Abstract
The task of competition policy is to eliminate or to prevent restraints of competition and not to cause them. For this reason, all legal restrictions of entrepreneurial freedom of action in competition must be examined regularly on the “test bench” of deregulation. The most recent cartel-law interventions in the vertical coordination of the value chains and the resulting rigid limitation of freedom of action in consumer-goods distribution are currently the subject of controversy and viewed increasingly critically in all related disciplines.
Cf. on this whole chapter Ahlert (2012).
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- 1.
Take the example of the Lindt Gold Bunny: it must be noted that chocolate Easter bunnies are on sale at both high and low prices, under famous brand names and as private labels (trademarks) in the most varied range of sizes and flavours, in all food shops and even at petrol stations. Why should the consumer then have a right to switch to alternatives within the ‘gold bunny’ brand? Even if there were only one single manufacturer that mastered the technique of making hollow chocolate components, it would be absurd to want to regulate this market. The consumer could switch e.g., to a bar of chocolate or box of chocolates instead. In the event of rising prices, the consumer could also simply choose not to consume and thereby ‘disempower’ the supplier.
- 2.
If we take high-quality fashion labels like Boss or Bogner as an example, even if fashion outlets stocking these labels focus their sales policy on the quality of their services and not on the prices, they nevertheless rely on the fact that consumers believe that the prices are fair. Consumers take great care to avoid being exploited in terms of price. Low-priced offers of distributors with aggressive pricing policies for clothing labels just purchased by the consumer in his own fashion outlet for the normal price cause an almost irremediable feeling of having been ‘ripped off’. Even if the specialist trade were able to match the special price of an aggressive price competitor without delay or immediately remove the product from the list, the ‘preconceived notion of an extortionate price’ deeply rooted in consumer minds has long since been revived.
- 3.
See also the chairman of the monopoly commission (Germany): ‘To be considered is the fact that vertical price maintenance, in contrast to horizontal agreements, does not automatically reduce competition or raise prices. In fact, the opposite may even be the case. For this reason, it is necessary to show who actually suffers under a vertical agreement. When evaluating vertical restraints, it is necessary to consider the consequences in different ways. There is a need to show where harm may occur and, explicitly, who exactly is harmed’ Haucap and Klein (2012, p. 180) (translated from German).
- 4.
Alongside short-term special-offer campaigns in cooperative distribution systems in which the maximum possible advertising impact is achieved by means of uniformly favourable prices, and combating the free-rider problem for products requiring in-depth advice, particular attention is drawn to the case of the market launch of a new product. In this context the manufacturer can, by means of the price tie, acquire distributors for market entry and, therefore, for investment in sales-promotional measures. Cf. European Commission (2010).
References
Ahlert D (2012) The liberation of the value chain from cartel-law restraints’, the risks and opportunities of deregulation. In: Zeitschrift für Vertriebsrecht 4/2012, pp 207–218
European Commission (2010) Guidelines on vertical restraints (Text with EEA relevance) (2010/C 130/01)
Haucap J, Klein G (2012) Einschränkungen der Preisgestaltung im Einzelhandel aus wettbewerbsökonomischer Perspektive. In: Ahlert D, Kenning P, Schröder H, Olbrich R (eds) Vertikale Preis- und Markenpflege im Kreuzfeuer des Kartellrechts, Wiesbaden, pp 169–186
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Ahlert, D., Schefer, B. (2013). Management Summary: ‘The Liberation of the Value Chain from Cartel-Law Restraints’. In: Vertical Price Coordination and Brand Care. SpringerBriefs in Business. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-35570-7_6
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