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Game Theory for Security: An Important Challenge for Multiagent Systems

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Book cover Multi-Agent Systems (EUMAS 2011)

Part of the book series: Lecture Notes in Computer Science ((LNAI,volume 7541))

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Abstract

The goal of this paper is to introduce a real-world challenge problem for researchers in multiagent systems and beyond, where our collective efforts may have a significant impact on activities in the real-world. The challenge is in applying game theory for security: Our goal is not only to introduce the problem, but also to provide exemplars of initial successes of deployed systems in this challenge problem arena, some key open research challenges and pointers to getting started in this research.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Computer Science Department, University of Southern California, Los Angeles, CA, 90089, USA

    Bo An & Milind Tambe

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  1. Bo An
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  2. Milind Tambe
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Editors and Affiliations

  1. Viale delle Scienze, ICAR-CNR, Ed. 11, 90128, Palermo, Italy

    Massimo Cossentino

  2. Departement of Knowledge Engineering, Maastricht University, Bouillonstraat 8-10, 6211, Maastricht, LH, The Netherlands

    Michael Kaisers

  3. Department of Knowledge Engineering, Maastricht University, Bouillonstraat 8-10, 6211, Maastricht, LH, The Netherlands

    Karl Tuyls  & Gerhard Weiss  & 

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© 2012 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg

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An, B., Tambe, M. (2012). Game Theory for Security: An Important Challenge for Multiagent Systems. In: Cossentino, M., Kaisers, M., Tuyls, K., Weiss, G. (eds) Multi-Agent Systems. EUMAS 2011. Lecture Notes in Computer Science(), vol 7541. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-34799-3_2

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-34799-3_2

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-642-34798-6

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-642-34799-3

  • eBook Packages: Computer ScienceComputer Science (R0)

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