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International Conference on Interactive Theorem Proving

ITP 2012: Interactive Theorem Proving pp 11–27Cite as

Computer-Aided Cryptographic Proofs

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Part of the book series: Lecture Notes in Computer Science ((LNTCS,volume 7406))

Abstract

EasyCrypt is an automated tool that supports the machine-checked construction and verification of security proofs of cryptographic systems, and that has been used to verify emblematic examples of public-key encryption schemes, digital signature schemes, hash function designs, and block cipher modes of operation. The purpose of this paper is to motivate the role of computer-aided proofs in the broader context of provable security and to illustrate the workings of EasyCrypt through simple introductory examples.

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Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. IMDEA Software Institute, Spain

    Gilles Barthe, Juan Manuel Crespo & César Kunz

  2. Universidad Politécnica de Madrid, Spain

    Benjamin Grégoire

  3. INRIA Sophia Antipolis-Méditerranée, France

    César Kunz

  4. Microsoft Research, USA

    Santiago Zanella Béguelin

Authors
  1. Gilles Barthe
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  2. Juan Manuel Crespo
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  3. Benjamin Grégoire
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  4. César Kunz
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  5. Santiago Zanella Béguelin
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Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

  1. Department of Computer Science, Princeton University, 35 Olden Street, 08540, Princeton, NJ, USA

    Lennart Beringer

  2. School of Electrical Engineering and Computer Science, University of Ottawa, 800 King Edward Ave., K1N 6N5, Ottawa, ON, Canada

    Amy Felty

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© 2012 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg

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Barthe, G., Crespo, J.M., Grégoire, B., Kunz, C., Zanella Béguelin, S. (2012). Computer-Aided Cryptographic Proofs. In: Beringer, L., Felty, A. (eds) Interactive Theorem Proving. ITP 2012. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 7406. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-32347-8_2

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-32347-8_2

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-642-32346-1

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-642-32347-8

  • eBook Packages: Computer ScienceComputer Science (R0)

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