Abstract
Relations between all constitutional and government organs must be moderated and evaluated depending on their way of decision making. Among their attributes one may find the right to veto. It is known already that a priori veto is rather strengthening the position of beholder. The evaluation of a power to make a decision is directly connected with a way of power measuring, i.e. with power index choice. In the paper we consider axiomatic base for such choice of an index of power evaluation.
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Mercik, J. (2012). On Axiomatization of Power Index of Veto. In: Nguyen, NT., Hoang, K., Jȩdrzejowicz, P. (eds) Computational Collective Intelligence. Technologies and Applications. ICCCI 2012. Lecture Notes in Computer Science(), vol 7654. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-34707-8_20
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-34707-8_20
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