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Common Commercial Policy after Lisbon pp 19–28Cite as

(National) Constitutional Law Limitations on the Advancement of the EU’s Common Commercial Policy

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Part of the book series: European Yearbook of International Economic Law ((Spec. Issue))

Abstract

The relationship between the Common Commercial Policy (CCP) of the European Union (Art. 207 et seqq. TFEU) and German—or any national—constitutional law has rarely been addressed in the past. This could be the result of a perception that where the more ‘technical’ trade law and ‘political’ constitutional law were considered in tandem, what resulted was a collision of two worlds which prima facie shared little in common. Considered differently, the relationship between national and European constitutional law is also at play here, in so far as one can consider primary EU law as a form of constitutional law. Despite that the division of competences in the ‘European constitutional courts compound’ (Verfassungsgerichtsverbund) has not been definitively established, this relationship has been explored to the greatest extent in multiple judgments of the German Federal Constitutional Court (FCC), the Bundesverfassungsgericht, and the Court of Justice of the European Union (ECJ). Moreover the national constitutional aspects of the CCP did not normally feature significantly in the foundational judgments of the ECJ and the FCC. In this respect the Maastricht Judgment of the FFC had no impact on the CCP.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    Certainly examination of the economic constitution of the German Basic Law has focused primarily on the importance of the European Legal Framework, see for example Papier, Grundgesetz und Wirtschaftsverfassung, in: Benda/Maihofer/Vogel (eds.), Handbuch des Verfassungsrechts, 1995, 2. ed., § 14 para. 30; see also Badura, Wirtschaftsverfassung und Wirtschaftsverwaltung, 2008, 3. ed., p. 60.

  2. 2.

    See von Bogdandy, Founding Principles of EU Law: A Theoretical and Doctrinal Sketch, European Law Journal 16 (2010) 2, p. 95; von Bogdandy/Bast (eds.), Europäisches Verfassungsrecht, 2009, 2. ed.; Lenaerts/van Nuffel, Constitutional Law of the European Union, 2005; Terhechte, Der Vertrag von Lissabon: Grundlegende Verfassungsurkunde der Europäischen Rechtsgemeinschaft oder technischer Änderungsvertrag?, Europarecht (EuR) 43 (2008) 2, p. 143.

  3. 3.

    Voßkuhle, Der europäische Verfassungsgerichtsverbund, Neue Zeitschrift für Verwaltungsrecht (NVwZ) 29 (2010) 1, p. 1; see also Terhechte, Konstitutionalisierung und Normativität der europäischen Grundrechte, 2011, p. 77.

  4. 4.

    Federal Constitutional Court, 2 BvR 2134/92; 2 BvR 2159/92, BVerfGE 89, 155 (Maastricht).

  5. 5.

    Federal Constitutional Court, 2 BvE 2/08 et al., BVerfGE 123, 267 (Lissabon).

  6. 6.

    See Herrmann, Die Gemeinsame Handelspolitik der Europäischen Union im Lissabon-Urteil, in: Hatje/Terhechte (eds.), Grundgesetz und europäische Integration. Die Europäische Union nach dem Lissabon-Urteil des Bundesverfassungsgerichts, Europarecht (EuR) Special Issue 1/2010, p. 193; Raith, The Common Commercial Policy and the Lisbon Judgement of the German Constitutional Court of 30 June 2009, Zeitschrift für Europäische Studien (ZEuS) 12 (2009) 4, p. 613; Terhechte, Art. 351 TFEU, the Principle of Loyalty and the Future Role of Member States' Bilateral Investment Protection, in: Bungenberg/Griebel/Hindelang (eds.), International Investment Law and EU Law, 2 European Yearbook of International Economic Law, Special Issue 1, 2011, p. 79 (93); Nettesheim, Ein Individualrecht auf Staatlichkeit? Die Lissabon-Entscheidung des BVerfG, Neue Juristische Wochenschrift (NJW) 62 (2009) 39, p. 2867 (2867).

  7. 7.

    For additional analysis see e.g. Grimm, Defending Sovereign Statehood Against Transforming the Union Into a State, European Constitutional Law Review 5 (2009) 3, p. 353; Halberstam/Möllers, The German Constitutional Court says “Ja zu Deuschland!”, German Law Journal 10 (2009) 8, p. 1241; Thym, In the Name of Sovereign Statehood: A Critical Introduction to the Lisbon Judgement of the German Constitutional Court, Common Market Law Review 46 (2009) 6, p. 1795; Ziller, The German Constitutional Court’s Friendliness towards European Law – On the Judgement of Bundesverfassungsgericht over the Ratification on the Treaty of Lisbon, European Public Law Journal 16 (2010) 1, p. 53; see also Hatje/Terhechte (eds.), Grundgesetz und europäische Integration. Die Europäische Union nach dem Lissabon-Urteil des Bundesverfassungsgerichts, Europarecht (EuR) Special Issue 1/2010.

  8. 8.

    Federal Constitutional Court, 2 BvE 2/08 et al., BVerfGE 123, 267 (Lissabon), para. 406.

  9. 9.

    Federal Constitutional Court, 2 BvE 2/08 et al., BVerfGE 123, 267 (Lissabon), para. 406.

  10. 10.

    Federal Constitutional Court, 2 BvE 2/08 et al., BVerfGE 123, 267 (Lissabon), para. 406.

  11. 11.

    For more on the exclusive competence of the Union in the field of the Common Commercial Policy ECJ, Case 41/76, Donckerwolcke/Procureur, [1976] ECR, 1921, paras. 31, 37; see also Osteneck, Art. 207 AEUV, in: Schwarze (ed.), EU-Kommentar, 2012, 3. ed., para. 26; Nettesheim, Art. 3 AEUV, in: Grabitz/Hilf/Nettesheim (eds.), Das Recht der EU, loose-leaf, para. 19.

  12. 12.

    For deeper analysis see Nettesheim, Kompetenzen, in: von Bogdandy/Bast (eds.), Europäisches Verfassungsrecht, 2009, 2. ed., p. 389 (424 et seq.).

  13. 13.

    See Nettesheim, Art. 3 AEUV, in: Grabitz/Hilf/Nettesheim (eds.), Das Recht der EU, para. 9 et seq.

  14. 14.

    See Terhechte, Art. 24 EUV, in: Schwarze (ed.), EU-Kommentar, 2012, 3. ed., para. 2.

  15. 15.

    Federal Constitutional Court, 2 BvE 2/08 et al., BVerfGE 123, 267 (Lissabon), para. 406.

  16. 16.

    For more, see Bungenberg, Going Global? The EU Common Commercial Policy after Lisbon, in: Herrmann/Terhechte (eds.), 1 European Yearbook of International Economic Law, 2010, p. 123.

  17. 17.

    ECJ, Opinion 1/94, [1994] ECR I, 5267; see also Hilf, The ECJ’s Opinion 1/94 on the WTO – No Surprise, but Wise?, European Journal of International Law 6 (1995) 1, p. 245; further evaluation of this opinion can also be found in Hilpold, Die EU im GATT/WTO-System, 2009, 2. ed., p. 193 (esp. p. 206 et seq.).

  18. 18.

    See also Raith, The Common Commercial Policy and the Lisbon Judgement of the German Constitutional Court of 30 June 2009, Zeitschrift für Europäische Studien (ZeuS) 12 (2009) 4, p. 613 (614 et seq.); see in relation to the changes which the Treaty of Nice introduced in the field of the CCP Herrmann, Common Commercial Policy after Nice: Sisyphus would have done a better job, Common Market Law Review 39 (2002) 1, p. 7.

  19. 19.

    Federal Constitutional Court, 2 BvE 2/08 et al., BVerfGE 123, 267 (Lissabon), para. 418.

  20. 20.

    Federal Constitutional Court, 2 BvE 2/08 et al., BVerfGE 123, 267 (Lissabon), para. 418.

  21. 21.

    See also Tietje, Das Ende der parallelen Mitgliedschaft von EU und Mitgliedstaaten in der WTO?, in: Herrmann/Krenzler/Streinz (eds.), Die Außenwirtschaftspolitik der Europäischen Union nach dem Verfassungsvertrag, 2006, p. 161.

  22. 22.

    Federal Constitutional Court, 2 BvE 2/08 et al., BVerfGE 123, 267 (Lissabon), para. 418.

  23. 23.

    Federal Constitutional Court, 2 BvE 2/08 et al., BVerfGE 123, 267 (Lissabon), para. 418 et seq.

  24. 24.

    Federal Constitutional Court, 2 BvE 2/08 et al., BVerfGE 123, 267 (Lissabon), para. 420.

  25. 25.

    Art. 205 TFEU contains a cross reference of Art. 21 and 22 TEU, which provide the basis for the CFSP, and which are also of relevance to the CCP for more see Khan, Art. 205 AEUV, in: Geiger/Khan/Kotzur (eds.), EUV/AEUV Commentary, 2010, 5. ed., para. 3; Terhechte, Art. 205 AEUV, in: Schwarze (ed.), EU-Kommentar, 2012, 3. ed., para. 2 and 7.

  26. 26.

    Federal Constitutional Court, 2 BvE 2/08 et al., BVerfGE 123, 267 (Lissabon), para. 420; for more detail on the problems posed by ‘parallel Membership’ see Herrmann, Rechtsprobleme der parallelen Mitgliedschaft von Völkerrechtssubjekten in Internationalen Organisationen – Eine Untersuchung am Beispiel der Mitgliedschaft der EG in der WTO, in: Bauschke et al. (eds.), Pluralität des Rechts – Regulierung im Spannungsfeld der Rechtsebenen, 2003, p. 139.

  27. 27.

    See Eilmansberger, Bilateral Investment Treaties and EU Law, Common Market Law Review 46 (2009) 2, p. 383; Bungenberg, Going Global? The EU Common Commercial Policy after Lisbon, in: Herrmann/Terhechte (eds.), 1 European Yearbook of International European Law, 2010, p. 123 (135 et seq.); Tietje, Außenwirtschaftliche Dimensionen der europäischen Wirtschaftsverfassung, in: Fastenrath/Nowak (eds.), Der Lissabonner Reformvertrag – Änderungsimpulse in einzelnen Rechts- und Politikbereichen, 2009, p. 237; Griebel, Überlegungen zur Wahrnehmung der neuen EU-Kompetenz für ausländische Direktinvestitionen nach Inkrafttreten des Vertrags von Lissabon, Recht der Internationalen Wirtschaft (RIW) 55 (2009) 7, p. 469; Bungenberg, Außenbeziehungen und Außenhandelspolitik, in: Schwarze/Hatje (eds.), Der Reformvertrag von Lissabon, Europarecht (EuR) Special Issue 1/2009, p. 195 (202 et seq.); Streinz/Ohler/Herrmann, Der Vertrag von Lissabon zur Reform der EU, 2008, 2. ed., p. 126 (127 et seq.); Müller-Ibold, Handelsaspekte geistigen Eigentums sowie Investitionen, in: Herrmann/Krenzler/Streinz (eds.), Die Außenwirtschaftspolitik der Europäischen Union nach dem Verfassungsvertrag, 2006, p. 117 (126 et seq.).

  28. 28.

    Federal Constitutional Court, 2 BvE 2/08 et al., BVerfGE 123, 267 (Lissabon), para. 421.

  29. 29.

    Pars pro toto Herrmann, Die gemeinsame Handelspolitik der Europäischen Union im Lissabon-Urteil, in: Hatje/Terhechte (eds.), Europarecht (EuR), Special Issue 1/2010, p. 193 (204).

  30. 30.

    For deeper analysis see Herrmann, Die Zukunft der mitgliedstaatlichen Investitionspolitik nach dem Vertrag von Lissabon, EuZW 21 (2010) 6, p. 207; Terhechte, Art. 351 TFEU, the Principle of Loyalty and the Future Role of Member States' Bilateral Investment Protection, in: Bungenberg/Griebel/Hindelang (eds.), International Investment Law and EU Law, 2 European Yearbook of International Economic Law 2011, Special Issue 1, p. 79.

  31. 31.

    Federal Constitutional Court, 2 BvE 2/08 et al., BVerfGE 123, 267 (Lissabon), para. 421 et seq.

  32. 32.

    Herrmann, Die gemeinsame Handelspolitik der Europäischen Union im Lissabon-Urteil, in: Hatje/Terhechte (eds.), Europarecht (EuR) Special Issue 1/2010, p. 193 (204).

  33. 33.

    Federal Constitutional Court, 2 BvR 2661/06, BVerfGE 126, 286 (Honeywell).

  34. 34.

    Nettesheim, Ein Individualrecht auf Staatlichkeit? Die Lissabon-Entscheidung des BVerfG, Neue Juristische Wochenschrift (NJW) 62 (2009) 39, p. 2867 (2867); Terhechte, Dynamik, Souveränität und Integration – playing up the rules as we go along? – Anmerkungen zum Lissabon-Urteil des BVerfG, Europäische Zeitschrift für Wirtschaftsrecht (EuZW) 20 (2009) 20, p. 724 (725).

  35. 35.

    For more on this see Terhechte, Europäischer Bundesstaat, supranationale Gemeinschaft oder Vertragsunion souveräner Staaten? – Zum Verhältnis von Staat und Union nach dem Lissabon-Urteil des BVerfG, in: Hatje/Terhechte (eds.), Grundgesetz und europäische Integration, Europarecht (EuR) Special Issue 1/2010, p. 135.

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  1. Leuphana University Lüneburg, Scharnhorststraße 1, 21335, Lüneburg, Germany

    Jörg Philipp Terhechte

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  1. , Business Economics and Business Law, University of Siegen, Hölderlinstr. 3, Siegen, 57068, Germany

    Marc Bungenberg

  2. Chair for Constitutional and Administrat, European Law, European and, University of Passau, Innstraße 39, Passau, 94032, Germany

    Christoph Herrmann

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Terhechte, J.P. (2013). (National) Constitutional Law Limitations on the Advancement of the EU’s Common Commercial Policy. In: Bungenberg, M., Herrmann, C. (eds) Common Commercial Policy after Lisbon. European Yearbook of International Economic Law(). Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-34255-4_2

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