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Game-theoretic Robustness of Many-to-one Networks

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Book cover Game Theory for Networks (GameNets 2012)

Abstract

In this paper, we study the robustness of networks that are characterized by many-to-one communications (e.g., access networks and sensor networks) in a game-theoretic model. More specifically, we model the interactions between a network operator and an adversary as a two player zero-sum game, where the network operator chooses a spanning tree in the network, the adversary chooses an edge to be removed from the network, and the adversary’s payoff is proportional to the number of nodes that can no longer reach a designated node through the spanning tree. We show that the payoff in every Nash equilibrium of the game is equal to the reciprocal of the persistence of the network. We describe optimal adversarial and operator strategies and give efficient, polynomial-time algorithms to compute optimal strategies. We also generalize our game model to include varying node weights, as well as attacks against nodes.

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© 2012 ICST Institute for Computer Science, Social Informatics and Telecommunications Engineering

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Laszka, A., Szeszlér, D., Buttyán, L. (2012). Game-theoretic Robustness of Many-to-one Networks. In: Krishnamurthy, V., Zhao, Q., Huang, M., Wen, Y. (eds) Game Theory for Networks. GameNets 2012. Lecture Notes of the Institute for Computer Sciences, Social Informatics and Telecommunications Engineering, vol 105. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-35582-0_7

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-35582-0_7

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-642-35581-3

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-642-35582-0

  • eBook Packages: Computer ScienceComputer Science (R0)

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