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Boardroom Voting Scheme with Unconditionally Secret Ballots Based on DC-Net

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Abstract

A novel electronic voting scheme is proposed which is quite suitable for small scale election settings. An outstanding characteristic of the design is its guarantee of unconditionally perfect ballot secrecy. It satisfies self-tallying, fairness and verifiability. Disruption of the result of an election equals to breaking the Discrete Logarithm Problem. Our scheme is built on top of the DC-net(dining cryptographers network) anonymous broadcast protocol. It needs no trusted authority to guarantee its security, but assumes a complete network of secure private channels between voters.

This work was supported by National Natural Science Foundation of China under grant 61101142 and the Fundamental Research Funds for the Central Universities under grant K50510030012.

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Li, LH., Huang, CQ., Fu, SF. (2012). Boardroom Voting Scheme with Unconditionally Secret Ballots Based on DC-Net. In: Xu, L., Bertino, E., Mu, Y. (eds) Network and System Security. NSS 2012. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 7645. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-34601-9_17

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-34601-9_17

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