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Below the Salt

The Dangers of Unfulfilled Physical Media Assumptions

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Security Protocols XVII (Security Protocols 2009)

Part of the book series: Lecture Notes in Computer Science ((LNSC,volume 7028))

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Introduction

The physical access media communication traverses is increasing in diversity. Users now access data and services from wired computers, wireless laptops, PDAs, cell phones, and any number of embedded devices. All of these devices now share the same network — the Internet. Of course the Internet itself consists of many media including traditional long haul, ISP, home, and telecommunication networks. Uncertainty introduced by the media diversity has historically led to insecurity simply because the threat models upon which a protocol or security technique may depend, make false or unfulfilled assumptions about the attacker. This has direct consequences on security protocol requirements.

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Blaze, M., McDaniel, P. (2013). Below the Salt. In: Christianson, B., Malcolm, J.A., Matyáš, V., Roe, M. (eds) Security Protocols XVII. Security Protocols 2009. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 7028. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-36213-2_4

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-36213-2_4

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-642-36212-5

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-642-36213-2

  • eBook Packages: Computer ScienceComputer Science (R0)

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