Skip to main content

A New Approach to Assessment of Confidence in Assurance Cases

  • Conference paper
Book cover Computer Safety, Reliability, and Security (SAFECOMP 2012)

Part of the book series: Lecture Notes in Computer Science ((LNPSE,volume 7613))

Included in the following conference series:

Abstract

An assurance case is a body of evidence organized into an argument demonstrating that some claims about a system hold. It is generally developed to support claims in areas such as safety, reliability, maintainability, human factors, security etc. Practically, both argument and evidence are imperfect, resulting in that we can hardly say the claim is one hundred percent true. So when we do decision-making against assurance cases, we need to know how much confidence we hold in the claims. And the quantitative confidence would provide benefits over the qualitative one. In this paper, an approach is proposed to assess the confidence in assurance cases (mainly arguments) quantitatively. First we convert Argument Metamodel based (ARM-based) cases into a set of Toulmin model instances; then we use Hitchcock’s evaluative criteria for solo-verb-reasoning to analyze and quantify the Toulmin model instances into Bayesian Belief Network (BBN); running the Bayesian Belief Network, we get quantified confidence from each claim of the assurance case. Finally, we illustrate our approach by using a simplified fragment from safety cases and discuss several future work.

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this chapter

Chapter
USD 29.95
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
eBook
USD 39.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
Softcover Book
USD 54.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Compact, lightweight edition
  • Dispatched in 3 to 5 business days
  • Free shipping worldwide - see info

Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout

Purchases are for personal use only

Institutional subscriptions

Preview

Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.

Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.

References

  1. Weinstock, C.B., Goodenough, J.B.: Towards an Assurance Case Practice for Medical Devices. CMU/SEI-2009-TN-018 (2009)

    Google Scholar 

  2. Yuan, T., Kelly, T.: Argument Schemes in Computer System Safety Engineering. Informal Logic 31(2), 89–109 (2011)

    Google Scholar 

  3. Goodenough, J.B., Weinstock, C.B., Klein, A.Z.: Assessing Confidence in an Assurance Case. CMU/SEI-2011-TR-Draft (2011)

    Google Scholar 

  4. Argumentation Metamodel (ARM). OMG Document Number: ptc/2010-08-36. Standard document (2010), http://www.omg.org/spec/ARM

  5. Toulmin, S.: The Uses of Argument. Cambridge University Press (1958)

    Google Scholar 

  6. Hitchcock, D.: Good Reasoning on the Toulmin Model. Argumentation 19(3), 373–391 (2005)

    Article  Google Scholar 

  7. ISO/IEC TR 15026-1:2010, Systems and Software Engineering - Systems and Software Assurance – Part 1: Concepts and Vocabulary (2010)

    Google Scholar 

  8. Bloomfield, R., Bishop, P.: Safety and Assurance Cases: Past, Present and Possible Future - an Adelard Perspective. In: Making Systems Safer, pp. 51–67 (2010)

    Google Scholar 

  9. Bloomfield, R., Littlewood, B., Wright, D.: Confidence: Its Role in Dependability Cases for Risk Assessment. In: International Conference on Dependable Systems and Networks, Edinburgh, pp. 338–346 (2007)

    Google Scholar 

  10. Bloomfield, R., Littlewood, B.: Multi-legged Arguments: the Impact of Diversity Upon Confidence in Dependability Arguments. In: International Conference on Dependable Systems and Networks (DSN 2003), pp. 25–34 (2003)

    Google Scholar 

  11. Littlewood, B., Wright, D.: The Use of Multilegged Arguments to Increase Confidence in Safety Claims for Software-based Systems: A Study Based on a BBN Analysis of an Idealized Example. IEEE Trans. Soft. Eng. 33(5), 347–365 (2007)

    Article  Google Scholar 

  12. Bishop, P., Bloomfield, R., Littlewood, B., Povyakalo, A., Wright, D.: Towards a Formalism for Conservative Claims about the Dependability of Software-based Systems. IEEE Trans. Soft. Eng. 37(5), 708–717 (2011)

    Article  Google Scholar 

  13. Denney, E., Pai, G., Habli, I.: Towards Measurement of Confidence in Safety Cases. In: 2011 International Symposium on Empirical Software Engineering and Measurement, pp. 380–383 (2011)

    Google Scholar 

  14. Bloomfield, R., Bishop, P., Jones, C., Froome, P.: ASCAD-Adelard Safety Case Development Manual. Adelard (1998) ISBN 0953377105

    Google Scholar 

  15. Kelly, T.: Arguing safety-a systematic approach to managing safety cases. York, University of York. PhD thesis (1998)

    Google Scholar 

  16. Górski, J.: Trust-IT - a Framework for Trust Cases. In: Workshop on Assurance Cases for Security - The Metrics Challenge, DSN 2007, Edinburgh, UK (2007)

    Google Scholar 

  17. Hawkins, R., Kelly, T., Knight, J., Graydon, P.: A New Approach to Creating Clear Safety Arguments. In: Safety Critical Systems Symp. (2011)

    Google Scholar 

  18. Leveson, N.: The Use of Safety Cases in Certification and Regulation. Journal of System Safety 47(6) (2011)

    Google Scholar 

  19. Hobbs, C., Lloyd, M.: The Application of Bayesian Belief Networks to Assurance Case Preparation. In: Achieving Systems Safety, pp. 159–176 (2012)

    Google Scholar 

  20. Sun, L., Zhang, W., Kelly, T.: Do Safety Cases Have a Role in Aerospace Certification? In: 2nd International Symposium on Aircraft Airworthiness, Beijing, China (2011)

    Google Scholar 

Download references

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

Authors

Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

Copyright information

© 2012 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg

About this paper

Cite this paper

Zhao, X., Zhang, D., Lu, M., Zeng, F. (2012). A New Approach to Assessment of Confidence in Assurance Cases. In: Ortmeier, F., Daniel, P. (eds) Computer Safety, Reliability, and Security. SAFECOMP 2012. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 7613. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-33675-1_7

Download citation

  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-33675-1_7

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-642-33674-4

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-642-33675-1

  • eBook Packages: Computer ScienceComputer Science (R0)

Publish with us

Policies and ethics