schryen, G., Langer, L., Schmidt, A., Buchmann, J.: Elektronische Wahlen: Verifizierung vs. Zertifizierung. In: GI Jahrestagung, pp. 1827–1836 (2009)
Common criteria for information technology security evaluation, and common methodology for information technology security evaluation, version 3.1 (2006)
Volkamer, M., Vogt, R.: Common criteria protection profile for basic set of security requirements for online voting products. BSI-CC-PP-0037, Version 1.0 (April 18, 2008), https://www.bsi.bund.de/SharedDocs/Zertifikate/PP/aktuell/PP_0037.html (May 02, 2013)
Mantel, H., Stephan, W., Ullmann, M., Vogt, R.: Guideline for the development and evaluation of formal security policy models in the scope of itsec and common criteria. BSI, DFKI, Tech. Rep. (2004)
Benaloh, J.D.C.: Verifiable secret-ballot elections. Ph.D. dissertation, Yale University, Department of Computer Science, Technical Report number 561 (1987)
Bräunlich, K., Grimm, R.: Formalization of receipt-freeness in the context of electronic voting. In: ARES, pp. 119–126 (2011)
Delaune, S., Kremer, S., Ryan, M.: Verifying privacy-type properties of electronic voting protocols. Journal of Computer Security 17(4), 435–487 (2009)
Jonker, H.L., Pieters, W.: Receipt-freeness as a special case of anonymity in epistemic logic. In: Proc. IAVoSS Workshop on Trustworthy Elections (2006)
Jonker, H.L., de Vink, E.P.: Formalising receipt-freeness. In: Katsikas, S.K., López, J., Backes, M., Gritzalis, S., Preneel, B. (eds.) ISC 2006. LNCS, vol. 4176, pp. 476–488. Springer, Heidelberg (2006)
Kremer, S., Ryan, M.: Analysis of an electronic voting protocol in the applied pi calculus. In: Sagiv, M. (ed.) ESOP 2005. LNCS, vol. 3444, pp. 186–200. Springer, Heidelberg (2005)
Backes, M., Hritcu, C., Maffei, M.: Automated verification of remote electronic voting protocols in the applied pi-calculus. In: CSF, pp. 195–209 (2008)
Grimm, R., Hupf, K., Volkamer, M.: A Formal IT-Security Model for the Correction and Abort Requirement on Electronic Voting. In: EVOTE (2010)
Volkamer, M., Grimm, R.: Development of a formal it security model for remote electronic voting systems. In: Electronic Voting, pp. 185–196 (2008)
Bohli, J.-M., Müller-Quade, J., Röhrich, S.: Bingo voting: Secure and coercion-free voting using a trusted random number generator. In: Alkassar, A., Volkamer, M. (eds.) VOTE-ID 2007. LNCS, vol. 4896, pp. 111–124. Springer, Heidelberg (2007)
Chaum, D., Ryan, P.Y.A., Schneider, S.: A practical voter-verifiable election scheme. In: De Capitani di Vimercati, S., Syverson, P.F., Gollmann, D. (eds.) ESORICS 2005. LNCS, vol. 3679, pp. 118–139. Springer, Heidelberg (2005)
Popoveniuc, S., Hosp, B.: An introduction to punchScan. In: Chaum, D., Jakobsson, M., Rivest, R.L., Ryan, P.Y.A., Benaloh, J., Kutylowski, M., Adida, B. (eds.) Towards Trustworthy Elections. LNCS, vol. 6000, pp. 242–259. Springer, Heidelberg (2010)
Ryan, P.Y.A., Peacock, T.: Prêt-à-voter: A Systems Perspective. Technical Report CS-TR 929, School of Computing Science, Newcastle University (2005)
Baskar, A., Ramanujam, R., Suresh, S.P.: Knowledge-based modelling of voting protocols. In: TARK, pp. 62–71 (2007)
Talbi, M., Morin, B., Tong, V.V.T., Bouhoula, A., Mejri, M.: Specification of electronic voting protocol properties using ADM logic: FOO case study. In: Chen, L., Ryan, M.D., Wang, G. (eds.) ICICS 2008. LNCS, vol. 5308, pp. 403–418. Springer, Heidelberg (2008)
Fujioka, A., Okamoto, T., Ohta, K.: A practical secret voting scheme for large scale elections. In: Zheng, Y., Seberry, J. (eds.) AUSCRYPT 1992. LNCS, vol. 718, pp. 244–251. Springer, Heidelberg (1993)
Jonker, H., Pang, J.: Bulletin boards in voting systems: Modelling and measuring privacy. In: ARES. IEEE Computer Society Press (2011)
Kremer, S., Ryan, M., Smyth, B.: Election verifiability in electronic voting protocols. In: Gritzalis, D., Preneel, B., Theoharidou, M. (eds.) ESORICS 2010. LNCS, vol. 6345, pp. 389–404. Springer, Heidelberg (2010)
Dolev, D., Yao, A.C.: On the Security of Public Key Protocols. In: Proceedings of the 22nd Annual Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science, pp. 350–357. IEEE Computer Society, Washington, DC (1981)
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Editor information
Editors and Affiliations
Rights and permissions
Copyright information
© 2013 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg
About this paper
Cite this paper
Bräunlich, K., Grimm, R. (2013). A Formal Model for the Requirement of Verifiability in Electronic Voting by Means of a Bulletin Board. In: Heather, J., Schneider, S., Teague, V. (eds) E-Voting and Identify. Vote-ID 2013. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 7985. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-39185-9_6
Download citation
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-39185-9_6
Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg
Print ISBN: 978-3-642-39184-2
Online ISBN: 978-3-642-39185-9
eBook Packages: Computer ScienceComputer Science (R0)